

## IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRANTS AND SOCIALISATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: patterns, problems and contradistinctions

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### Introduction

The purpose of comparative methodology is to identify common or different patterns of phenomena and their causal relationships, leading to a deeper understanding of political, social and economic phenomena at a *national* level. It is this philosophy which informs the conference, and should always be borne in mind.

My paper is in four thematic sections plus a conclusion: clearly, it is impossible to do any more than make broad brush strokes with this big comparative picture, but it should constitute a solid base for further discussion and research agendas. First, I examine available empirical data. How do southern European countries' experiences compare with:

- a) the 1960s immigration into northern Europe? [which has formed the plank of immigrant movements and immigrant integration in most northern European countries]?
- b) contemporary immigration into northern Europe?

The second and third themes are the economic and social locations of immigrants in southern Europe. Next, I focus on government policy and implementation, and the clear patterns in southern Europe. Finally, I will try to identify the common patterns, regional variants and some national idiosyncrasies across southern Europe; and to address the question: what can we learn from the northern European experiences?

### **A] characterisation of migration and migrants in southern vs northern Europe.**

There is an almost black and white contrast between immigration into northern Europe in the 1960s and immigration into southern Europe over the last 20 years – see Fig. 1. *This is important politically, because southern Europeans believe that they know about migration as former migrants of the 1960s: in fact, their experiences are almost worthless in understanding the contemporary immigration into southern Europe.*

In trying to compare the “traditional” Gastarbeiter migration of the 1960s with the southern European immigration today, three themes stand out: **diversity**, **illegality** and **extent**. Fig. 1 shows the much greater degrees of diversity and illegality of the contemporary immigration into southern Europe, alongside quite modest levels of immigration compared with the 1960s. Fig. 2 summarises the southern European features.

Figure 1

COMPARISON OF IMMIGRATION CHARACTERISTICS IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTHERN EUROPE AND NORTHERN EUROPE IN THE 1960s	
<b>SOUTHERN EUROPE</b> numerous diverse nationalities diverse educational levels general illegality [of entry, residence and/or work] employment recruitment by private illegal 'brokers' illegal trafficking by private agents high absorption by the informal economy bi/multi-lateral treaty for expulsion arrangements often no social and few legal rights	<b>NORTHERN EUROPE</b> specific [few] nationalities predominantly lower educational levels general legality [except in France] employment recruitment by state agencies  little trafficking Incorporation into formal economy bilateral treaty gives legal protection equality with nationals or specific legal base

SOURCE: Baldwin-Edwards, 1999

Figure 2

#### *Southern European Immigration Features*

**Diversity:** nationality, educational level, skills, gender, family status.

**Illegality:** usually legal entry [except Alb. and Mor.], illegal stay and work

**Extent:** very low in comparison with northern Europe, even including illegal estimates.

As far as the types of migration are concerned, there is little real data, as there has been minimal interest shown in such research by southern European governments. Reyneri (2002:19-21) suggests, on the basis of his EU funded 5-country comparative project, several types of migratory project<sup>1</sup>:

***Involuntary pendulum migration*** – mainly from Albania and North Africa, resembles rural-urban migrations but with the return movement effected by deportation! A variant exists of middle class youths looking for independence, who tend to fall into marginal or deviant labour markets.

***Family migratory project***. This is really the old-fashioned temporary and targeted migration, where the migrant's identity is closely linked to the country of origin and sending money back home for the family. The anticipated timeframe is 5-6 years; however, their illegal status and difficulty of regular return can change this into permanent settlement.<sup>2</sup> This is because the links with country of origin, including functional economic linkages, are subordinated to the immigration and labour market controls of the country of settlement – as opposed to a facilitation of frequent migratory movements, or voluntary pendulum migration.

<sup>1</sup> my own terminology is used here

<sup>2</sup> It should be recalled that the Gastarbeiter also tended to remain, even without that intention. I cite the above-mentioned reasons as additional to the previously observed mechanisms.

**Seasonal migration.** Concerns many North Africans and increasingly more men and women from Eastern Europe, in agriculture and construction work especially, also in domestic work and care for the elderly.

**Female migration** is a relatively new phenomenon for long-distance migration. Particularly practised by women from Philippines, Cape Verde, Latin America. Reyneri notes that although this migration often starts as temporary targeted, it can also be an individual choice with longer term implications – including psychological problems.

