Islam in the Russian Federation and the post-Soviet Republics: a Historical Perspective (Part B)

Note: Photo of Mosque in Groznyy, capital of the Chechnya Autonomous Republic
Secular and religious ideologies are often quite copasetic. For instance, an individual can easily believe in Keynesian economics while also being a devoted Christian, reflecting Weber's insight into how religious and secular worldviews are often compatible and can borrow from one another to produce compatible systems of belief. This compatibility is the result of defining the domain of a secular ideology in such a way that it does not overlap and overlook a religious doctrine.

In fact, some historians hold that religion was most successful in Western Europe after religious and secular doctrines became the specialties of separate institutions. Peter Raedts persuasively argues that:

“A new era for Christianity in Europe began when after 1800 the churches gradually lost support of the state and had to organize themselves. And it was not until then that the new forms of mass media and the schooling of all the population made the Christianization of everyone a reality”.

Arrival of Soviet communism in the early twentieth century dramatically changed church-state relations within the territories which fell under its influence. Communism was unique because it was the first political ideology that was not only anti-clerical but also advocated a radical atheistic worldview. As explained by Isaiah Berlin:

“What in fact was created by Marx was a new ecumenical organization, a kind of anti-Church, with a full apparatus of concepts and categories, capable, at least in theory, of yielding clear and final answers to all possible questions, private and public, scientific and historical, moral and aesthetic, individual and institutional.”

As such, communist ideology could not accept the continued influence of religion even as an independent institutional entity. Lenin demanded that communist propaganda must employ militancy and irreconcilability towards all forms of idealism and religion. And that means that materialism organically reaches that consequence and perfection which in the language of philosophy is called “militant atheism”.

Militant atheism became central to the ideology of the Communist Party and a high priority in the policies of all Soviet leaders. In addition to answering the question of how society should be organized, communism advocated the destruction of all religion. Within the logic of militant atheism, convinced atheists were not only the most politically astute but also the most virtuous individuals.

As Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantil Lemercier-Quelquejay put it: “apart from a few peasant troubles of no great gravity in the Middle Volga River, in Azerbaijan and in

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1 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
2 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
Central Asia, the Muslim masses did not rise up in defense of their faith”. The absence of Islamic Jihad suggests that Soviet Muslims were unwilling to fight for the political ideals of their religion. In actuality, Soviet Muslims did fight for their ideals - but as with all religions, the ideals of Islam are more complex than any Western popular image of war-mongering Soviet Muslims suggest.

While the Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia experienced a reduction from 78 percent Muslim in 1926 to 55 percent in 1965, this decrease reflects the number of Russians and other Eastern Europeans, who were moved into the various Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics to farm, work in and manage factories, and administer public offices and schools. Nevertheless, the number of Muslims in Central Asia grew from around 10.5 million to 16 million over forty years.

Carl L. Brown points out a key difference between Christianity and Islam: “In Islam, unlike Christianity, there is no tradition of a separation of church and state. . . One simple reason for this difference between Islam and Christianity is that Islam knows of no church in the sense of a corporate body whose leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical, and distinct from the state”.

Early Christianity grew into an extensive network of religious communities which were later embraced by the Roman Empire. Since the initial rise of Christianity, Christian institutions were independent of state government, producing a church-state relationship in which religious and political spheres were autonomous even while becoming mutually dependent and functional.

The medieval church-state arrangement and the modern idea of a secular state that is religiously neutral were not the results of working compromises. The more reasonable

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3 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
union the partisans of Pope and Emperor, just as the later the more reasonable Catholics and Protestants, seeing that doctrinal purity and logical consistency spelled continued strife, settled for a nebulous but manageable middle ground between the extremes.

Doctrinal competition between Christianity and European rulers’ claims to legitimacy were sufficiently resolved through an understanding of separate yet symbiotic spheres of influence. This relationship was also theologically justified within Christian scripture, often referred to as “the doctrine of two swords”. As the Apostle Paul explains in Romans:

“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore, be who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of him who is an authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God’s servant for your good”.

“But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain; lie is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid God’s wrath but also for the sake of conscience. For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God attending to this very thing. Pay all of them their dues, taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is due, loyalty to whom loyalty is due, honor to whom honor is due”.

The religio-political project of the Prophet and early Imams was replaced, among Sunnis and Imami Shi’ites, by political quietism. Consequently, ulama’s often deferred new and pressing political decisions to ruling Sultans and Viziers, leading to a "political quietism" amongst Islamic clerics. In fact, “On balance, the weight of Muslim tradition was on the side of political submission. . . . Caliph Umar, often singled out in the hadith literature as the epitome of early Arab boldness, is related to have admonished, “If he (the ruler) oppresses you, be patient; if he dispossesses you, be patient.” There are also numerous hadiths of this sort attributed to Muhammad”.

In turn, Islamic syncretism can take multiple forms although it also draws on the early Islamic community for legitimacy. “Indeed, observers of Muslim political thought in modern times have often noted, sometimes with patronizing sympathy, sometimes with superciliousness and sometimes with sanctity, that those Muslims who seek democracy argue that Muhammad was the first democrat and the early Muslim communists was the first democracy, those advancing socialism depict Muhammad as the first socialist and the early community as the (first socialist state, and so on as political styles change. Even certain

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4 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
5 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
Muslim communists went so far as to that Muhammad and the early community prefigured the idealized communist society.”

Leading historical scholars on Islam in the Soviet Union, Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelqnejay, summarize the characteristics of this group as follows:

“They were, generally speaking, sincere Marxists who, to begin with, accepted without reservation the programme of the Bolshevik Communist Party but remained nonetheless deeply imhued with the nationalist ideal. . . . Within Marxist doctrine, they took their pick of ideas and methods, selecting those that were in keeping with their particular need; that is to say, those which could substantiate their case for a more radical struggle with the West and an acceleration of the pace of reform in Muslim society. . . . The Moscow government gave them its blessing, regarding them as a necessary ‘buffer’ between central power and the native population, and hoping that it would be able, in the long term, to re-educate and re-train them.”

Sultan Galiev was the intellectual leader of the national communists and the highest-ranking Muslim in the Bolshevik Communist Party between 1920 and 1923. As a leading advisor to Stalin, Galiev argued that in Islamic regions “we need to say openly, to whom it is appropriate, that we are in no way fighting against any religion, we are only conducting propaganda for our atheist convictions, exercising our right to do so”. But in addition to advocating religions tolerance, Galiev made a more dangerous political move in advocating an independent communist state in Central Asia.

In 1918, Galiev wrote that “we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist movement that shall be our own and autonomous”. This placed Soviets in a difficult position; a grassroots communist movement was occurring within Central Asia but was taking on a nationalist and Islamic spirit referred to as “Sultan Galiyeism”. In Central Asia, Caliyes was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude; he was eventually executed in 1940. And between 1927 and the 1939, supporters of Galiyev and his brand of Marxism were purged from the Bolshevik Communist Party.

By killing off many leading Muslims communists, Stalin created a political dilemma. Replacing Muslim communist leaders with Russian communists would insure that Islamic nationalism would not impact communist ideology in Central Asia, but loyal Russian communists were urgently needed in the newly formed Russian Republic and few had knowledge of the Islamic society the would be asked to rule.

Nevertheless, many elite positions in Central Asia were given to Russians. But Muslim communists were still needed to advise these leaders and often held leadership positions themselves. The Board of Muslims was created for the education of Russian communists concerning Islamic society and many Communist Party members in Central Asia

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6 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
7 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
were self-identified Muslims: in 1918, one-half of the Communist Party of Turkestan was Muslim and in 1924, the Bukhara Communist Party was 70 percent Muslim. Under these circumstances, Soviet elites had to come to terms with the fact that Muslim communists were a reality that could not be wholly eliminated.

In 1942, the Central Muslim Religious Board sent Stalin the following salutation: “hearty greetings in the name of Muslims of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to you . . . champion of the liberation of oppressed peoples and a man ever attentive to the need of the peoples . . . May Allah help you bring your work to a victorious end”. As this message demonstrates, representatives of official Islam showed respect and allegiance to the Soviet Government while also explicitly establishing the importance of their religious identity and the purpose of the communist project in relation to a higher power. The message clearly suggests that Stalin would not accomplish his goals without the assistance of Allah.8

Therefore, Islamic nationalism did not automatically find itself opposed to communist interests. In contrast, nationalism throughout Eastern Europe was at odds with the communist agenda from the beginning and developed into the main expression of anti-communist convictions. This is mainly due to the fact that Eastern Europe was more industrialized than Central Asia; consequently, communists sought different goals in these regions.

Eastern European communists wanted to unite the proletariat of all countries and shift the control of industry into the hands of its workers. But Central Asia had no industry to speak of and Muslim communists hoped to industrialize their regions in order to catch up to their western counterparts. The act of modernizing Islamic society was closely linked to its empowerment in the world economy and therefore communism became an unintended eman to realize this pre-existing nationalist goal. In fact, many high-ranking Central Asian communist officials saw no contradiction between Islam and Communism.

In line with Muslim nationalist goals, Soviets offered something which had not previously been available to Muslims - free public education on a massive scale. At the end of the Tsarist regime less than three thousand Muslim children attended public school, but the Soviets prioritized the educational system to the extent that in 1921 over 84,000 Muslim children were enrolled in state public schools. In time, all Muslim children attended free Soviet schools and by most accounts received instruction similar to that of more modernized regions of the Soviet Union.

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8 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
By 1965, the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics had at least eight times more per capita output of electricity than Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey. In addition, the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics had substantially more tractors, doctors, and newspapers in circulation per capita than Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey combined. Finally, nearly 90 percent of the Soviet Central Asians could read by 1965 while only 30 percent or less of Iranians, Pakistanis, or Turks were literate in 1964.⁹

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⁹ “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
The Muslim population became more technologically advanced and urbanized to the extent that they began to fill elite roles within the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics. This is evidenced by a study of technological and scientific workers in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan between 1960 and 1975. The percent of doctors in science, doctoral candidates in science, and scientific elites who are Uzbek dramatically increased within the fifteen-year period of the study. While only 35 percent of all doctors of science were Uzbek in 1960, 60 percent are Uzbek in 1975. In turn, the percentage of scientists in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan who were Russian was shrinking.¹⁰

¹⁰"I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition", Paul Froese, University of Harvard
In 1929, the Soviet Union passed the Law on Religious Associations which outlined how state officials were to monitor and control all religious groups. In Central Asia, communists dissolved all Islamic courts; these courts oversaw criminal justice by upholding both customary law ("adat") and Koranic law (Sharia’h). Bennigsen and Leniercier-Quelquejay point out that this assault was relatively easy because it was supported by Muslim elites who viewed the Soviet reform as "merely one more engagement in the long war of Jadids to modernize the juridical structure of Islam." ¹¹

In this case, the communist anti-Islamic policy realized what some Islamic nationalists had hoped to accomplish as long ago as the early 19th century. While the loss of Islamic courts was clearly not supported by all Muslims, it is important to note that some

¹¹“I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
Islamic thinkers saw communism as a means to settle centuries-long conflicts within the ravaged Muslim community.

As one Muslim scholar noted, Islam can justify even “the rule of a usurper as a means of assuring the public order and the unity of all Mushms”. By the mid-decade of 1920 Islamic courts ceased to have any official impact in criminal cases or civil suits and Soviets had established communist state courts throughout Central Asia. A record of functioning Islamic courts in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan from 1922 to 1927 shows the rapid elimination of Sharia’h courts.

In turn, Islamic studies were no longer an element in the edification of Muslim youth, a deficiency which would have powerful implications for the practice of the Islamic religion throughout Central Asia. For instance, Soviet schools reformed the instruction of indigenous languages and “through the so-called language and alphabet reforms, Central Asian youths were denied access to the very rich Islamic religious literary traditions written in the Arabic alphabet”. Approximately eight thousand Islamic primary and secondary schools were in operation in Central Asia before the Russian Revolution; by 1928, none remained.12

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12 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
In 1917, there were 20,000 mosques in Central Asia, but by 1929 fewer than 4,000 were functioning and by 1935 there were only 60 registered mosques in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan (the largest of the Asian Soviet Socialist Republics with over half of the Muslim population of Central Asia). Without clerical property (waqf), imams and mullahs were unable to financially support themselves and the number of official clergy dropped dramatically to the point where many regions were without any registered imams, sheiks, mullahs or ayatollahs.

Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quekquejay explain: “The Soviet regime struck heavily at the large joint family, causing it to lose all economic significance. In spite of that, this type of family survived . . . in a modified form but still preserving its traditional characteristics in the formerly nomad districts. Here the large joint family persists more as an ethical than as a functional unit, in the sense that a number of customs survive despite prohibitions; but these are nevertheless gradually disappearing”.

The 1959 Soviet census shows that the percent of inter-faith marriages (which they call mixed marriages) in Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics was quite high, between 14 to 18 percent of the population in urban centers. The number of inter-faith marriages indicates that local Islamic customs were commonly broken by the decade of 1950 and the traditional Islamic family system was in crisis.

| Table 4: Percent of Interfaith or “Mixed” Marriages in 1959. |
|-----------------|-------|-------|
|                 | Total | Urban | Rural |
| Kazakstan       | 15    | 18    | 12    |
| Uzbekistan      | 8     | 15    | 5     |
| Kyrgyzstan      | 12    | 18    | 9     |
| Tajikistan      | 9     | 17    | 6     |
| Turkmenistan    | 9     | 14    | 3     |

Source: Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quekquejay (1967:194)

13 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
In fact, leadership roles based on clan hierarchical systems tended to reproduce themselves within the Communist Party. The tendency for kinsbip to permeate Soviet institutions was not confined to the local level but appeared at the highest tiers of authority such that the tribal structure has in some bizarre fashion fused with the party structure to form a single indissoluble whole.

As Bennigsen and Leniercier-Quelquejay explain: “Dar el Harb, faith without religious observance, is perfectly possible and even common, and that Islam, like Judaism, is a religion where the part played by spiritual leaders and religious institutions is only secondary, and therefore it is better able than Christianity to resist outside pressure”.

Mehrdad Haghayghi explains: “Several Hanafi principles have been instrumental in providing a flexible framework for the practice of Islam, hence offering more freedom to the Central Asian believer. First, and perhaps the most critical aspect, is the qualitative distinction that has been made between faith (“iman”), and work or practice (“amal”). The Hanafis argue that if a Muslim whole-heartedly believes in God and the prophethood of Muhammad, but is negligent in performing his religious duties, he is not an infidel”.

Of course, further closures of mosques and madrassas occurred after 1936; the most drastic assault happened under Nikita Krushchv when 3,567 mosques and 21 madrassas (mostly unregistered) were closed between 1961 and 1963 in the Soviet Socialist Republic of

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14 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
Uzbekistan alone. Therefore, one can assume that many Muslim communities went without mosques or houses of prayer during the communist era.