The crude data we do have are shown in Table 1, below:

Table 1  
*Total population, estimated immigrant stocks and work permits, 2000 [000s]*

	Total population (million)	With residence permit ('000)	Of which, EU nationals F	Illegal estimates	Total non-EU immigrants (minimum estimate)	Non-EU immigrants as % total population	Non-EU legal workers ('000)
Greece	10.3	309+148*	200	350–500	607	5.8	??
Italy	57.0	1,250	150	230–290	1,330	2.3	750
Spain	39.1	900	380	300–400	800	2.0	213
Portugal	10.0	190	50	100	240	2.4	92

Notes: \*granted temporary “Green Cards” in legalisation; F including ethnic Greeks with special status

Source: Baldwin-Edwards, 2002a

The northern European immigrant/population ratio is generally in the range 3-9%, with Switzerland at 19%. In southern Europe, Spain has the highest at 2.2% legal immigrants – but 40% of these are EU [mainly British]. Adjusting the data by removing those and inserting illegal estimates, it remains around 2%. Greece counted 800.000 in the 2001 Census, but this figure also includes EU, EFTA and ethnic Greeks. These number about 150-200,000, leaving 600-650,000 in the Census, which puts immigrants in Greece at 6-6.3% of 1991 population, or less than 6% of 2001 population, but only if we include illegal estimates. Evidence suggests that legal non-EU immigrants in Greece have never exceeded 200,000, i.e. 1.8% of population, whilst estimates of illegals [other than the Census] are non-scientifically based. *The southern European countries thus have very low levels of non-EU migrant stocks, including illegal estimates, compared with the North.*

What about migration characteristics into contemporary northern Europe? These show marked differences with southern Europe too, although a few points of similarity. Fig. 3 details the characteristics.

Figure 3

The New Migration into Northern Europe  
DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS

- 1) predominant legal form is **family reunion**
- 2) great extent of spontaneous **asylum seeking**
- 3) almost **zero recruitment of unskilled** and semi-skilled labour
- 4) limited, very selective, **recruitment of the highly skilled** [usually hi-tech]
- 5) mass illegal immigration [all skill levels]
- 6) high **student** flows [often remaining after study]
- 7) high **tourist** flows [with illegal work, overstay etc]
- 8) recent increases in **trafficking** and smuggling [lnked with sex industry and mafia]
- 9) extensive – often illegal or semi-legal – **pendular migration, frontier workers, seasonal workers** [highly variable and unknown length of stay]
- 10) increasing **diversity of countries of origin**, especially of asylum-seekers and illegal migrants

*Family reunification*

Some 40-50% of immigration into northern Europe consists of family reunion. In southern Europe, only Italy has been generous with this policy, constituting until recently about 25% of legal immigration flows. However, we should bear in mind two other factors: first, the requirement of legal residence is difficult to satisfy in southern Europe, along with very high demands such as “satisfactory” housing and income; second, the phase of migration in southern Europe – it is still early days, as some analysts argue.

*Asylum-seeking*

Asylum seeking is negligible in southern Europe. Application rates are low, and acceptance rates the lowest in the EU. Table 2 shows total asylum applications and recognitions, 1990-99 for EU countries; Table 3 gives asylum inflows, which although not adjusted for population size, are clearly low levels for southern European countries.

Table 2

**Asylum Applications, Recognitions and Principal Nationalities in the EU, 1990-99**

country	Asylum applications 1990-99 [000s]	Geneva Convn. recognition [%]	Total recog- nitions [%]	Principal nationalities			
Austria	129.7	12	13	Yugoslavia	Romania	Iraq	Iran
Belgium	180.4	25	25	Yugoslavia	Romania	Congo	India
Denmark	112.5	18	74	Afghanistan	Bosnia-H.	Iraq	Somalia
Finland	18.3	1	51	Yugoslavia	Somalia	Russia	
France	296.9	20	20	Turkey	Romania	Iran	Sri Lanka
Germany	1879.6	9	10	Yugoslavia	Romania	Turkey	
Greece	24.6	9	12	Iraq	Turkey	Albania	Iran
Ireland	18.4	15	18	Romania	Nigeria	Congo	Algeria
Italy	89.5	13	16	Albania	Yugoslavia	Iraq	Romania
Netherlands	321.5	15	39	Iraq	Somalia	Yugoslavia	Afghanistan
Portugal	5.6	5	12	Romania	[insignif]	[insignif]	[insignif]
Spain	83.6	6	8	Romania	Poland	Algeria	Liberia
Sweden	245.5	3	50	Yugoslavia	Bosnia-H.	Iraq	Somalia
UK	374.1	12	43	Yugoslavia	Somalia	Sri Lanka	
EU	3746.4	11	21	Yugoslavia	Romania	Turkey	Iraq

SOURCE: UNHCR (2000)