Nevertheless, Poliakov argues that these untrained clergy served Islam very well on the daily level, because they knew very well what their people needed. While it seems possible that the spiritual needs of Muslims were being served on some level, the Islamic character of this spiritualism is unclear. In an ironic twist, the League of Militant Atheists in Tashkent actually wanted to translate the Koran into the Uzbek language so that more Muslims would know the Koran so that they could subsequently be shown its fallacies.

Walter Kolarz's summation of the study of Islam under communism illustrates this point: “If one glances back over the many years during which the Soviet communists have fought Islam one easily discovers that much of the fight has been concentrated on the secondary aspects of the Moslem religion; the veil of the Moslem women; the pilgrimage to a sacred tomb, often of doubtful historicity; the wasteful ways in which Moslem feasts are celebrated; circumcision often carried out in unhygienic conditions. . . . [But] Communism is not concerned with the abolition of certain practices but with the extermination of religion itself. . . . The real target is the central idea, concept and message of the Koran and Hadiths, that there is one God.”

First, atheist proselytizers encountered something new in the recruitment of Muslim people -they were accustomed to attempts of Christian missionaries to convert them to a new faith. In Eastern Europe, Roman Catholics and Orthodox believers had never really

**TABLE 6: ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS (1936 SURVEY)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered clergy</th>
<th>Unregistered imams</th>
<th>Unregistered ishans</th>
<th>Unregistered mullahs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totaled Raion Records (Rural Districts)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totaled City Records</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Keller (2001a:230)

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15 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
encountered active attempts to convert them to a different faith. These churches enjoyed a
monopoly influence over their populations and were assisted by the state in dispelling
religious competitors and protecting the believers.

While Islam was certainly a majority religion in Central Asia, Muslims had
encountered Russian missionaries and were familiar with their tactics. The head of the League
of Militant Atheists, Emelian Yaroslavsky was aware of this phenomenon and saw it as a
potential problem for atheist recruitment. Yaroslavsky warned atheists in Central Asia that:

“A careless approach to the matter of anti-religious propaganda among these people
can ail up memories of this [Tsarist] oppression and be interpreted by the most backward and
the most fanatical part of the Muslim population as a repeat of the past, when Christian
missionaries reviled the Mohammedan faith”.

Second, Mushms were not willing to disown their religious members for publicly
advocating atheism. As one committed Kazakh communist explained, “I am an atheist but
also a Mushm, because all Kazakhs are Muslims and I cannot deny my forefathers”.
Consequently, the League of Militant Atheists faced an opponent that refused to fight with
Muslims willing to accept atheism but unwilling to attack Islam.

In fact, the phenomenon of the non-believing Muslim is reported to be widespread in
Soviet publications. But this phenomenon is difficult to explain. It is not clear that Muslims
were as much non-believers as they were willing to reconcile the doctrine of atheist
communism with the idea of Islam. Uzbek scholar, Tolib Saidbayev, argues that under
communism Mushms lived in two dimensions:

“In the one dimension relating to the public sphere, Central Asians were thoroughly
Sovietized in their attitudes, values and loyalties; in the other dimension, relating to the
private sphere, they retained a largely traditional outlook, their world shaped by customs and
preconceptions that were rooted in Islamic practice”.16

16 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competition”, Paul
Froese, University of Harvard
These two dimensions are most easily observed in the interaction between Muslims and the Communist Party. Communist Party members throughout the Soviet Union necessarily disavowed their religious memberships or beliefs or, at the very least, kept them hidden. But Communist Party members throughout Central Asia were self-proclaimed Muslims. Various reports from inside the Soviet Union document this exception to normal Communist Party practice in the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia.

In 1918, approximately on-half of the Communist Party members in Turkestan (a single united Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republic at that time) were self-proclaimed Muslims and in 1924 the Bukhara Communist Party reported that 70 percent of its members were Muslims. In 1965, an investigation into mosque attendance in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan revealed that every tenth participant was a member of the Komsomol. And in 1985, a Soviet study reported that 14 percent of the Uzbek Communist Party and 56 percent of the Tajikistan Communist Party were active Muslims, implying that they were believing Muslims.\footnote{\textquoteleft{\textquoteleft I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion\textquoteright\textquoteright, Paul Froese, University of Harvard}

Due to the theology of Islam, covert religious practice or even a lack of religious practice is acceptable as long as the individual privately believes in Allah. \textquoteleft{\textquoteleft In Islam, the
means of crossing the boundary from non-Islam to Islam is relatively straight-forward: through the “shahada” or the profession of faith that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Cod. This first pillar of the Islamic faith is the moral equivalent of a public declaration delimiting the borders of one’s mind”.

Overall, Islam was less competitive than Christianity with Communism; in other words, it more easily reconciled itself to the religious and political demands of Communism. Without active competition between the doctrines of Islam and Communism, religious and anti-religious fervor was less apparent throughout Central Asia. Many Muslims dispassionately admitted to being atheists and many Communist Party members openly retained their Muslim identity.

This produced an ideological landscape with no clear victors. Soviet atheists were unable to disrupt stron ties to Islam even amongst leading communists in Central Asia. And while Muslin identity resolutely persisted throughout the communist era, Islam entered a long “jahiliyija” -the Muslim term for an era of religious ignorance. Decades of covert Islamic activity led to a re-emergence of pre-Islamic symbols and spiritual beliefs as untrained clergy improvise from a limited knowledge of their religious heritage.

In many ways unofficial Islam resembled indigenous folk religions and the Islamic scholar Sharin Akiner even asserts that during Soviet rule “scarcely anybody, other than the ulama, the sheiks and religious trainees, knew even the basic Muslim attestation of faith: “There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet”. In the end, the Soviet era produced an unusual mix of estranged Muslims and religious communists woven into an ideological braid which, years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is still in the process of unraveling its secrets.

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18 “I am an Atheist and Muslim: Islam, Communism and Ideological Competetion”, Paul Froese, University of Harvard
A. Wars of Muslims in the former Soviet Union

A.1. Caucasus Mountains

After the liberalisation of religious policy under Gorbachov at the end of the decade of 1980 a number of mosques were built and re-opened, even in the Russian Federation. On 1st January 1991 there were 870 registered mosques (and a total of 1,602 in the Soviet Union). The largest numbers were found in the autonomous republics of Daghestan (240), Chechen-Ingushetia (162) Tatarstan (91) and Bashkortostan (65).

And in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya itself, neither a religious nor an ethnic “nation” had come together behind the figure of Dudaev; if he had become the embodiment of national integration this was due to Moscow’s reaction to the breakaway republic. Dudaev tried to base his politics on Islamic sentiment and to blend religion with nationalism, for example in his 1993 attempt to introduce Islamic legal norms into the new constitution.

But not only did parliament stress that the March 1992 constitution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was a secular one, Chechnya’s official Islam leaders also took up a moderate position. In September 1994 the “Muftiat” issued a “fatwa” forbidding Chechens to use weapons in political disagreements. In January 1994, Islamic religious dignitaries from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria had met with the Russian Prime Minister to discuss a peaceful means of resolving the conflict.19

The official clergy opposed Dudaev’s domestic and foreign policy. An independent Chechen Muftiat had been formed in 1991. On October 14th, 1991, a Council of Imams elected a new mufti and founded under his leadership an Independent Religious Authority of the Muslims of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The muftiat clergy criticised the economic slowdown and decline in the rule of law under the Dudaev regime, while the regime set up its own Islamic authorities.

On Dudaev’s side and supporting the radical national movement were Islamic parties such as the “Muslim Brothers” (the first branch of the Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood” in the Soviet Union, founded in Grozny in the summer of 1992), the “Islamic Cultural Centre of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” and the “Islamic Path” party. This “Islamic Path” party was one of the protagonists of the “Chechen revolution” of 1991. It was founded in 1990 by Beslan Gantemirov, a comrade-in-arms and later an opponent of Dudaev, and at the beginning of the secession provided the core unit of the “National Guard”, but had only limited influence among the population.20

20 “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, August 2004
The national branch of the union-wide “Islamic Cultural Centre of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”, founded in December 1990, was also not particularly successful and fall into diseatude after the secession from the Russian Federation. The main ideological support for Dudaev’s planned secession from Moscow was provided not by an Islamic religious party but by a secular nationalist party, the “Vainakh Democratic Party” under the leadership of Zelimkhan Yandarbiev.

The Chechen Revolution was supported by elements of the lower clergy, imams from the village mosques and murid activists, particularly members of the Kunta-Hadji order and the so-called “dhikr followers” (Russian zikristy). Dudaev used the influence of this particularly active branch of the order from the Qadiri brotherhood. One of its ustazy (religious leaders) was his eldest brother Bekmurza Dudaev. Geographically, the strongest support for Dudaev was in the south of the republic, in so-called “Ichkeria”, where the Kunta-Hadji order was dominant.21

In the 19th century the Naqshbandi brotherhoods preferred to support the Islamic Jihad, while the Kunta-Hadji clergy, who came from the Qadiri tradition, were in favour of making peace with the Russian Empire, but today their positions have been reversed. The Naqshbandi followers, predominantly found in the North of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, tended to oppose the confrontation advocated by Dudaev, and in contrast both the Qadiri branches and the Kunta-Hadji orders supported the secessionist regime, which was increasingly looking for support in the mountainous Southern regions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In the Oblast of Daghestan the Islamic scholars were highly influential and had a great deal of contact with the Arabic world, deep into Southern Arabia. Before the Octobrian Revolution of 1917 there were some 2,000 religious schools here with 40,000 pupils studying Arabic language, literature and theology. In the early Soviet era there were more than 2,500 mosques. Thousands of Islamic scholars, known popularly as “Arabists”, formed a broad and well-educated class (5 percent of the population in 1917).22

In the small Autonomus Republic of Daghestan alone there are five Islamic institutes: one in Machačkala, Gergebil and Kizlyar and two in the city of Buynaksk, which has become the North Caucasus Mountains centre of Islamic education. Since the autumn of 1992 the Islamic religion is also taught at the secondary level in state schools. Almost all of the local parties which stood in the Russian parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1995 made Islam an election issue, and there was even discussion over whether it should be made the state religion and whether teaching the Koran in schools should be made compulsory.

During the Soviet era the Avars, Kumyk and Dargins held on more tightly than other ethnic groups to the Arabic tradition and popular Islam, with its substitutes for the forbidden

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21 “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, August 2004
pilgrimage to Mecca (the tradition of the ziyarat, a pilgrimage to various local shrines). Islamic revivalist movements sprang up as early as the decade of 1970 in these areas, where under Khrushchev 200,000 Muslims from the Avar-Dargin highlands had been forcibly resettled. It was particularly in these forced resettlements that a renaissance of Muridism occurred, resulting in an extremely sharp response from the Soviet authorities.

There is an interesting parallel here to a similar process in Tadjikistan. The Soviets had been implementing a policy of “national consolidation” and had encouraged the assimilation of small ethnic groups into the Autonomous Republic of Daghestan’s larger ethnic groups. This meant that the small ethnic groups of mountain peoples were divided up into a series of larger ethnic groups, between which there was a struggle to gain representation in the local power structures.

In 1997 a book by a Daghestani author, Magomed Tagaev, entitled “Our Struggle or the Army of Insurrection of the Imam”, which was published in Kiev, provoked heated debates in Russian specialist circles. It described insurrection scenarios of Pan-Caucasian and Pan-Islamic dimension based on Islam; and these scenarios seemed to become true when local Wahhabites took control of some villages in the Buynaksk District of the Autonomous Republic of Daghestan and put them under Sharia-Law, and when the already mentioned movements for a unification of the Autonomous Republics of Chechnya and Daghestan, like the Congress of the peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan promoted the idea of an Islamic motivated elimination of Russian dominance in the Caucasus Mountains. The decisive event in that context was the incursion by groups of "boeviki" (fighters) from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to the Western part of Daghestan under the command of Chechen field commanders in August 1999.23

The North Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia have inaugurated the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan of the Volga River, but have also introduced the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula. The Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanist Movements have inspired the Trans-Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan and have influenced the Autonomous Republics of Dagestan and Chechnya, which were intimated into the Muslim Jihad by the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran but also the Arab Republic of Egypt.

However, the Muslims of the North Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia were not expounded the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanist Movements and were not enlightened about the Neo-Jaddist Movements of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan of the Volga River. The Muslims of the Muslims of the North Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia did not espouse the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and did not endorse on the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; therefore, the Muslims of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Socialist Republics excommunicated the Muslim Muslims.

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Jihad and exonerated Kremlin as far as the malcontent and the malice of Islam and Prophet Muhammad is concerned.

**Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region**

Map 1: Ethno-linguistic Groups in the Caucasus

The Muslims of Central Asia and the North Caucasus Mountains that indulged in Muslim Jihad idealized the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and immortalized the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; they importuned the Global Islamic League for the inculcation of the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria.
(Chechnya) and the Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan among Muslims and implored the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States to imperil the Russian Federation and the ex-Soviet Socialist Republics.

Due to the fact that the majority of Muslims impugned the influence of the Global Islamic League and ingratiated the Islamic Relief to indemnify the Muslims of the conflicts and confrontations in Central Asia and the North Caucasus Mountains; they also interceded with the Russian Federation to intercept the Muslim Jihadists. The Russian Motherland was not insinuated by the Muslim Jihad as the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States had invested on the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) to ingest.

The minority of Muslims that was not impeded by Kremlin to impose the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) and the Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan fomented military corporations such as the “Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade” and the “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment” and fostered military components such as the “Riyadus-Salikhin (Garden of Martyrs) Reconnaissance” and ‘Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs”; in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan flourishes the “Sharia Jama’at” and in Kabardino-Balkaria foments the “Yarmukh Battalion”.24

Moreover, the minority of Muslims that endorsed the Hanafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and espoused the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula were enervated by the ex-Soviet Socialist Republics which eradicated the Muslim Jihad and were emasculated by the Russian Federation which eliminated the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanist Movements; the Islamic Revolution of Ruhollah Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran was not emulated and the majority of Muslims expostulated them against the Neo-Jaddist Movements of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan of the Volga River.

On the other hand, the Indo-Iranian Tajiks in Central Asia were endowed with armament and advisers from the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Caucasian Chechens were endued with armament and administrators from the Republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan; the enemies of the Russian Federation were embroiled in the confrontation and entangled in the conflict. Nevertheless, Kremlin abjured the Muslims’ aspersion to coalesce and confederate with the Muslim Jihadis and adjured the Moslems’ abnegation to collaborate with the “Muslim Terrorists”.

The Riyadus-Salikhin Islamic Group was absent till it appeared in the capture and consolidation of the Moscow Theatre in 2002. Alongside Shamîl Basaev, the Chechen Field Commander of the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria, appeared Samer Bin Saleh Bin Abdullah Al-Swelim (“nom de guerre”=Amir Khattab), an Saudi Arab who was active in the Civil Wars in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Amir Khattab connected the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria with Al Qaeda and contracted it with the Islamic Benevolence International Foundation and the Global Islamic League.

Amir Khattab was assassinated by the Russian Spetsnaz (Special Forces) in 2002, and Abd Al-Aziz Bin Ali Bin Said Al Said Al-Ghamdi (nom de guerre”=Amir Al-Walid) was appointed to accentuate the connections with the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States and accredit the Chechen Jihad the commiseration of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Russian Spetsnaz (Special Forces) assassinated Amir Al-Walid in April 2004, and the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria was agitated and the ambitions of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula were alloyed.

The Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria was acquitted by the Al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden from the sanitization to acclimatize the Northern Caucasus Mountains with the Muslim Jihad and was animadverted by the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan for the solemnization to acquaint the Russian Federation with the Neo-Jaddist Movement; the stagnation of the Muslim Jihad was ascribed to the culmination of the War in Iraq and the stalemate in the Neo-Jaddist Movement was accredited to the capitulation of the Islamic Mujahadeens in Tajikistan which adumbrated the final conquest of Chechnya by the Russians.

As Alexei Savateyev wrote, even after the intensive repressions in effect from the decades of 1960 to the 1980: “[Islam] obviously existed in everyday life. Its prevalent form in the [Caucasian] society at that time was so-called “‘National Islam”, a syncretic religious system with a strong Sufi influence, whose organisational groundwork and network lay in the illegal brotherhoods (virds).”

‘Conservative by nature, National Islam resigns itself to the archaic beliefs of its followers, whose community was traditionally, organized on the basis of the customary norms (“adapt”), and actually supports these in certain ways. Paradoxically, traditional social structures thus ultimately enabled Islam to survive under the conditions of the Soviet political system economic reforms and to descend from the mountains to the town”: 25

The Achkhoy-Martan District of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya is a prime example of Islam's survival. In 1968, the Achkhoy-Martan District had over 30 registered Murid groups and sects organizing secret meetings, during which, in addition to reciting their prayers, members discussed political events from a patently anti-Soviet position. With state control diminishing in the late decade of 1980, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic saw the emergence of up to 280 Murid groups.

These Murid groups reconstructed or built hundreds of mosques and “ziyarats”, highly venerated monuments dedicated to Sufi saints. Islam in this territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (largely of the Shafi Mazhab of religious law) was represented primarily by the adherents of two Sufi “tariqs”-Naqshbandiya (followed mainly in the lowlands) and Qadiriya (followed mainly in the highlands)-further divided into “virds”. These were named after Sufi sheikhs and often led by “teyp” elders.

25 “Sufism and Folk Islam in the Soviet Union”, Silk Road Paper, October 2003, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Sil Road Studies Program
The highland (southern, Ichkerian) Qadiriya “virds” were the traditional bastions of anti-Sovietism. There were conflicts among some “virds” in earlier eras about theological issues which were often later promoted by Soviet security agents. For example, at the dawn of Soviet rule, these forces turned not only the Qadiris and Naqshbandis against one another, but even two highly esteemed Qadiri brotherhoods: the “vird” of Kunta-haji Kishiyev, founder of the Chechen Qadiriya (so-called Zikrism), and the followers of Sheikh Bammat-Girey-haji Mitayev, including his son Ali Mitayev.

In the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan, the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had infiltrated among the Turco-Mongolic peoples and influenced the Indo-Iranian peoples; the Muslims in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan not only slated the Russian Federation which scorned the Shia Islam and scolded the Holy Imamate but also savaged Moscow which slandered the Neo-Jaddist Movement and slurred the Muslim Jihad in support of the United Sates of America. These Moslems stigmatized Kremlin (which succoured NATO in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) and solemnized the Islamic Republic of Iran which sympathised with the Shia Muslims of the Caucasus Mountains and surmised to assist their ambitions.

Villages such as Chabanmakhi, Karamakhi, and Kadar were captured and controlled by Islamic Mujahadeens who obtruded the compliance with the Sharia Law upon Muslims and Christians and obviated the conciliation with Kremlin; any Muslim who orchestrated compromises with Moscow was ostracized (or even worse obliterated). Amir Khattab assisted the Islamic Mujahadeens and accessed them to Al Qaeda and the Global Islamic League so as to accommodate the Muslim Jihad in the Caucasus Mountains.

Amir Khattab and Shamil Basayev, Filed Commanders of the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria, deployed the Islamic Mujahadeens in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan, but they were defeated by the Dagestan National Guard and the Russian Army decimated them inside the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria, outside Groznyy. The Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens were coordinated by Rabbani Khalilov, a Caucasian Lak who married into the Osmanli Dagestani Clan of Karamakhi that Amir Khattab had married into and cooperated with the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens. Khalilov did not surrender despite the fact that the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens submitted or were suborned; he stroke in Kaspiysk in May 2002 when the Dagestan National Guard was seduced by the Muslim Holiday of Bairam. Khalilov created “Sharia Jamaat” in February 2005. 26

The Autonomous Republics of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia (Northern Caucasus Mountains) have been infested with Islamic Mujahadeens who were intrigued by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and instigated by the Republic of Turkey. However, Moscow inoculated the majority of Moslems in the Caucasus Mountains against the Islamic Mujahadeens who influenced only a minority of Moslems; the installation

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of Islamic Emirates was impeded by Kremlin and the insemination of the Neo-Jaddist Movement was intercepted by Kremlin’s allies and assistants.

The “Yarmukh Battalion” was stationed in the Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and stroke in the capital Nalchik in October 2005 when the National Guard of Kabardino-Balkaria was superintending the surrender of the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in the North-Western Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. The Russian Army pursues the “Yarmukh Battalion” and persecutes the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens who penetrated the Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and prescribe the Muslim Jihad in the Caucasus Mountains.27

The Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) conspired against Moscow and colluded against the United Sates of America; however, the Kremlin stultified the Muslim Jihad and submerged the Neo-Jaddist Movement. The Chechen Islamic Mujahadeen communed with the Wahhabbi Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and were commended for the confound of Kremlin in the Caucasus Mountains. The Chechens coordinated the corporations of drug trafficking, prostitute trafficking, child trafficking, the abduction business, the commerce of military equipment. Shamil Basayev was canonised as a martyr for the competence of his mission of Jihad and was celebrated throughout the Russian Federation and the Islamic World.

Approximately 50,14 million refugees are displaced due to conflicts and disasters around the world; 2,56 million refugees are dislodged due to confrontations in the Caucasus Mountains. It is estimated that 723,000 Azeris have been evicted from Armenia or Azeri lands evoked by Armenians due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War. In addition, 64,000 Russians, 11,000 Georgians and 22,000 Kurds, were expatriated to Armenia from Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War.28

Approximately, 74,000 Ingushes and 16,000 Ossetians were dislocated due to the Ingush-Ossetian conflict; in addition to 70,000 Russians that were displaced due to the chaos in the Autonomous Republics of Adyghea, Ingushetia and North Ossetia. Almost 352,000 Armenians and 155,000 Russians were evicted from Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War; moreover, 164,000 Ukrainians were expatriated from Azerbaijan and Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Furthermore, approximately 65,000 Akhiska Turks and 43,000 Meskhetian Turks were displaced from the ex-Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan after the confrontation between the Uzbeks and the Caucasians due to the commandment of the Supreme Soviet Council to dedicate indemnifications and improvements to Chechens. Moreover, 280,000 Georgians were expelled from Abkhazia, 123,000 Abkhazians and 100,000 Ossetians were evicted by Georgia and 100,000 Azeris were expatriated from Georgia.

28 “Conflict in the Caucasus Mountains in the 20th Century and Russian Imperialism”, Conflicts Research Centre, Volume 34, April 2005
The distinctiveness of the historical development and geo-strategic position of Russia lies in the fact that Russia is not simply situated next to the Muslim world, but the Muslim world is inherent in Russia. There are 11,152,000 Russians in the Caucasus Mountains where 8,733,000 Christians and 86,000 people belonging to other confessions also live.  

A.1.a. Nagorno-Karabakh War

Azerbaijan's Communist Party General Secretary, Heidar Aliev, ascended in 1987 and attempted to “Azerify” the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which was acclaimed the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast. The Armenians abjured on the Holy Scriptures of Christianity not to acquiesce in the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and adjured Heidar Aliev on the Holy Scriptures of Islam, Koran and Hadiths, to acquit the Azerbaijan's Communist Party of the assimilation of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast; the Azeris however, asseverated their intention not to abrogate the imposition of the affiliation within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan and adumbrated the Armenians not to intervene.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Armenian population retrogressed to 76.45 percent, Armenian property retrograded to 68.73 percent, Armenian Christian proliferations retracted to 58.41 percent, Armenian professions recoiled to 62.13 percent and Armenian political prescription was relegated to 70.14 percent. However, Azeri population was reinforced to 21.55 percent, Azeri property was reimbursed to 30.12 percent, Azeri Muslim proliferations were renovated to 23.75 percent, Azeri professions were restored to 32.56 percent, Azeri political prescription rose to 24.75 prescription and educational institutions and educative institutes regurgitated the Azeri ethnic, ethnotic and ethical ratiocinations and regulations.

On February 22, 1988, Armenian demonstrated in Askeran of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and deflected to confrontation with the Azeris and delivered 15 casualties (6 Azeris demised). On February 28, Deputy Procurator Alexander Katusev of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics declassified the nationality of the casualties in the Askeran in the Central Radio and Television Broadcast Station of Baku and demystified the nationality of the demised; the Nagorno-Karabakh War was deciphered and the Trans-Caucasian Confederation of the Soviet Socialist Republics was dissipated.

29 “Conflict in the Caucasus Mountains in the 20th Century and Russian Imperialism”, Conflicts Research Centre, Volume 34, April 2005
In Sumgait, the Azeris deflected to conflict with the Armenians and delivered 56 casualties (32 Armenians demised). Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics dispatched the Red Army in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan to disperse the Armenian national movement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and depress the Azeri national movement of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast; the Red Army defected to confrontation with the Azeris and delivered 234 casualties (124 Azeris demised).

“Congratulations on your earthquake. Nature has spared us the trouble” was the allegation of the Azerbaijan Central Radio and Television Broadcast Station of Baku at the announcement of the Leninakan Earthquake in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia on December 7, 1989. In January 1990, the Azeris in Baku defected to conflict against the Armenians and delivered 61 casualties (36 Armenians demised). The deviation of the Armenians to devolve upon the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was divulged among the Azeris and the disobligation of Armenians to devolve upon the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast was disseminated all over the Caucasus Mountains.31

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics dispatched the Red Army in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan to dishearten the Azeri duplicities on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and disprove the Azeri delineation on the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast; the Armenians were also disillusioned about the Red Army discriminations and were discredited by Mikhail Gorbachev’s documentation. However, 46 conscripts of the Red Army, 127 Azeri civilians and 253 Azeri combatants demised in the confrontations.


In the spring of 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev decoded “Operation Ring” which dislocated the Armenians of the district of Shahumyan in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (which was later devoted to the Azeris) in order to discountenance the Armenians and dictate the Azeris. However, the dissolution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the disintegration of the Trans-Circassian Federation of the Soviet Socialist Republics

denigrated the disputes over the Autonomous Oblasts of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh because both Armenia and Azerbaijan were deliberated.


In February 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States committed military contingents from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation to circumvent the Azeri-Armenian conflict and conciliate the Republics of Armenian and Azerbaijan and confiscate the self-designated and self-declared Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Field Commander of the Corps of the Commonwealth of Independent States contemplated that the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh would be consolidated and contract Non-Aggression and Non-Annexation Agreements by any of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan; but the collaboration was not credited with success.

The Field Commander of the Corps of the Commonwealth of Independent States reprieved the denigration and deprecation of the Autonomous Oblasts of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh and remitted the derogation and debilitation of the Nagorno-Karabakh War for the Moscow Conference of the Commonwealth of Independent States for March 1992; the Armenians remonstrated the Russian Federation and the Azeris reprimanded the Commonwealth of Independent States and the recriminated ex-Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan against the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States in Lahore.

On February 23, 1992, the Armenians conquered the city of Khojaly in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and committed atrocities against the Azeri civilians; the Human Rights Watch Organization extrapolates the demised at 2,123 Azeris and estimates the casualties at 4,673 Azeris. On May 9, 1993, the city of Susha in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh capitulated to the Armenians who were stigmatized by the decimation of 1,875 Azeri civilians and the discarding of 437 Azeri combatants, thus scavenged the Geneva Accords For the Treatment of Civilians and Captives During Warfare.32

The capture of the city of Susha in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh by the Armenians instigated anxiety to the Republic of Turkey and incited astonishment in the

Republic of Turkey. The Parliament of the Republic of Turkey impeached the Armenians for the desecration and destruction of Islamic mosques and madrassa they inflicted, implicated the Armenians in the defilement and denigration of Azeri monuments they infringed and importuned the United Nations’ General Assembly against the disobligation and disproval of the Armenian atrocities they inflicted in Khojaly; the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States was interceded against the deprecation of the Republic of Armenia.

Suleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, declared that “the insult of the Christian Armenians against Muslims is inexpiable {…} the Republic of Armenia ought to indemnify the Azeris for the invasion of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, impede the Armenian insurgents from infringing upon the Azeris, inhibit the Armenian irregulars from incommoding the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, indict the insatiate and impious impingement on Islam and Prophet Mohammad by Christian Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast {…} the Republic of Armenia ought to inoculate the Christian imperious from immolating the independence and integrity of the North Caucasus Mountains!”33

However, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation proscribed the Republic of Turkey not to provoke the Republic of Armenia and prescribed to the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States not to prohibit the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and not to prompt the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Russian Federation endorsed the Republic of Armenia to eradicate the Republic of Azerbaijan and espoused the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh to eliminate Islam and Muslim Jihad in the Caucasus Mountains; the Republic of Azerbaijan was encumbered by the enforcements of the Commonwealth of Independent Sates and entangled in the evasion of “Great Azerbaijan”.

Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan exhorted 3,457 Uzbekistan, Afghan and Tajik Mujahadeens to engage the Republic of Armenia and extolled the erosion of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh; the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation excommunicated the escalation of Muslim Jihad in the Caucasus Mountains and the Spiritual Board of the Muslim of the Volga River and the Ural Mountains expiated the envenoming of Christians-Muslims and exorcised the Moslems of the Russian Federation against the enrolment in the Muslim Jihad.

The Russian Federation enjoined the elucidation of the concept of Muslim “Salaam” (Peace) and enkindled the enunciation of the condemnation of Muslim Jihad; the Neo-Jadid Movement was emasculated and the Wahhabite Mazhab in the Caucasus Mountains was enervated since the Russian Federation enshrined the entitlements of Islamic Muftis for Sunni Muslims and enthronements of Sheiks and Imams fro Shia Muslims in the Constitution. The Islamist Jihad was expunged by the Russian Mohammedans.