Table 3

*Inflows of asylum seekers, 1990-2000 [000s]*

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Austria	23	27	16	5	5	6	7	7	14	20	18
Belgium	13	15	18	27	15	12	12	12	22	36	43
Denmark	5	5	14	14	7	5	6	5	6	7	10
Finland	3	2	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	3
France	55	47	29	28	26	20	17	21	22	31	39
Germany	193	256	438	323	127	128	116	104	99	95	79
Greece	4	3	2	1	1	1	2	4	3	2	3
Italy	5	32	3	1	2	2	1	1	11	33	18
Nethlds	21	22	20	35	53	29	23	34	45	43	44
Spain	9	8	12	13	12	6	5	4	7	8	7
Sweden	30	27	84	38	19	9	6	10	13	11	16
UK	38	73	32	28	42	55	37	42	58	91	98

SOURCE: OECD (2001): Table A.1.3

### *Labour Recruitment*

Skilled recruitment is also negligible in southern Europe, whilst unskilled recruitment is low and highly bureaucratic.

The common patterns across North and South include mass illegal immigration, increasing number of source countries, the trafficking of migrants, and tourism with overstaying. However, whilst these are present across all of the EU, in southern Europe 80-90% immigrants are known to have entered without work permits and were subsequently legalised. *This is the normal mode of labour migration into southern Europe, and forms a stark contrast with family reunion and asylum-seekers in the North.*

### **B] Immigrants and the labour market**

I will do no more than summarise some complex analyses here. The principal function of immigrants in the southern European labour market seems to be to provide flexibility where the rigid legislation of over-protected employment impedes economic progress, while native workers refuse low-pay employment. This is a contrast with the northern European use of Gastarbeiter as labour supply for periods of excess labour demand, although there is more recent analysis [e.g. Castels et al., 1989] that advanced capitalism is utilising illegal labour for increased competitiveness. This latter point actually suggests, in a specific way, some convergence of labour markets in northern and southern Europe.<sup>3</sup>

For southern European labour markets [except Portugal], the following observations<sup>4</sup> apply:

- Very low native participation rates and high unemployment of native workforce
- General exclusion of women and young people from employment
- High job tenure but without career development and training [dead end jobs]

<sup>3</sup> See also IMF Reports on the world trend of growth in underground economies, a phenomenon particularly noticeable in northern Europe.

<sup>4</sup> For detailed explanation of these and related points, see Baldwin-Edwards (2002b)

- Mismatch of educational level with better employment

The role of immigrants in the economy can be summarised as the following:

- Compensating for insufficient labour supply [low participation rates, late labour market entry]
- Compensating for inflexible and over-regulated labour markets
- Propping up uncompetitive low-productivity sectors

It is also important to mention the size of the informal or “black” economy and the role of immigrants within this. Although it predated mass immigration, immigrants’ location in it was a crucial pull factor [additional to push factors such as collapsing Albania] ; the resulting immigrant employment created a structural issue for all southern European economies<sup>5</sup>. However, the employment of immigrants is almost completely complementary to the work sought by natives, at least until very recently.

Table 4  
Estimated underground economy as a percentage of GNP

	Average estimates		Range of estimates
UK	6.8	13.0	7-13
Germany	8.7	15.0	4-14
Netherlands	9.6	13.6	5-14
France	11.4	14.6	4-14
Spain	11.1	23.1	10-23
Italy	17.4	27.3	20-26
Greece	29.4	29.0	29-35

SOURCE: Reyneri, 2002

The effect of legalisation programmes is crucial in the management of this problem. Whereas much has been done in Italy, and a certain amount in Spain and Portugal, the analysis of this in Greece has been confined to data from the application process. The actual effect of the legalisations is unknown.

We know from the Italian studies that several effects can be expected (Reyneri, 1999, 2002):

- That legalised immigrants become unemployable and have to revert to illegality or to remigrate [eg to Northern Italy or another EU country]
- That the migrant has to accept bad and semi-legal work, eg working fulltime and being paid part-time
- That the applications were fake and the migrant remains in the black economy, perhaps even continuing to pay social insurance
- Complex arrangements with some legal and some illegal work

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<sup>5</sup> see Reyneri (2002) and Baldwin-Edwards (1999)

Furthermore, the rate of legalisation in Italy has been estimated at 20-60% for various programmes (Brucker *et al.*, 2001), and the renewal rate of legalised immigrants in both Spain for 1992 and Greece for 2001 is only around 50%.