On April 10, 1992, the Azeris captured the village of Maraghar in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and committed cruelties against the Armenian civilians; 45 civilians were

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massacred and mutilated, 3 men were decapitated and dismembered, 4 women were impaled and ignited, 146 women and 46 children were deflorated and dispatched in the Republic of Azerbaijan to be promoted for prostitution. The ravage of the village of Maraghmar recited the repercussions of Azeris for the retribution of Armenians in Susha and Khozaly. 34

On May 19, 1992, Armenians conquered the city of Lachin, in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh which sequestrated the complementation between the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and sequestered the communication with the Republic of Azerbaijan; the Azeris in the Autonomous Oblast of Nakhichevan and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh were secluded from the submersion with the Republic of Azerbaijan and saturated with the summons of Armenians to submit. The Republic of Azerbaijan was savaged by the Islamic Republic of Iran for subside and was slated for the stultification of the “Great Azerbaijan” in the Caucasus Mountains.

On June 12, 1992, the Azeri conquered Shahumian, in the Northern Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, and confuted the Armenians. Stepanakert, the capital of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, was abandoned by 34,000 Armenian civilians as the Army of Azerbaijan advanced and assailed Iskandar. However, the Army of Azerbaijan disintegrated into disarray and defeat by the 104th Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Federation due to the misunderstanding and miscalculation of the Azeri mobile artillery detachments and mechanized armor divisions who approached and assaulted Ganja, the camp of the mediatory military contingents of the Russian Army! 35

In June 1992, the European Economic and Monetary Union convoked the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki and concurred to create the Minsk Group which was co-chaired by the Republic of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Minsk Group conjectured the cessation of the Nagorno-Karabakh War and conjured the confirmation of the Moscow Conference of the Commonwealth of the Independent States and consented on the conviction of the Peace Settlement of Stepanakert. The United States of America and the Russian Federation contoverted upon the chastening of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the chastisement of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

However, the Civil War in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the War of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova, the First Chechen War and the Georgian Civil War in the Autonomous Oblast of Abkhazia complicated the discussions and complemented the declamation of the collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Moreover, the Russian Federation condemned NATO for conspiracy to circumscribe the Commonwealth of Independent States and contemplated that the United States of America would contest a challenge Moscow in the Caucasus Mountains.

In late June, the Army of Azerbaijan attacked Mardakert and Martuni but they were annihilated by the Field Commander of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Monte Melkonian. On September 24, 1992, the Defence Minister of the Russian Federation, Marshal Pavel Grachev convoked a conference between the Defence Ministers of the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia to compound conciliation over the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, but the compromise was not confirmed; the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh contorted the peace settlement and contradicted the peace negotiations.

After the closure of the Metsamor nuclear power plant, the closure of the hydroelectric dam of Matrakert and the conflicts in the Autonomous Oblasts of Abkhazia and Ossetia in the Georgian Civil War, commissions for fossil fuels ceased in the Republics of Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh for the winter seasons of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993. The Commonwealth of Independent States decided to impose sanctions and implement solemnities in the Republic of Armenia which dynamitized the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh War. However, the Armenian Diaspora in the United States of America dispatched commodities such as medical equipment, fossil fuels, military equipment to the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and deployed commissions for food supplies.

The Shell and British Petroleum Oil Corporations were discomforted by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and were discountenanced by the condemnation of the Russian Federation of the Republic of Azerbaijan; the Stock Markets in Baku and Moscow were downgraded and the Oil Markets of Sevastopol and Vladikavkaz were demoted. The Republic of Azerbaijan was damaged financially and disparaged politically by the Nagorno-Karabakh War who was been deployed inside the Republic of Azerbaijan.

On April 3, 1993, Armenians conquered the city of Kelbajar inside the Republic of Azerbaijan which marked a milestone in the military history and heritage of the Nagorno-Karabakh War as the first city of the Republic of Azerbaijan (out of the context of the conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh War) to capitulate to the Armenians. On April 30, 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) prescribed the postulation and presentation of Resolution 822, which was co-sponsored and co-directed by the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which predicated and presumed that the Armenians peculated the independence and integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and proscribed the Republic of Armenian not to proceed further in the Republic of Azerbaijan.36

However, the United Nations’ Security Council remitted the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh from repudiation at the request of Moscow and reprieved the Republic of Armenia from repagination until the reconciliation of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Tashkent Conference of the Commonwealth of Independent Sates. The Army of Azerbaijan retreated from Zivel, Zagalty, Karalar Tatar, Kyshlak in the Republic of Azerbaijan (which were retrieved by the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh) and retrogressed from Agdam, Fizuli,

Jebrail, and Zangelan in the Republic of Azerbaaian which were retrieved by the Republic of Armenia in August 1993.

Thomas Simons, the former United States aid coordinator to the Commonwealth of Independent States members, told Aliyev that Washington too was “far from indifferent” to Azerbaijan now that it was pledged to democratic reforms in economics and human rights. But, in 1993, aid to Azerbaijan depended on lifting the blockade on the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and on a lasting cease-fire.

Those acts would induce the United States’ Congress to allow humanitarian aid. That is, without democratization by Baku, President Clinton's hands were tied. This effectively put the United States out of the running in Baku for the moment so Aliyev further cultivated his British ties. In January 1994, the “Independent” reported British approval for military backing of Baku via mercenaries and arms supplies, also involving Turkey and based in Turkish Cyprus which is not affected by an arms embargo on Azerbaijan.

Though London denied the charges, the report's confirmations seem to override the denial. It charged that Baku was willing to pay up to 150 million pounds (about $240 million) mainly in oil. A United States oil firm was supposedly paying for American ex-military personnel to train Azeris. Baku also hired Afghan mercenaries, who apparently helped improve the quality of its forces.

Tancu Çiller, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic demanded that the Armenians depart from the Republic of Azerbaijan and detach from the Autonomous Oblast of Nakhichevan; the Turkish Army was deployed along the frontier borders of the Republic of Armenia. Furthermore, Haidar Aliev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recruited 1,784 Arab and Afghan Mujahadeens so as a prerequisite to revere Holy War (Jihad) and received 36 American experts as a prerogative to ratify the exploitation rights of Mega Oil and Texaco Oil Corporations in Baku.37

Then there is the Turkish connection. According to Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, Turkey has given aid of $1.5-2 billion to Azerbaijan since it became independent as part of a larger aid program. Tansu Ciller has often told Russia that it must cooperate with the Republic of Turkey to end the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Republic of Turkey also seeks to link its Azeri pipeline with opening Iraq's pipelines through Yurmutalik and establishing independent transit of energy to and from the Republic of Ukraine to help free it from dependency upon Russia.

Thus, the Republic of Turkey is a major partner in efforts to link Ukraine's projected Odessa oil transshipment terminus with Europe, a plan that allows the Republic of Ukraine to meet its own oil needs and ship large amounts of energy to Europe. This partnership also accords with the geopolitical benefits for the Government of Turkey of a Ukraine that can resist Russian pressure in the Black Sea.

Accordingly, Russia has been able to use its unique regional leverage to compel not just a political-military presence but also an economic one. It uses its monopoly on existing pipelines to dissuade Azerbaijan and Central Asian states from considering new projects for pipelines, especially ones that bypass Russia. It is also literally “muscling in” on Caspian Sea oil and gas deals and contracts.

At the meeting of the riparian states on the Caspian Sea in October 1993, Russia pushed to define the Caspian Aquatorium, a geographical lake, as a sea. That definition means Baku's loss of all major investigated off-shore oil fields since all waters beyond the 12-mile limit will be declared neutral, putting the sea at the mercy of Russian submarines. Turan Radio reported in November 1993 that Russia's representatives openly insisted on this outcome in return for supposed pressure on Armenian forces to withdraw from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

As Ben Miller, American director of Ernst & Young's Almaty Office said, “The Russians believe that they have an inherent proprietary interest in the natural resources that they developed during the Soviet period”. Or as the “Washington Post” put it, Russia is engaging in "blackmail" towards local oil possessing states so as to extract profits from energy resources and infringe upon their domestic affairs.38

On May 30, 1994, the British Foreign Office released a Russian governmental letter of April 28, 1994, to its embassy in Moscow. This letter constituted a Russian ultimatum against any oil projects in the Caspian Sea, stating that without Russian approval they cannot be recognized, thereby threatening not only Azerbaidzhan's oil projects where Lukoil already had a 10 percent share, but also the Chevron-Tengiz and Caspishelf projects in Kazakhstan (led by Mobil, BP, British Gas, Agip, Statoil, Total, and Shell).

The letter states: “The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single ecosystem and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or activities including resource development have to be resolved with the participation of all the Caspian countries . . . (It concludes that) any steps by whichever Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with regard to the areas and resources . . . cannot be recognized . . . (and) any unilateral actions are devoid of a legal basis.”39

Its date, April 28, 1994, the day before the French and United States announcements and as Aliyev was giving orders to expedite the final stages of negotiations on Azerbaidzhan's oil, suggests Moscow knew this foreign pressure was coming and thus sought to make a pre-emptive strike against it. The demarche's very brutality of tone, and address to Great Britain, confirms that Russia sees this question as an East versus West issue.

Although the demarche is clearly menacing in tone, it apparentlyreflects Russia's awareness that Baku, Paris, Washington, London, and Ankara were on the verge of successfully resisting Moscow's pressure in both the oil and Nagorno-Karabakh issues. It may

be the opening shot in a campaign, but it is not a campaign born of strength. In fact, the opposite version is true.

While Azerbaijan's regime is hopelessly corrupt and unable to prosecute the war effectively or improve conditions at home, it also is not going to fall into Russian hands if its diplomacy is as wily and resolute as it has been, especially if it is supported by the West. As the “Economist” points out, energy in the ground is useless. If Azeri or Kazakh oil cannot be safely transported, it is worthless in international affairs.

In October 1993, Haidar Aliev was anointed President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and announced the abdication of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the Commonwealth of Independent States; Haidar Aliev accredited the allurements of the United States and arranged to be attained as an ally of NATO and access Western Europe and North America. In October and November 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) prescribed the postulation and presentation of Resolutions 874 and 874 which predicated and presumed that the Armenians peculated the independence and integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and proscribed the Republic of Armenian not to permeate any further the Republic of Azerbaijan (so as to preempt the prohibition on attack and assult).


An Armenian commander commented that “The difference is in what you do and what you do it for. You know a few miles back is your family, children, women and old people, and therefore you're duty-bound to fight to the death so that those behind you will live.” On May 16, 1994, Prime Ministers and Ministers of External Affairs and Defense of the Republics of Armenian, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Russian Federation concluded in Moscow a contract which compelled the Armies of Azerbaijan and Armenia to cease the conflict and camp at least 3-6 miles from the conlaves of the Republics of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan that the Armenians had captured.40

Moreover, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian Federation dispatched 49 Russian delegates, 3 Uzbek delegates, 3 Kazakh delegatess. 3 Ukrainian delegates, the Republic of Armenia deployed 16 Armenian deputies and the Republic of Azerbaijan delivered Azeri deputies; Commonwealth of Independent States deployed a military detachment that numbers 18,000 Kyrgyz, Ukrainians, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik and Russian conscripts which would conciliate the Armies of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Nagorno-Karabakh War cost the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh the demise of 6,145 conscripts and the dislocation of 256,000 Armenian civilians from the Republic of Azerbaijan and 34,000 Armenian civilians from the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, 18,456 Azeri conscripts demised, 4,367 Azeri captives were dispatched to the Republic of Armenia, 548,000 Azeri civilians were dislocated from the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and 31,000 Azeri civilians were deposed from the Republic of Armenia. Moreover, 14,232 Azeri civilians demised and 3,782 Armenian civilians were discarded during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. 41

Although the issue of the amount of territory of the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan that the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has captured has often been claimed to be 20 percent and even as high 40 percent, the number is believed to be, taking into account the exclave of Nakhichevan, 13.65 percent or 14.11 percent. Moreover, the self-designated and self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognised by the international community with the exception of the Republic of Armenia.

In February 1994, the Armenian President he went to London to seek British support and a more active role in framing solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The exchange of letters with Prime Minister John Major over the SOCAR-led development of the Caspian Sea holdings gave him leverage to press for a solution so that the oil could flow and the investment actually materialize.

Evidently his promise to give SOCAR this priority, but with the participation of Russia's Lukoil firm, led to better results with London than those Armenia attained. In October 1993, while in Baku, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hogg stated that Great Britain viewed Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan whose status cannot be changed by force, rather only by agreement of the interested parties in the conflict.

The agreements to develop the rich "Azeri" and "Chyrag" (or Shirag or Shirak) deposits in the Caspian Sea under SOCAR's and/or BP's leadership appears to call for Lukoil to put up 10-12 percent of the costs with the consortium putting up 70 percent and Baku the rest. However, these figures are only in principle. Everything now depends on Lukoil's financial capabilities, which are unpromising. 42

Thus this question is not yet resolved. Lukoil might yet receive Baku's assent to develop the originally intended third field, Gyuneshli, which was then taken out of the deal under Russian pressure. But that, too, depends on whether Lukoil can get either Russian state funding (the government already owed it 450 billion rubles in nonpayment for 1993 which are probably lost) or foreign sales or loans from the World Bank or foreign consortiums.

Aliyev stated that two main goals for cooperation with NATO were integration into Western democracy and the quest for additional ways to stabilize the regional situation and end the Nagorno-Karabakh War. As Azerbaidzhan’s Radio-Television network stated:

“Participating in NATO's program . . . will also bring to light various complex problems in the Karabakh dispute. It will be recalled that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Helsinki in 1992 discussed the possibility of using NATO’s military forces in ending disputes in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe countries. The proposal that was made on the matter was approved.”

“That means that our republic's participation in NATO's program of the Partnership for Peace is essential if it wishes to safeguard and maintain its independence and if it decides to exclude itself from the framework of other countries (Commonwealth of Independent States) in the near future.”

Turkey and the Kurds thus openly link the Kurdish question to Turkey's energy relations with the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia. Any linkage of the Kurdish question to already difficult Russo-Turkish relations concerning oil and Turkey's policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States can only further aggravate them. Any further such linkages of oil and vital security issues or Armenian-Russian attempts to undo Azerbaidzhan's sovereignty or integrity could drive the Republic of Turkey, already beset by high levels of domestic agitation for entry and internal crisis, into a conflict with Russia.

Russian pressure in 1993-94 led Azerbaijan to reduce its projected Western partners' original share. Russian collusion in the coup that unseated Elchibey preceded steady pressure to grant Russia a 10 percent share even though it put up no equity. In addition, the original three oil fields became two, SOCAR's 30 percent of profits became 20 percent, and a quarter shares in each field were reserved for Russia.

Russia, with no equity, hoped to receive at least 10 percent of the Azeri and Chirag fields in the Caspian Sea, if not 20 percent of fields whose estimated worth is $108 billion in oil, though it is not clear whether that means from profits or from gross receipts. This apparent trend away from the West alarmed the consortium members who then demanded guarantees that political unrest would not lead to the contract's termination once it was signed.

But through early 1994 Baku refused to go to a final accord with its Western partners. So in early 1994 they sent Baku an ultimatum stating that if there is no clear answer by the spring of 1994 they would leave. This pressure, Western support for a solution that did not include only Russian peacemakers and Aliyev's insight into Russian aims probably contributed to the turnaround in Azeri policy to limit Russian participation and make Moscow pay for its oil investment.

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Azeri, Western, and Russian sources all concurred that Russian pressure is linked to Moscow's notion that it can recover Azerbaijan's lost territories in return for this 20 percent. Russia also considers the establishment of a Commonwealth of Independent States fuel bank with the Republics of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to be the desirable form of financing the operation in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

One member of Russia's Energy Ministry delegation that held talks with Baku in November 1993 told Radio Turan in Baku that, "this event can be qualified as a step towards the creation of the united organization of oil producing republics of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics under the umbrella of Russia, which will be analogous to the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries".  

In 2001, Kocharyan and Aliev, Prime Ministers of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, were invited at Key West, Florida, the directorate of the United States’ Department, to investigate the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, although the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia was importuned to account for the abdication from the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, he was invaccinated as to acquiesce in the abolishment of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan was infuriated by the appeal to allocate autonomy to the former Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh and insisted that the Republic of Azerbaijan intends only to impound the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Melkonian notes, Russia welcomed the Armenian victories, namely Kelbajar's: “Washington was intent on undermining Soviet influence in the Caucasus and usurp the imperiosity of the Russian Federation, the United States of America were involved in the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Chechnya was insinuated by the Islamist and independence ideologies, the Republic of Georgia was incommoded in the Abkhazian War, Azerbaijan was incited by the Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turanist ideologies to cast the lot to the Republic of Turkey, a menace for the Russian interest...

"... Only the Armenians constituted the allies of the ‘Christian’ Russian Federation to restore the Russian reputation in the Caucasus Mountains. The Armenians became once more the Trojan Horse for the insinuation of the Caucasus Mountains with Russian influence and the instigation for the recovery of the Russian dominance in the political affairs, but also religious issues of this corner of the world which seemed to fall under the sway of NATO and threaten the megalo-ideatic visions of Kremlin for the restoration of the Pax Russica."

In 1997, Russian parliamentary member and chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, Lev Rokhlin released a report detailing Russian arms shipments transferred to Armenia at the worth of $1 billion dollars including 84 T-72 tanks, 50 armored personnel

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46 Petrosian, David. "What Are the Reasons for Armenians' Success in the Military Phase of the Karabakh Conflict?" Noyan Tapan Highlights. June 1, 2000
vehicles, 72 howitzers, 24 Scud missile systems, 5 million rounds of ammunition and 34 tons of miliatry equipement from 1994-1996.

On September 11, 1992, Azerbaijani forces captured 6 Russian Special Forces (spetznaz) paratroopers of the 7th Russian Army based in Armenia near the village of Merjimek in Kelbajar. The men reportedly were hired in Russian rubles by the Armenian Ministry of Defense for action near the village of Srkhavend, Nagorno-Karabakh, in June 1992. Soldiers of Armenian descent serving in the Russian 127th Division based in Armenia were captured in Kelbajar province, Azerbaijan, in January 1994.

The support of the Russian Federation towards the Armenians was profound; but the Armenians could not have won only by shipments of military equipement by Moscow and commisions of fossil fuels by the Armenian Diaspora in the West if it had not been for the valour and tenacity of the Armenian soldiers. The victory of Armenians over the Azeris signified the vulnerability of the Islamic religion in the post-Soviet era and its failiure to adapt quickly to the challenges that arose after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

The United States consumes 25 percent of the oil produced worldwide, and slightly more than half of this oil is imported (National Energy Policy 2001). A paradox is that even though the United States increasingly relies on producers in the Western Hemisphere to meet its energy needs, Washington is still dependent on the stability and production capacity of oil-rich states in far-away regions such the Middle East.

This is mainly because the price of oil is set globally, and the United States economy is more sensitive to changes in the oil price than most other industrial countries. Being the world’ s greatest oil importing country, as well as home to the lion’ s share of the most important oil companies, the United States also has an interest in being represented in all major oil provinces in the world (Noreng 2003b:67).

In 1994 the “Deal of the Century” brought important United States commercial interests to bear in the Caucasus Mountains. In the years 1995–97 a number of additional oil contracts were agreed upon, and by 1997 more than $30 billions had been earmarked for investment in the Republic of Azerbaijan’s oil sector (Nassibli 1998). The oil companies wanted to protect their substantial sunken costs in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and consequently they had an interest in stabilizing Aliyev’ s regime and relax the restrictions on United States economical aid to the country.47

In the mid-decade of 1990 an influential oil lobby was created to promote these interests in full force (MacDougall 1997). Several scholars, including Khokhar and Wiberg-Jørgensen (2000:92), Dekmejian and Simonian (2001:134), and Magnusson (2003:191) argue that the oil companies were instrumental in moving the United States foreign policy makers to realize the potential significance of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In November 1999, Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act (1999), which formulated a clear United States policy for the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia:

47 Petrosian, David. "What Are the Reasons for Armenians' Success in the Military Phase of the Karabakh Conflict?" Noyan Tapan Highlights. June 1, 2000
“[…] to assist in the development of infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, and energy on a East-West axis in order to build strong international relations and commerce between those countries and the stable, democratic, and market-oriented of the Euro-Atlantic community; and to support United States business interests and investments in the region (Silk Road Strategy Act 1999).”

In order to do so, Washington promoted building a southwestern 1,700 km pipeline, which would route the Caspian Sea oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Eastern Mediterranean Sea coast – the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was criticized for being too long, too vulnerable, and too expensive, but it satisfied a number of vital United States interests.

Routing the oil away from Russian control, upholding the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing secure oil transit to the Republic of Israel, bolstering the Republic of Turkey with transit revenues, and creating an East-West energy transport corridor linking Central-Asia and the Caucasus Moutains to the West (Kleverman 2003:27; Noreng 2003a:161-62; Matchavarian 2003).

In this respect the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline first and foremost was a political project, although it was to be operated on a commercial basis. In Lisbon in December 1996, at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe summit, the change in United States policy became apparent. At this summit the Minsk Group presented an United States-sponsored proposal that was very favorable to Azerbaijan’s interests. It included three main principles (Magnusson 2003:187): a) Maintaining the territorial integrity of the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, b) the highest degree of autonomy for the Oblas of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan, and security guarantees for the population in the Obast of Nagorno-Karabakh.

By throwing its support behind the Lisbon principles, the United States essentially shifted its weight from the Republic of Armenia to the Government of Azerbaijan. From 1997 the United States also acquired a permanent seat as Co-chairman in the Minsk Group.

Washington initiated a more active role in the peaceprocess that generally downplayed the Republic of Armenia, and supported the main interests of Azerbaijan (Magnusson 2003).

The cornerstone of United States energy security had traditionally been the capability of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia to deliver the last oil that the market demands – effectively restraining an increase in the oil price25 (Noreng 2003c:411). The increasing anti-American sentiment in the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia, uncertainty concerning the future of the Saudi regime in Riyadh, and strained relations to the Middle Eastern countries because of strong United States support to the Republic of Israel, made it a priority for the United States to diversify its oil dependency away from the Middle East.

The National Energy Policy (2001) states that: “We need to strengthen our trade alliances, to deepen our dialogue with major oil producers, and to work for greater oil

48 “Black Oil and Ethnicity in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Morten Astorp Rosenkvist, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
production in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, the Caspian Sea, and other regions with abundant oil resources”. Second, the geopolitical significance of the Caucasus Mountains substantially increased with the prolonged War on Terror.49

The Republic of Azerbaijan became not only essential for access to Caspian Sea oil, but also for supplying and sustaining United States bases in Central-Asia, and possibly also a future staging area for United States operations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Zbigniew Brezeziniski (1997:129) had earlier described the Republic of Azerbaijan as an important “cork” controlling the access to the “bottle” of the Caspian Sea Basin and Central-Asia.

Brezeziniski’s statement seemed about to materialize -the Republic of Azerbaijan was evolving into a vital piece in the geopolitical puzzle. Washington moved rapidly to strengthen its ties with Azerbaijan. In January 2002 Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act was removed. Later the same year Washington signed a major security assistance agreement with Baku, which included upgrading the Republic of Azerbaijan’s air defense systems, training Azerbaijani officers, improving the protection of the country’s land borders, and enhanced Azerbaijan’s naval capabilities in order to protect its territorial and economic zones in the Caspian Sea – where most of the oil fields are located (Cornell et al. 2004:58).

In September 2002 the building of the Baku-Tbiisi-Ceyhan -with a projected capacity of 1 million barrels a day- was also initiated. The increased United Stats-Azerbaijan cooperation raised the possibility of permanent United States bases on Azerbaijani soil. In order to be better equipped to meet the new security challenges of the 21st Century, the United States initiated a review of its overseas bases. The Republic of Azerbaijan was one out of two countries (the other was Nigeria) that, due to its potential oil resources, were given special attention by the Overseas Basing Commission (OBC) (Smith 2004).50

Because Moscow could no longer entirely disregard the legacy of its former land-based empire in Eurasia, in 1992–93 the Russian foreign policy gradually tilted from an exclusive Atlantic approach to a more Eurasian approach. The new Foreign Policy Concept (1993) emphasized that the Near Abroad (the former Soviet republics) should be given top priority, and the Military Doctrine (1993) further argued that Russia had the exclusive right to use military force in the defense of Russian nationals on the territory of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

In a speech held in February 1993 Boris Yeltsin stated that:

“Stopping all armed conflicts on the territory of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is Russia’s vital interest. [...] I believe that the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics” (as quoted in Donaldson and Norgee 1998:172).

49 “Black Oil and Ethnicity in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Morten Astorp Rosenkvist, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
50 “Black Oil and Ethnicity in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Morten Astorp Rosenkvist, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
The war with Azerbaijan and Turkey’s economic blockade effectively closed its eastern and western borders. The Republic of Georgia, to the north, was in permanent crisis, and not a very viable option for secure land passage. The Islamic Republic of Iran, located in the south, was forthcoming towards the Republic of Armenia, but it was remote and hard to reach by overland routes (Waal 2003:205). The situation was close to unbearable for a country that was landlocked and poor in resources. Tellingly, Armenia’s Gross Domestic Product fell with nearly 40 percent in 1992, and industrial output was set back to the production levels of 1971 (Dawisha and Parrott 1994:190).51

Deprived of much of its former military leverage, Moscow needed to consider other approaches for not being marginalized in its former sphere of influence (Baev 1997a). In order to keep the United States out of the Caucasus Mountains, Russia needed to control, or at least be able to disrupt, the oil pipelines running from the Caspian Sea Basin. Exit was a real option for the United States, and Russia thus calculated that without the prospect of dominating the flow of oil – essentially meaning dependable access to Caspian Sea oil and substantial leverage in the Caucasian Mountains states – Washington’s costs for challenging Moscow in its own backyard would be largely disproportionate to the benefits.

In this respect the Republic of Armenia was vital to Russian interests. The country separated the Republics of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and functioned as a wedge dividing the United States sponsored energy corridor running from the Caspian Sea Basin to the Republic of Turkey. The Republic of Armenia was also necessary for linking Russia with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thus opening the possibility for creating a North-South axis rivaling the United States East-West axis consisting of Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan (Spector 2002).52

In addition, the simmering conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh would most likely reduce the economical viability of the Baku-Tilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, as it was projected to run only some 30 km from the heavily fortified and highly unstable line of contact separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Penetrating the Republic of Armenia could thus disturb the preferred pipeline option of the United States, and buy Moscow some time until economic revival enhanced its resource base sufficiently to allow for a once more proactive stance in the Caucasus Mountains (Baev 1997b:58).

Moscow consequently moved rapidly to expand the Republic of Armenia’s dependency on Russia. In December 1994, at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Budapest, Russia acquired a permanent seat as Co-chairman of the Minsk Group from where it could influence the peace-process in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, in April 1997 an agreement secured the continued presence of Russian military bases on Armenian territory for the next 25 years (Allison 1999:50).

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52 “Black Oil and Ethnicity in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Morten Astorp Rosenkvist, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
In August the same year, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was the first of its kind in the post-Soviet Republic of South Caucasus Mountains. It envisaged mutual military support, a pledge of both parties not to join other militarily alliances, and Armenia’s agreement to Russia’s patrolling of its Turkish and Iranian borders (Fortnight in Review 1997).

In December 1996 the isolated position of Yerevan became all the more evident at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Lisbon Summit. Except for the Republic of Armenia the entire Minsk Group supported a resolution on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that was very favorable to the interests of the Government of Azerbaijan. The Ter-Petrosian administration consequently began to realize that Armenia would have to shed its territorial acquisitions in Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to survive economically (Libaridian 1998).

Ter-Petrosian stated that: “It happened in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs lost everything. I don’t think that the maintenance of the status quo in the Caucasus Mountains is a real option. We may resist for a year or two, but the international community will become exasperated and loose all patience” (as quoted in Latin and Suny 1999).

With Kocharyan in power a literal Karabakhi takeover had taken place in Yerevan. Kocharyan was the former “president” of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and – like himself – a number of his key ministers were Karabakh Armenians. Neither willing or able to surrender Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, the new administration instead returned to Armenia’s traditional reliance on Russia – proclaiming that the economic problems of Armenia would be solved without any compromise in Nagorno-Karabakh (Suny 1999:159; Herzig 1999:72).

The change in Moscow’s security perception was in large a consequence of the substantial setbacks that Russia had suffered in the second half of the decade of 1990: the August 1998 financial and fiscal crisis, the Kosovo War in Serbia, NATO’s eastward expansion, United States Russian tensions concerning strategic arms control, and the second Chechen War (Sergounin 2003:20).

The National Security Concept (2000) especially emphasized the growing number of external threats to Russian security:

“Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its international interests

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and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region (National Security Concept 2000)”.

In 2002 a debt for equity deal settled Yerevan’s $100 million dept to Moscow by transferring five of Armenia’s key industrial plants to Russian ownership (Weinstein 2004a). Russia further acquired control of the main energy generating facilities in Armenia (producing 75-80 percent of the current demand), and made efforts to entrench its position as Armenia’s sole provider of gas (Eurasian Daily Monitor 2005; Martirosyan 2005). Moscow was also Yerevan’s primary trading partner, its largest source of investment, and the main destination of its surplus labor and migrant workers (Weinstein 2004a; USIP 1999).

Märta-Lisa Magnusson (2003:183) argues that Washington’s favorable inclination towards Yerevan in the early decade of 1990 first and foremost was due to the highly vocal and influential Armenian diaspora living in the United States. Being well funded, well organized, and supported by prominent figures in Congress like Senator Bob Dole, the Armenian lobby constituted a very powerful pressure group in Washington.

This group consistently and vigorously lobbied for United States assistance to the Republic of Armenia, and in 1992 it was in part instrumental for pushing Section 907 through Congress (Waal 2003:234; Cornell et.al 2004:57). The special interests of the Armenian diaspora consequently had to yield for basic great power interests as the United States evolved from a largely disinterested to an interested actor in the Caucasus Mountains.