*Thus, the comparison of immigrants and the labour market between North and South shows as much divergence as the characterisation of migrant types.*

### **C] The socialisation of migrants**

This area requires some definitional accuracy: do we mean the social acceptance of immigrants by a local community, or do we mean the beginnings of social integration into formal/legal structures. In the first case, there is some evidence that regional and city variations are so great that we cannot make generalisations, even within one country (Koff, 2002). There also appears to be some limited evidence that urban acceptance is harder to gain than rural, despite the greater tolerance of immigrants in urban centres. Finally, there is a general issue of public perception of illegal immigrants across southern Europe, their alleged criminality, and the alleged claim of labour market competition with natives (Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 2000; Baldwin-Edwards, 2001; Baldwin-Edwards, 2002b). These trends can however be linked with more general state failure in the management of economic and social issues, accompanied by a tendency to look for scapegoats, such as immigrants.

The second case, of integration into formal structures is rather more problematic. The effect of mass illegality has been to deny not only extended rights, but generally in southern Europe to deny even basic human rights to illegal immigrants. This is in contravention of international law and constitutional principles, and has been documented thoroughly in Greece and Spain by the Ombudsman's Offices. Thus, the incarceration rates of foreigners in the prison system are very high, often awaiting trial, for breach of immigration rules, or for minor misdemeanours. There is also extreme doubt about the acceptability of judicial procedures, legal representation etc across southern Europe (HRW, various reports; Baldwin-Edwards, 2001). For those migrants who have not fallen foul of the law, there is still the problem of acquiring or indeed enforcing rights, such as family reunion, the right to travel in Schengen, etc.

A more secure status, that of permanent resident, is generally available in advanced countries. Indeed, a whole literature has developed (e.g. Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996) claiming that international human rights law has so pervaded European and other advanced countries that formal citizenship is almost irrelevant. This hardly applies in southern Europe, if only because the theoretical long term residence permits are not awarded! There is also extreme doubt, at least in my mind, about the application of associated rights for the permit holders.

Table 5  
Criteria for Acquisition of Permanent Residence Status [all EU countries]

	Years reqd.	Permanent?	Work?	Soc. Assistance?	Lost if unemp?	Lost if absent?	% TNCs
A	5	Y	N	N	Y	N	45-55
B	5	Y	Y	Y	N	>1 year	
Dk	3	Y	Y	Y	N	>1	
Fi	2	Y	Y	Y	N	>2	
F	3, 5, 10	10 years	Y	Y	N	>3	65
G	8	Y	Y	Y	N	>6months	50
Gr	10	Y	Y	N	?	N	0
Irl	5/10	Y	N	Y	Y	18 months	
I	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
L	5	5 years	N	N	Y	6 months	
N	5	Y	Y	Y	N	9 months	50
P	6/10	Y	Y	Y	?	2 yrs	
Sp	5	Y	Y	Y	N	?	
Sw	4	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	
UK	4	Y	Y	Y	N	2	

SOURCE: Groenendijk and Guild, 2001 [updated]

As can be seen from Table 5, the range of years of residence required is 2-4 for Scandinavia, typically 5 for continental Europe, 8 for Germany and actually 10 for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. If we add to this, the fact that only legal residence counts, we can see that southern Europe is effectively preventing long-term residence permits from being awarded. There is also a question over whether such permits will be cancelled in the case of loss of employment in Gr and P – generally, it is not in the EU<sup>6</sup>.

In the longer term, access to citizenship across southern Europe has been made much more difficult since the mid-1990s (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997) and more recently in Greece, which has the highest nominal application fee for nationality in the EU – and it is outrageously high when adjusted for earnings potential.

Thus, there is little obvious comparability<sup>9</sup> with northern Europe in this area too.

### D – state policy

I intend to deal with this briefly, as it is not the principal focus of this paper and requires detailed and extensive analysis.<sup>7</sup> Looking at two main areas, immigration policy and rudimentary immigrant integration policy, several features stand out across southern Europe.

**Immigration:** policies [except in Greece]<sup>8</sup> have lurched back and forth incoherently, reflecting underlying ambiguities, confusion of policy objectives with policy mechanisms, and have also

<sup>6</sup> The EU Directive on “the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents” was finally approved on 25 November, 2003 and is awaiting publication in the Official Journal. This directive grants the right to an EU-regulated permit status after only 5 years’ residence; however, it allows governments two years to implement the policy.

<sup>7</sup> Comparative analyses of state policy in southern Europe can be found in Baldwin-Edwards (2002a) and a revised model, with more recent data, in Baldwin-Edwards (2004).



created new management problems not only of migration [e.g. trafficking] but also of international relations [e.g. Spain/Morocco].