Nevertheless, the diaspora’s influence on United States foreign policy was not entirely wiped out as the Republic of Armenia continued to be the second largest per capita recipient of United States aid after the Republic of Israel – totaling more than $1.6 billion since 1992 (Martirosyan 2004; Mainville 2005). With more at stake in the Caucasus Mountains following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States found it increasingly hard to leave the Republic of Armenia uncontested in the hands of Russia and the Shangai Organization (Starobin and Mukhin 2003).

Washington thus moved to expand its penetration of the stoutly pro-Russian regime in Yerevan. A breakthrough in this respect was achieved in April 2004 when a United States-Armenian military cooperation agreement was signed and preliminary discussions concerning joint military exercises were opened (Berman 2004:62). In January 2005 trade relations between the United States Department on Foeig Relations and the Republic of Armenia were also normalized (Danielyan 2005). Despite this substantial rapprochement between the United States and the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan nevertheless upheld its nonflexible attitude regarding a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The new Aliyev administration was an initial success for Russian interests in the Caucasus Mountains. The Republic of Azerbaijan rejoined the Commonwealth of

Independent States in 1993, and an understanding was reached with regard to the redeployment of Russian troops along the Azerbaijani border to the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Zverev 1996:34). In the long run, however, the Aliyev administration proved to be a disaster for Moscow’s regional influence.

In 1994-95, Baku successfully resisted – with United States support – the stationing of Russian soldiers on its territory, and began constructing a westbound pipeline to the Georgian town of Suspa that would effectively bypass Russian territory and control. In 2002, after several years of Russian opposition, the Putin administration even agreed to straighten out the demarcation line between Russia and Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea – where most of the oilfields are located (Badykova 2003).

Moscow did, however, not attempt to woo Baku with carrots alone. Russia’s capability to cause socio-economic disruption in the Republic of Azerbaijan – due to its nearness and relative economical size – was also applied in order to put diplomatic pressure on the regime in Baku. Russia’s penetration of Azerbaijan has not gained Moscow any direct leverage regarding a resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, but it has led to an improvement of Moscow’s general influence in Baku.

According to Elchibey’s Secretary of State, Ali Kerimov, Russia demanded that Baku agree to exclusive Russian presence as peacemakers in Azerbaijan in return for all the territories captured by the Armenians. Elchibey refused and was soon deposed in a coup that had many Russian fingerprints on it. Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh then attacked areas of Azerbaijan intended for the pipeline (whether they did so to disrupt the oil or because these lands had other intrinsic strategic value cannot be determined) and Geidar Aliyev, the new leader in Baku, was obliged to apply for membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, something Elchibey had spurned to Russia's discomfiture.

Moscow threatened support for insurgents who would destroy the Republic of Georgia, while Armenia completely depends on Russia for energy and support against the Republics of Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Trans-Caucasian Republics of Armenia and Georgia had no choice, given their internal weakness and international isolation and decry but to accept the terms dictated by the Kremlin.

One factor that obliged the Republic of Georgia to yield to the brutal Russian military and political demands that Georgia join the Commonwealth of Independent States or face Russian-supported Abkhazian military operations on its territorial is that the Republic of Georgia depends on Russia for 85 percent of its energy resources and was in the worst energy shape of any post-Soviet state.

Moscow combined its economic weapons with direct force to compel Georgia to surrender, adhere to the Commonwealth of Independent States and a Russian economic plan, negotiate with the self-proclaimed and self-designated Republics of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia over their sovereignty or autonomy within a much less sovereign Republic of Georgia, and accept Russian military bases there.

Russian commentators, like Valery Lipitskiy in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, now openly contend that Arab states should invest in Russian oil to prevent a Western takeover of those assets and concomitant decline of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. They also recommend that the Arabs should buy Russian arms. Russian elites generally pose these threats as objective factors along with certain geopolitical imperatives pertaining to the entire southern Commonwealth of Independent States periphery.

They assert that these countries cannot create stable polities and/or economies without Russia. Objectively, they need Russia more than Russia needs them. Russia has vital interests and a sphere of vital influence (there is no reticence about using this term) here and will do what it deems necessary regardless of outside criticism. Russia has been subsidizing these states for some time with energy supplies of finished products and refined energy purchased at prices below those of the world energy market and now demands marketization and fair price or payment for its unilateral mediation of their conflicts. Thus Russia perceives itself alone as the arbiter and peacekeeper or regional stabilizer.57

Russia's campaign to intimidate and subvert independent states in Trans-Caucasia arguably began in March 1992 when Turkey proposed a territorial solution to end this war that gave it unmediated access to a direct pipeline from the Republic of Turkmenistan that bypassed and excluded regional Iranian and Russian influence. The plan was vital to Turkey's grand design for a leading role in the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia, and for its own economy, because of the pipeline's capacity for oil shipments.

Turkey’s annual capacity of 40 million tons far exceeds Azerbaidzhan's capacity. Azeri oil production over the next few years is not expected to exceed 25 million tonnes per year. The extra capacity has been incorporated into the pipeline to attract oil transportation demand from Central Asian countries, mainly from Kazakhstan. The pipeline would integrate Turkey, Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia into a single economic and political network excluding both Russia and Iran, a solution that Russia finds intolerable.

Russia wants the pipeline to go through Novorossiisk and the Black Sea and then to Europe. The Republic of Turkey seeks to obstruct tankers’ passage through the Black Sea by invoking the 1936 Montreux Treaty and citing ecological and health dangers to Istanbul (Constantinopole) and its coast. Russia dismissed those arguments, but the real issue is the destination of the oil and gas.

The Republic of Turkey wants to build the pipeline from Turkmenistan through the Caspian Sea, or the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and then to Eastern Turkey, as the 1992 plan intended. That outcome would give Turkey predominance over the region's economy and make Armenia a landlocked Turkish satellite at the mercy of whoever controls the pipelines and the ports.

Facing this situation, Russia made a preliminary agreement, in bilateral talks with the Republic of Turkey in April 1994, to use the overland route through Turkey and continue exporting natural gas to the Republic of Turkey in return for Russian and Turkish entry into the international consortium to develop Azeri and Kazakh oil. In other words, Russia traded its insistence on a unilateral route for the oil through Russia for international acceptance of a Russian stake in the consortium.\textsuperscript{58}

Confidential sources in Ankara told a Russian reporter that Moscow had won United States assent for the Kazakh pipeline to go through Russia and thus for the Azeri pipeline that would connect with the Kazakh shipments. That assent was openly advertised in February 1994 when President Clinton told Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev that the United States preferred a Russian, i.e., not an Iranian route for Kazakh oil shipments.\textsuperscript{59}

It also made no sense for the Western consortium developing Azeri and potentially Central Asian oil fields to pay the high transit fees Turkey demands for tanker traffic through the Straits. However, at this time (September 1994) the agreement is not yet finalized and the pipeline through the Republic of Turkey is still subject to attacks from the Kurds who have already caused major damages and costs to Turkey by previous attacks there. Meanwhile, Russia's press and government continue, as well, to attack Turkey's policy.

At the same time, Russia has campaigned to force Baku to give it 20 percent of the profits of oil exploration and sales or rewrite the contract to bring in Russian firms with the Anglo-American consortium known as SOCAR and led by British Petroleum. The difference would be that Russia would not put up any equity. Russia has also raised the linked idea of sending peacemaking forces to Azerbaijan, which triggers Baku's and Ankara's staunch opposition. Otherwise Russia threatens to not mediate the war. That would, in fact, allow the Armenians to further overrun Azerbaijan.

Russia's former ambassador to Turkey, Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev, made it clear that “countries hosting Russian bases must pay for this privilege and the Republic of Azerbaijan has nothing but oil or the collateral of future receipts with which to pay”. Economic dependency on Russia will be joined to Russia's military bases, not a viable basis for sovereignty. The Republic of Azerbaijan’s Government and Parliament have duly resisted Russian peace plans, because they remove Azeri land and resources from Baku's control and sovereignty and place Russian bases there.

The Aliyev administration essentially invited Russian oil interests to join the Azerbaijan International Operating Company in order to secure a more constructive Russian stance towards Western penetration of Azerbaijan. In 1994 the Russian oil company Lukoil therefore obtained a decent 10 percent share of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company contract (Baev 2004). Baku ensured in this way that Moscow had substantial

\textsuperscript{58} “Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Islam and Energy Security in the Caucasus, The James A Parker Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, April 2006

\textsuperscript{59} “Armenia and the Middle East: Friends and Enemies in a War”. Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, Volume 38, No. 2, Winter 2005
economical interests in a project that eventually would reduce Russian influence in the Caucasus Mountains and the Near East.

Russia does not only demand a share of Azerbaijan’s oil economy. Nor does it only threaten to adopt a pose of disinterest while more Armenian offensives take place. As it has done in the Republic of Georgia, it demands permanent bases in Azerbaijan and joint Azeri-Russian border patrols, particularly as the Armenian forces have reached the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Russia ties this demand to ending the Nagorno-Karabakh War “under rigorous compliance with international norms – the guarantee of territorial integrity and the immutability of the Azerbaijan’s Republic borders.” Thus Russia demanded 20 percent of the oil deal in return for recovering the Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh but threatens further Armenian offensives if Baku does not yield.60

60*Armenia and the Middle East: Friends and Enemies in a War*. Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, Volume 38, No. 2, Winter 2005
Map 3: Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
A.1.b. War in Abkhazia

The Great War disparaged and disintegrated the Russian Empire, and the Russian Civil War debilitated and demoted the Russian Bolsheviks. However, the Red Army campaigned in the Caucasus Mountains and conquered the Trans-Caucasian Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan; the Red Army also conquered the Islamic Emirates of Dagestan, Ichkeria (Chechnya) and Abkhazia, which were also controlled by the Romanov Tsars before the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1921 in the Eastern Basin of the Black Sea.

However, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics elucidated the envenoming of the Caucasians, Indo-Iranians, Ural-Altaic and Turco-Mongolic peoples and populations and enunciated the embitterment of the Christian and Muslim peoples and populations of the Caucasus Mountains; thus, the Jaddist Movement of the Muslims of the Volga River would be emasculated and the Nur (Light) Movement of the Muslims of the Ural Mountains would be enervated so that the Russian Bolsheviks would enjoin the enforcement of Communism and enkindle the establishment of Marxism.

In 1931 Ioseb Dzhughashvili (alias Stalin), the Georgian High Commissar of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union denigrated the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and derogated to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia; this debilitated the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and disobliged the Autonomous Oblast of Adyghea (from where many Muslim Abkhazians were dislocated and dispersed throughout the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia) which was denigrated to the Mountainous People’s Autonomous Republic of the Caucasus Mountains.61

Moreover, a Christian Mingrelia from the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic named Lavrent’i Beria, contrived the campaign to ‘Kartvelianise’ the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and concocted the conversion of Muslim Abkhazians to Christianity and Marxism. In 1936, the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was insinuated with Russian, and Ukrainian Slav Christian immigrants; moreover, it was infiltrated by Armenian and Georgian Caucasian Christian immigrants that impounded the professions and properties of the Muslim Abkhazians and inherited the agricultural and pastoral lands of Moslem Abkhazians.

In the census conducted in 1989 for the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Muslim Abkhazians consisted 17.8 percent of the population of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, against the Christian Kartvelians who comprised 45.7 percent (239,872) of the population. Christian Kartvelians colonised the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and consumed the Muslim Abkhazians. Moreover, Stalin, now First

61 Marshania L. “Tragedy of Abkhazia”, Moscow Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1996
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, devised language formations and literature formulations for the Muslim Abkhazians which discredited the Caucasian Abkhazian language formations and literature formulations and delivered the Slavic Russian language formations and literature formulations, or even worse, depicted the Caucasian Georgian devised language formations and literature formulations.62

In March 1989, the Parliament of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic implored the Supreme Soviet Council to improve the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into a Full Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic and importuned the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Michael Gorbachev not to impound Abkhazia one more to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia; moreover, Lenin and Marx were idealized as ‘illuminators’ of the Muslim Abkhazians and Michael Gorbachev was immortalized as the “inciter” of Glasnost and Perestroika so as to ingratiate the Supreme Soviet Council of Moscow.

On April 9, 1989, Georgians in Tbilisi (capital of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia) deprecated the application of the delegates of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for autonomy and deflected to assaults against the deputies of the Abkhazian Muslim Spiritual Board who accredited the Abkhazian Issue to the Soviet High Commissar for the Caucasus Mountains; the Georgians caused 36 casualties (12 Muslim Abkhazians demised). On July 16-17, 1989, Abkhazian and Georgians deviated into confrontation in the Sukhumi University (capital of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and deflected into clashes which caused 16 deaths and 145 casualties.63

On July 23, 1992, the Parliament of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic declared autonomy from the Republic of Georgia and deduced abdication from the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the North Caucasus Mountains. The Republic of Georgia deprecated the defiance of the delegates of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and decried the deviation of the deputies of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. The Republic of Georgia disproved the allegation that it devolved autonomy and auto-rule to the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and dispensed attacks.

On August 14, 1992, the Georgian Police and National Guards conquered Sukhumi and captured 123 Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens; the Georgians deflorated 2,325 Abkhazian women, the discarded 1,456 Abkhazian men and deported of 6,705 Abkhazians to the Republic of Georgia; the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens decapitated 34 Georgian Policemen and National Guardsmen and dismembered 316 Georgain amles, females and children in detest to the Georgian desecration of the Republic of Abkhazia.64

In the Georgian village of Orjonikidze, Chechen and Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens deflorated 45 Georgian women, decapitated 63 Georgian men and deported 104 Georgians

64 Marshania L. “Tragedy of Abkhazia, Moscow Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Institute for Islamic Studies, 1996
only to be dismembered 5 days later. The Chechen and Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens defiled Christian monasteries, desecrated Christian churches, destroyed Georgian historical monuments, and dishonored the military legacy of Georgians.

On September 3, 1992, the Russian Federation discontented the deployment of the Georgian National Guard and Police in Pitsouna and discountenanced the displacement of the Georgian Army in Gagra; the Republic of Georgia was discommoded by Moscow to defeat the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens. Although the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia deprecated the dispensing of the Russian Army in Gagra, the Russian Federation dissociated the deployment of the Russian Army with any duplicity against the Republic of Georgia and the Georgian Army.

On October 2, 1992, Abkhazian collaborated with Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens (whom the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the North Caucasus Mountains contracted) and campaigned against Gagra; however, Kremlin coerced the Abkhazian, Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeen not to combat the Russian Army who conglomerated Gagra for the Russian Federation (navy vessels: SKP "Bezukorizenniy", "KIL-25", "BTH-38", "BM-66", "Golovin", Landing 345, // aviation aircraft SU-25, SU-27, MI-31 and anti-aircraft 643-GHJK armored contingents commanded by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russian Federation G. Kolesnikov// Russian tanker “Don” delivered 420 tons of fossil fuels to Gudauta which was controlled by Abkhazians). 65

Moreover, Gudauta and Tkvarcheli were conceded by the Russian Army to the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens who congratulated the Russian Federation and celebrated Moscow; the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens were contended with the consolidation of an Independent Republic of Abkhazia (which would confirm the coherence of the Caucasus Mountains under the conditions of the Russian Federation) and the Georgian Army was constrained to configure the Republic of Georgia from the conspiracies that Moscow colluded. However, 5,630 Georgians demised and 7,800 Georgians were dislocated from the conquered districts of Gudauta and Tkvarcheli.

On September 5, 1992, Kvemo Eshera capitulated to the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens who committed crimes against Georgian civilians. Chechen, Balkar, Avar and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains campaigned against Kamani, Shroma and Gulripshis but they were combated by the Georgian Army who captured the military contingents of the Balkar and Avar Islamic Mujahadeens. The Republic of Georgia condemned the attack of the Chechen, Balkar, Avar and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens and coerced the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains to abandon the conflict.

However, the President of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains abjured his contempt for the abnegation f the contemplation of the Republic of Georgia and adjured the conviction for the assertion of the consolidation of the

Independent Republic of Abkhazia; the President of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains asseverated the configuration of the announcement of the acclaiming of Gudauta as the Headquarters of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains which would contemplate the acquaintance of the Eastern Basin of the Black Sea with Islamism.

On March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, Head of the State Council of Georgia, commended the Georgian Army for the defense of Sukhumi, capital of the former Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, commemorated the dedication of the Georgian National Guard and Police and commiserated with the deplumation of the Georgian civilians. Moreover, Eduard Shevardnadze conducted the dialogue with the Head of the self-designated and self-declared Independent Republic of Abkhazia, Ardzinba; however, Ardzinba did not configure the decalims of the Republic of Georgia.

On March 14, 1993, Abkhazian, Chechen, Avars, Balkars, Rutuls, Kabardinians Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains, campaigned against Sukhumi and almost captured it. The Abkhazian and Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens deflorated 2,345 women, discarded 4,128 men, deported 234 children to Gudauta, the Headquarters of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains. Moreover, the Parliament of the former Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia was destroyed and the Monastery of St George was desecrated.

On July 2, 1993, the Russian Navy and Aviation Forces assaulted the Georgian National Guard and Police in the village of Tamishi and attacked the Chechen and Rutul Islamic Mujahadeens in the village Tarnoshiski; the Russian Federation accomplished the ‘Divide and Rule’ arguments in the Caucasus Mountains. The Georgian Army not only did not capitulate to the assault of the Russian Army but also captured 560 Abkhazians, Balkars and Dagestanis Islamic Mujahadeens in the assailment of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains.

The villages of Akhalsheni, Guma and Shroma were captured by the Abkhazian and Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus who committed crimes against Georgian civilians; the Georgian Army was disheartened and debilitated by the deluge of the former Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia by Islamic Mujahadeens. By the end of July, 1994, Sukhumi was sequestered under siege by the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens and secluded by the Russian Army; the Russian Army was savaged by the Republic of Georgia due to the destruction of airplanes which were deporting Georgian civilians to Tbilisi and were delivering the Georgian National Guard and Police to Sukhumi by Adenakert while Moscow was solemnized by the Abkhazians.

On July 27, 1993, the Russian Federation convoked a conference between the Georgians and Abkhazians in Sochi and compounded a ceasefire; however, the Russian Federation decoyed the Republic of Georgia for the compromise between Georgians and

Abkhazians and dissimulated the Commonwealth of Independent States from the conciliation of the Republics of Georgia and Abkhazia because Kremlin deviated from the ceasefire, the Russian Army was deployed against Sukhumi and Moscow dynamitized the conference so that concessions would not be deduced.

On September 16, the Russian Army and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains captured Sukhumi. Eduard Shevardnadze and 63,000 Georgian civilians escaped death and eluted capture; the delegates and deputies of the nominal Abkhazian Government Council -Zhiuli Shartava, Guram Gabiskiria and Raul Eshba- were executed; 7,678 Georgian male and females expected demise, 1,654 Georgian females experienced defloration, 3,467 Georgian children enlisted deportation to Gudauta, the Headquarters of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains.

Eduard Shevardnadze declared that: “Abkhazian Muslims intend to expropriate Georgian institutes in Greek coveted Fassilis and Kolhis, extort Georgian institutions in Roman celebrated Iberia, expunge Georgian influence and intuitions in Christian Lazica and Alania, encroach on the Georgian inoculations upon culture and civilization, […] history will evince the Abkhazian horrors, history will exhibit the Georgian heritage because the Muslim Jihadis cannot expostulate with the United Nations Organization or the Commonwealth of Independent Sates against the expiation of the righteous punishment upon the Abkhazian nation and the exoneration of the penalization of the Georgian nation.”

In September 1994, the Republic of Armenian confronted the Abkhazians Islamic Mujahadeens and combated for the city of Gali; the contest of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Abkhazia confirmed the conflict between Christianity and Islam, Democracy and Autocracy on the Caucasus Mountains. the Republic of Armenia defeated the Abkhazians Islamic Mujahadeen; thus, the Armenian Army was not diverted by the Nagorno-Karabakh War and decimated the Azeri Army in the battle of Susha. Moreover, Kodori Gorge was invaded by the Georgian National Guard and incorporated in the Republic of Georgia after the incrimination of the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens by the Armenians.

The Abkhazian War cost the Republic of Georgia the demise of 18,456 civilians, the demise of 5,034 conscripts, the disappearance of 2,127 captured civilians and conscripts, the dislocation of 256,000 Georgian civilians. The heavy number of Georgian civilian fatalities should be allocated to the harsh climatic and geographical conditions which accompanied the migration to the Republic of Georgia from the mountainous terrains of Abkhazia.

Moreover, the Abkhazians suffered 4,257 military fatalities while 6,240 Abkhazian civilians were subjected to massacres; 23,000 Abkhazians have migrated to the Russian Federation. The Independent Republic of Abkhazia has not yet been recognized by the international community (like the example of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh). However,

Moscow takes advantage of the bleeding wound of the Independent Republic of Abkhazia that still plagues the internal politics of the Republic of Georgia so as to extort privileges and assert its authority.  

Oxford Professor S.N. MacFarlane, notes on the issue of Russian mediation in Abkhazia: “As one group of influential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put it in May 1996, 'it is definitely not in Russia’s interest to see outside mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union'. The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ‘near abroad’ is evident in its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the former Soviet Union...”

‘Moreover, the policy of Kremlin is intending to reassert control over the Soviet air defence network, to obtain agreements on basing Russian forces in the non-Russian republics, and by its obvious sensitivity to external military presences on the soil of the former Soviet Union. To judge from Russian policy on Caspian Sea and Central Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/security realm and into the economic one.’

In December 1993, the United Nations Organization, the Russian Federation and the Group of Friends of Georgia (United States of America, the Republics of France, Germany and the United Kingdom) implemented conciliation through the imposition of a ceasefire; the Russian Federation instigated the Republic of Abkhazia to compromise with the Republic of Georgia and incited the Commonwealth of Independent States to configure the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The Confederation of the Mountain Peoples’ of the Caucasus Mountains implored the Russian Federation to intervene so as to intercept the insults of the Group of Friends of Georgia (United States of America, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom).

On April 4, 1994, the contract "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict" was concluded in Moscow which conveyed the deployment of military contingents of the Commonwealth of Independent States and confirmed the denigration of the Republic of Abkhazia from the international affairs. On May 21, 1994, the Organization of the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States corrugated the delegation of the contract; Moscow conjectured the discountenance of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and conjured the deprecation of the claims of the (de facto independent) Republic of Abkhazia.

In June 1994, deputies of the United Nations High Commissionary on Conflicts and Disasters and delegates of the Commonwealth of Independent States arrived in the self-proclaimed and self-asserted Independent Republic of Abkhazia, but aborted the demise and displacements of Georgians; therefore, 1,234 Georgians were discarded by the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeens and 21,567 Georgians were dislodged. On December 15, 1994, the

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69 Amy McCallion, “Abkhazian Separatism”, Institute for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, New York, 1999

United States’ Department condemned Abkhazia’s declaration of independence and declaims of the implementation of the Geneva Accords on Civilians and Captives during Warfare.71

On March 21, 1995, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons condemned the Republic of Abkhazia for the demise of 64 Georgian civilians and the deportation of 123 Georgian and Russian civilians; the Russian Federation did not ignore the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and impeached the Republic of Abkhazia for the insult of the human life and dignity. Thus, the Republic of Abkhazia had to comply with the investigation and inquiry that Moscow configured.

In April-May, 1998, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict escalated in the Gali District when Abkhaz Islamic Mujahadeens engaged the Georgian National Guard and Police in the villages of Teraman, Vopirteg and Zemun and expelled the Georgian civilians. Eduard Shevardnadze, President of the Republic of Georgia, requested that the Georgian National Guard and Police retrogressed from the Gali District and rejected the repugnance of the Republic of Abkhazians; on May 20, 1998, the Abkhazians Islamic Mujahadeen were repelled from the villages of Teraman, Vopirteg and Zemun and retreated in the Republic of Abkhazia. However, Eduard Shevardnadze recriminated the Georgian Army against the rupture with the Russian Federation and recriminated the Georgian Army.

In October 2001, 516 Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens and 84 Georgians Policemen defeated the Abkhazian Islamic Mujahadeen in the Kodori Valley and decimated them in Gaudita; nevertheless, Russian Army defeated the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens and captured the Georgians Policemen outside Sukhumi.

Oxford Professor S.N. MacFarlane, notes on the issue of Russian mediation in Abkhazia: “Notably, it is clear that Russian policy makers are uncomfortable with the idea of a prominent role being granted to external actors in dealing with conflict in the former Soviet space. More recently, this has been extended specifically to the activities of international organisations in the management of conflict. As one group of influential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put it in May 1996, ‘it is definitely not in Russia’s interest and benefit to see outside mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union’. [...]72

“Russia has clear hegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet space. Although a wide array of opinions is expressed on Russian policy in the newly independent states in the media and in parliament, a dominant consensus appears to have emerged among foreign policy influentials on the need for active presence and influence in the area. Such views have been widely expressed in official statements, influential statements by independent policy groups, and by advisers to the president, influential political figures, and the president himself.”

71 Amy McCallion, “Abkhazian Separatism”, Institute for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, New York, 1999
“The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ‘near abroad’ is evident in its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the former Soviet Union, to reassume control over the Soviet air defence network, to obtain agreements on basing Russian forces in the non-Russian republics, and by its obvious sensitivity to external military presences (including multilateral ones) on the soil of the former Soviet Union.”

“To judge from Russian policy on Caspian Sea and Central Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/security realm and into the economic one. Its sources are diverse, and include the Russian imperial hangover, but more practically the fate of the Russian diaspora, the lack of developed defences along the borders of the Russian Federation proper, concern over Islam, and discomfort with the spill-over effects of instability in the other republics.”

Leonid Radzikhovsky is a political analyst and independent journalist who stated that: “The tangled and antagonizing history of relations between Georgia and Russia from 1991 through to 2004 awaits scrupulous analysis. Attempting any guess as to who is to blame is useless at the moment. It may have been Zviad Gamsakhurdia with his affected anti-Russian hysteria; Russian generals who helped the Abkhazians to fight with the Georgians; Shamil Basayev’s Abkhazian battalion engaged in the massacre of the Georgians, who believed that it was directed by Moscow; the United State., convinced that a pro-American Georgia must preferably be anti-Russian; or the warlord Ruslan Gelayev and his gang that took hiding in the Pankisi Gorge. No one can draw a commonly shared opinion on all of these factors today. Moreover, it is unwise to build relations that are based on the balance sheet of past reciprocal offenses”.

“It seems to me that gaining new territories is precisely the thing that Russia does not need these days. Moreover, if it does need new territories, it is worthwhile seeking them in any other place, even on the North Pole, but not in the Caucasus Mountains. I dare say that Chechnya is quite enough for us now. To support foreign separatism means to throw stones at your neighbors while living in a glass house. Should we really do this even if we love our neighbors so dearly”?

“Supporting the separatists may have played into our hands – we have something to bargain over. If our goal is to wipe out the terrorists in their backyards, then Russia must offer Georgia a compromise. The Georgians have an interest in restoring their territorial integrity, encompassing Abkhazia. The Russians have an interest in building an alliance with Georgia to fight against terrorists.”

73 Andersen, Andrew. “Russia versus Georgia: One Undeclared War in the Caucasus”, Journal of Islamic Studies, October 2001
74 Andersen, Andrew. “Russia versus Georgia: One Undeclared War in the Caucasus”, Journal of Islamic Studies, October 2001
A.1.c. Ossetian-Ingush Conflict

In the Campaign in the Caucasus Mountains in the middle of 19th century, the Caucasian Ingush collaborated with the Imperial Russian Army and cooperated with the Romanov Tsars so as to conquer the Central and West Caucasus Mountains. Thus, the Tsars conceded Vladikavkaz (Master of the Caucasus) in the Central Caucasus Mountains to the
Caucasian Ingush so as to compensate them for their collaboration; the Autonomous Okrug of Ingushetia was created in 1881.

After the depletion of the Great War and the dissolution of the Russian Empire in the Brest-Litofsk Peace Treaty, the Caucasian Ingushes were defeated by the Trans-Caucasian Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and were deported to the Western Caucasus Mountains. However, the anointment of the Supreme Soviet Council and the affiliation of the Muslims of the Volga River and the Ural Mountains with the Bolshevik Government arose the aspirations of the Ingush Muslims for accreditation of the Autonomous Okrug of Ingushetia and assumed the ambitions of the approval of the Jaddist Movement.

Thus, in 1920 the Bolshevik Government allocated allurements to the Ingush Muslims so as to abnegate the arrangements of the Mensheviks; the Ingush Muslims were abstracted to the Central Caucasus Mountains and were affirmed the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Ingushetia. The Ingush abjured their affiliation within the Bolshevik Government and adjoined their abolishment of the Mensheviks. However, the Mensheviks advocated wider autonomy and auto-rule to the Ingush and adumbrated the assertion of an Islamic Emirate o Sultanate.

As a consequence, during the Russian Civil War the Ingush Muslims combated the Bolsheviks and collaborated with the Mensheviks; however, the Red Army captured the Islamic Emirate of Ingushetia and the Ingush capitulated. The Leninist-Marxist Government animadverted on the Ingush for the conspiracies they colluded and accused the Ingush Muslims for the contracts they concluded; the Ingush asseverated the convictions of the Mensheviks, but the Bolsheviks did not condone their abandonment in the crisis of the Russian Civil War.

In 1924, the Leninist-Marxist Government conjectured the Autonomous Oblast of Ingushetia which was conglomerated in the Mountainous People’s Autonomous Republic of the Caucasus Mountains; the Russian Bolsheviks conjured the Ingush against the convictions of Pan-Islamism and contoverted with the Ingush against the configuration of the Jaddist Movement. The control of Vladikavkaz (Master of the Caucasus) was consigned by the Supreme Soviet Council to the Ossetian Autonomous Oblast so as to celebrate the cooperation with the Indo-Iranians Ossetians.