Recent significant changes in immigration laws include the following:

**Portugal:** 2001 law with radical new policies, eg visa and continuous legalisations. Now abandoned, allegedly to conform to Schengen

**Spain:** Law 4/2000 effectively repealed by 8/2000 [which removed rights for illegal aliens]

**Italy:** 1998 law was impressive modernisation. 2002 law overturned almost all innovations and instituted repressive measures

**Greece:** 2001 law established new procedures for immigration, without any consideration of implementation or appropriateness. A 2002 amendment instituted a “rescue measure” to grant a stay of execution for migrants holding any sort of expired permit; some 2003 amendments make adjustments of a positive nature, without actually addressing the fundamental problems.

Now, all four countries have converged onto a ‘Greek style’ immigration management, which is essentially statist and control-oriented. Both Spain and Greece are under international attack [and also by their Ombudmen] for the arbitrary implementation of law, massive inconsistency and regional variation of treatment of migrants, and serious violations of international and human rights standards (HRW, v14/6; *et al...*)

**Integration policies:** very few exist, other than for privileged aliens [e.g. ethnic Greeks]. There are some superficial measures, largely for external EU appearances, but these are hardly relevant for migrants whose main two priorities are to obtain and keep employment whilst remaining legally on the territory. As noted above, in ‘socialisation of immigrants’, the structural difficulties are tremendous for migrant inclusion. Whilst overall social tolerance of migrants is quite high, the state structures tend toward exclusion. Citizenship and social integration are not seen as valid policy goals.

Some literature on social membership (eg Suarez-Navaz, 1997) emphasises the exclusionary nature of southern European societies [insider/outsider], whereby formal legal membership is not sufficient anyway. In this view of southern Europe, citizenship is not in itself a guarantee of full societal membership: thus, immigrants are closer to gypsies and other marginal indigenous groups in society. However, social acceptance of immigrants can be gained more easily within local (rural) communities, even whilst living illegally on the territory.

This pattern forms a stark contrast with the ‘social citizenship’ thesis of T. H. Marshall, which is frequently adduced to explain European welfare states’ emergence in the twentieth century. Marshall actually developed it by tracing the historical relationship between citizen and state in the UK, and accounting for the development of universal welfare rights based on citizenship which were embraced after World War II. Southern European states have no such conception

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<sup>8</sup> Greece has maintained a consistent policy of almost complete prohibition of legal immigration [other than ethnic Greeks] dating from 1929, through the exclusionary 1991 Law and culminating in the 2001 Law.

of citizenship, and, in a sense, are more inclined to emphasise citizens' duties rather than their rights.

#### *Where does policy come from?*

Recent theoretical literature (e.g. Pierson, 2000) emphasises historical continuity in this matter, thus the *state bureaucracy* and its "way of seeing things" shapes the laws and policies (Sciortino, 2000; Baldwin-Edwards, 2000). We can also add *structural imperatives*, such as Schengen and the EU (Lahav, 1997); *policy importation* – eg a superficial transposition of ideas from other countries, with no consideration of its effect (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000); *interministerial competition* – this has proven important in all southern countries, which have not established one overarching controlling ministry; *electoral gambits*, which look to immigration as a diversion from the issue of government failure; and blatantly uninformed opinion of leading politicians. The one policy input missing, is that of experts! Italy had such a committee, which led to the 1998 Law – widely held to be a considerable advance (e.g. Zincone, 1999). In Spain and Greece, attempts to establish such have been bogged down by clientelist behaviour and the dominance of patronage over expertise.

#### **Towards some conclusions...**

There are clear common patterns across southern Europe, although with regional variations. Southern Europe has experienced a common problem of new immigration, although it is at low levels in all but Greece [where the level is unknown but higher]. It has been almost exclusively [illegal] labour migration, although now is rapidly turning into family migration with or without family reunification measures. The major problems of northern Europe are almost unknown in southern Europe. Similarly, the problems of southern Europe are not well understood in the North, except perhaps by France – which has a long history of poor state management of migration and illegality. It is not clear how southern Europe fits into Schengen or the EU embryonic regime (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997): indeed, Spain and Greece were two of the countries blocking the family reunification proposals of the EU, as they had opposed granting rights to same-sex couples. More generally, the problems of immigration into southern Europe are linked with the following:

- Labour market failures
- Undercapitalisation and poor economic competitiveness
- Bureaucratic structures and mismanagement – statist and control oriented, without expertise
- The absence of social citizenship – a plank of northern European policy
- Aberrant political leadership, which is more anti-immigrant than the electorate
- Arbitrary and even illegal application of national and international law

It is difficult to see where northern Europe can offer lessons to the South, except maybe in certain technical facilities, such as statistical accuracy and bureaucratic management techniques. Perhaps the lessons are more negative ones, how *not* to do something... in that vein, we can turn to address the complexities of immigrant integration.

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