In 1934, Stalin, High Commissar of the Communist Party in the Caucasus Mountains, demoted the Autonomous Oblast of Ingushetia and denigrated to the Chechen Autonomous Oblast so as to delegate the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast which was derogated to the Mountainous People’s Autonomous Republic of the Caucasus Mountains. Thus, the designation of the “Ingush Islamic Emirate” was debilitated and the declaration of the “Chechen Islamic Emirate” was also deplored by the Russian Bolsheviks. Stalin condemned them in dislocations in 1938 in the Central and Northern Caucasus Mountains; he conceived their duplicity in the Jaddist Movement and he chastened them with dislodgment.

76 “Soviet Policies towards Muslims in the Caucasus: Islamic Minorities in the former Soviet Union”, Islam Around the World, Prince Fayzall Academy of Islamic University
In 1943, during Hitler’s Caucasus Campaign, the Ingush Muslims defected to the Nazi Germans and decoyed the Supreme Soviet Council. The Ingush and Chechen Muslims cooperated with the German Wermacht which defrauded them with the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) and collaborated with the Vlasov Movement which also deceived them with the consignment of 2 Battalions of Russian and Tatars of the “Liberated Democracy of Russia”. However, after the Red Army defeated Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War, the Ingush Muslims were delivered to the Bolshevik Government.

On 24 February, 1944, 76,000 Ingush Muslims were dislocated to concentration camps to Siberia and Central Asia; 34,000 Ingushes demised in the labour contingents. In April 1957, the Supreme Soviet Council arranged the accumulation of the Ingush and Chechen Muslims in the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic and accorded to accumulate them again in June 1958 in the Central Caucasus Mountains where the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast was allocated to accommodate them; however the district of Podirogny was abstracted from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast and allocated to the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.77

Nevertheless, in 1961, Ingush Muslim deluged the district of Podirogny (which was devolved upon the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast) and declaimed the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. However, the district of Podirogny was designated to the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and Vladikavkaz (Master of the Caucasus) was devolved upon the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast; moreover, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast was denigrated to the Russian Federation.

On April 26, 1991, the Supreme Soviet Council of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics confirmed the articles 3 and 6 of the Constitution after the delegation of Ingush Muslims complained about the devolvement of the district of Prigorodny upon the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast: “Stalin, Father of Peoples of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Victor of the Great Patriotic War, reprieved Ingush Muslims for their Nazist and Fascist redemption in 1944 to relocation and rehabilitation to the Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Taymyria, Yakutia,\{…\} However, the Supreme Soviet Council retrograd from the repercussions against Ingush Muslims in 1957\{…\}”

‘As a result, Ossetians in the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast ought to relinquish their claims and contests from the Ingush Muslim’s commodities \{…\} Confiscations should be reimbursed to Ingush Muslims, commodities should be reinstated to Ingush Muslims, compounds should be ratified to Ingush Muslims \{…\} Every discommoding or discontenting comportment of Ossetians against Ingush should be reproved and reprimanded by the Soviet authorities in command’78

77 “Soviet Policies towards Muslims in the Caucasus: Islamic Minorities in the former Soviet Union”, Islam Around the World, Prince Fayzall Accademy of Islamic University
On October 30, 1992, Ingush Islamist Mujahadeens attacked the Prigorodny District and on November 2 assaulted the Valdikavkaz District. The Russian Federation condemned the attacks and counselled the abnegation of the “Islamic Emirate of Ingushetia”; moreover, it did not concur in the affiliation of the Prigorodny District and did not consent in the absorption of the Valdikavkaz District by the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia. Furthermore, Moscow chastened the Ingush Islamist Mujahadeens and chastised the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia. The Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia contains 632,428 inhabitants which as national consistency indicate 61 percent Ossetians, include 30 percent Russians and incorporate 9 percent Ingush Muslims.

On November 2, 1992, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, issued a Federal Decree which declared that the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic would inherit the Prigorodny District and designated that the Valdikavkaz District would be impounded by the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic. Moreover, the Russian Army intervened in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, intercepted the Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens and infringed upon the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia.

Approximately 610 Ingush Muslims demised, 63 Ossetian Christians demised, 1,257 Ingush Muslims were dispatched by the Ossetian Republican Guard in Moscow and 476 Ingush Muslims have disappeared, 65,000 Ingush and 9,000 Ossetians have been dislocated in the Autonomous Republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. By 1995, all Ossetian refugees have been repatriated to the Prigorodny and Vladikavkaz Districts; nonetheless, 4,000 Ingush Muslim refugees were rehabilitated to the Prigorodny District.79

On October 11, 2002, the Presidents of the Autonomous Republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed “The Agreement for Promoting Cooperation and Neighborly Relations” which signaled the alleviation of slur and slander between the Ossetian Christians and the Ingush Muslims. However, the Beslan hostage crisis of 2004 hampered the friendly acquaintances and harboured fellings of vengeance among Ossetians.

A.1.d. First Chechen War

"We are like a herd of horses. When we sense danger, we unite immediately in order to confront it. As soon as the danger disappears, however, we start turning on one another.” Chechen proverb

In December 1991, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was dissolved and the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern Europe was disintegrated; in March 1992 the Commonwealth of Independent Sates was declared and the Russian Federation was

designated along with the Republics of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania (States of the Baltic Sea), Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Moreover, the denomination of the “Soviet Client State” of Mongolia was declaimed by the Russian Federation.

In April 1990, Boris Yeltsin, candidate of the All-Fatherland-Russia, confronted Michael Gorbachev, candidate of the Comunist Party of the Russian Federation, and contested for the conclave of the Prime Minister and President of the Russian Federation; Boris Yeltsin disseminated the allocation and accentuation of the autonmoy to the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation and Michael Gorbachev deciphered the abrogation and abolishemnt of the auto-rule of the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation. Thus, Boris Yeltsin animadverted Michael Gorbachev on “Russian Chauvinism” and ascribed the Comunist Party of the Russian Federation the aberration of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Boris Yeltsin was annoinnted President of the Russian Federation and Michael Gorbachev was accredited Prime Minsister of the Russian Federation; Boris Yeltsin abjured the allocation of autonomy to the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation and adjured the Russian Government on the accommodation of auto-rule of the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation. Michael Gorbachev asseverated the abrogation of the arrangements of autonomy lest the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics should be abolished and aborted.

However, on March 31, 1991, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, and Ruslan Khasblatov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, concluded the contract of the “Russian Federation Treaty” which contemplated the consignment of autonomy to the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation and consented the consessions of auto-rule to the Muslim Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics of the Volga River, the Ural Mountains and the Caucasus Mountains. Thus, 86 (from 88) Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation concured with the Russian Government upon the correspondnce to the appeal for autonomy and configured the conciliation upon the arengments on autorule.80

However, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tatarstan controverted with the Russian Federation against the compromise of the “Russian Federation Treaty” and concocted the creation of the Muslim Full Soviet Socialist Republic of Tatarstan; the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic did not certify the “Russian Federation Treaty” which circumscribed the consolidation of the “Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria” and

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80 “Chechnya and the Cetralization of Moscow’s Athourity: Implications and Ramifications in the Russian Federation”, Moscow Institute for International Affairs, Fund for Caucasus and Central Asia Regional Studies, December 2006
challenged the Russian Federation upon the conglomeration of the Ingush and Chechen Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republics in the Caucasus Mountains.

On September 6, 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev, Head of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, coerced the Cechens to castigate the Russian Federation and compelled the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens to campaign against the Supreme Soviet Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Vitali Kutsenko, Chief of the Communist Party of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for Groznyy, was decapitated, the Supreme Soviet Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was dissolved and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was deviated from the Russian Federation.

Dzhokhar Dudayev, Head of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, exonerated the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from the elusion from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, expiated the Communist Party of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for the eviction from the Russian Federation and the establishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, exorcised the Supreme Soviet Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic against the envenoming of the Russian Federation and exostulated with the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains against the erection of the “Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria” and the enforcement of the Pan-Islamistic Movement.

Moreover, Dzhokhar Dudayev did not espouse the emergence of the Wahhabite Mazhab of Islam which emanated from the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and did not endorse in the embracement of the Hanfi Mazhab which was emitted by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On the contrary, Dzhokhar Dudayev enjoined the emulation of the Hanfi Mazhab which was enshrined by the Republic of Turkey and enkindled the Neo-Jadiddist Movement which was enlightened by the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tatarstan in the Volga River.81

In June 1991, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was segregated into the separate Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics; the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Ingushetia was sequestrated into the Russian Federation and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Chechnya was sequestered in the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria savaged the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic for the surrogation of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and stigmatized the Russian Federation for the suspension of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Ingushetia.

In July 1991, approximately, 76,320 Russians and 41,365 Chechens depreciated the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, depreciated Dzhokhar Dudayev and departed for the Russian Federation. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was castigated by the the Commonwealth of

81 “Chechnya and the Cetralization of Moscow’s Authority: Implications and Ramifications in the Russian Federation”, Moscow Institute for International Affairs, Fund for Caucasus and Central Asia Regional Studies, December 2006
Independent Nations and condemned by the Republic of Armenia; thus the Chechen “Government in Exile” collaborated with Yerevan and was commended by Tashkent in the conspiracy it colluded to combat Dzhokhar Dudayev and confront the Islamic Mujahadeens.  

In March 1992, the Chechen “Government in Exile” orchestrated the overthrow of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the obliteration of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People; however, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens obviated the Chechen “Government in Exile” which was later ostracized by Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Chechens oscillated between the offers of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains and the orders of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and, on the other hand, the obligations of the Russian Federation. Dzhokhar Dudayev was offended by Moscow…

The Russian Army defeated the Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia and decimated the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia; Dzhokhar Dudayev disconcerted the Russian Federation against the disintegration of the Neo-Jaaldist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in the Volga River and derogated the Commonwealth of Independent Nations against the depression of the Muslim Jihad in Central Asia, in the Republic of Tajikistan. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was declared the defender of Islam and Prophet Muhammad in the Caucasus Mountains and Dzhokhar Dudayev designated the Muslim Jihad.

The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was connected with the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States and was configured within the Global Islamic League; moreover, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria conjectured the cosolidation of the Hanafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and conjured the conversion of Chechens in the Wahabbite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula. Dzhokhar Dudayev conceded that the he conceived the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria the concept of the “Islamic Emirate” only so as to contrive the collaboration and co-option of the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States.

Dudayev commented on the percolation of Radical Islam in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria: “I would like the Chechen Republic to be an institutional secular state. This is what we are fighting for; this is the ideal that we seek to achieve....If religion takes priority over an institutional secular system, a more striking form of the Spanish inquisition and Islamic fundamentalism will emerge [in Chechnya].” After a while, however, he had to turn to Islam publicly so as to draw support.

The President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, who was fond of Armenian cognac, emphatically urged his fellow countrymen from television screens to pray three times a day as proper Muslims, while in fact the rules of (Sunni) Islam dictate that adherents pray

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82 “Dudayev’s Regime: Vacillation Between Nationalism and Islamism”, Journal of Ilamic Studies, Berkley University, May 2005
83a “Dudayev’s Regime: Vacillation Between Nationalism and Islamism”, Journal of Ilamic Studies, Berkley University, May 2005
five times per day. In an interview he gave shortly before his death, Dudayev explained the essence of the country's development: "Russia has forced us to choose the path of Islam, even though we were not duly prepared to adopt Islamic values."

In March 1992, the Chechen “Government in Exile” orchestrated the overthrow of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the obliteration of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People; however, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens obviated the Chechen “Government in Exile” which was later ostracized by Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Chechens oscillated between the offers of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains and the orders of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and, on the other hand, the obligations of the Russian Federation and the oath of the Tashkent Conference of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Dzhokhar Dudayev was offended by Moscow for the second time… 84

In August 1994, the Chechen “Government in Exile” coerced the Russian Federation to combat the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; the Russian Army on August 15, 1994, campaigned against the Ingush and Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens who had camped to the frontier border between the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia and the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia. Dzhokhar Dudayev congegated the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens in the capital city of Groznyy and consecrated the Abkhazian and Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens in the city of Shali.

On October 13, 1994, military contingents of the mobile artillery detachments and military contingents of the aviation detachments of the Russian Army assailed Groznyy and attacked Shali and accessed Shahin. On October 18, 1994, the Chechen “Government in Exile” and the Russian Army assailed Groznyy and attacked Shali; however, the National Guard of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria aborted the assault against Shali and abregated the attack against the capital city of Groznyy.

On November 26, 1994, the Chechen “Government in Exile” and the Russian Army combatted the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in Groznyy and confronted the Abkhazian and Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens in Shali; the Abkhazian and Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens in Shali capitulated to the Russian Army but the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in Groznyy were not conquered by the Chechen “Government in Exile” and confiscated contingents of the mobile artillery detachments of the Russian Army and captured Russian and Chechen conscripts of the Russian Federation.

On November 29, 1994, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, issued an ultimatum which impeded conflict between the Russian Army and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, inhibited the confrontation between the Chechen “Government in Exile” and the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens and intercepted the cogitation of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains; moreover, it indicated the confiscation of the Chechen 123th Armored Infantry Brigade and implied the capitulation of the National Guard of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

84 “Dudayev’s Regime: Vacillation Between Nationalism and Islamism”, Jounal of Ilamic Studies, Berkley University, May 2005
On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin, declared that “Chechen dictator Dzhokhar Dudayev was a sanctimonious and sanguinary domineer that has converted the sedulous and solemn Chechens into servile and submissive contumacious combatants, sequestrated and segregated the Chechens’ commodities and commotions for his own dereliction, sequestered and secluded the Chechen Autonomous Republic from the Russian Federation and committed sacrileges against sacrosanct Islamic institutions and imprecations within the context of self-determination and self-righteousness.”

Akhmad Kadyrov declared that “Russia denigrates Chechen Muslims, disrespects Ingush Mohammedans, despises Abkhaz Muslims, depreciates Dagestan Mohammedans, discredits Azerbaijan Moslems, dogmatizes Russian Islamic denominations, dissent Russian Muslim doctrines, disorients the ideology and the influence of Prophet Mohammad in order to infringe upon Dar el Islam and impinge on Sunni Caliphate and Shia Imamate. Chechnya is not an Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation; it is an Independent Islamic Republic or Emirate.”

“We shall discommode the Slav domination, we shall discountenance the Christian domineers. We will not dissimulate our vehemence for the Russian Federation, but we shall display our vengeance upon Slavs and our vindication upon the Westerners. We summon all Muslims to deplore the campaign of Russians, denounce the crimes of Slavs. We shall not expiate to punishments, we shall not expostulate to protests, we shall not be extirpated with penalties, and we shall not be expunged from the memories of history of Dar el-Islam and we shall celebrate the Jihad of Muslims!”

In December 6, 1994, Pavel Gratchev, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, and Dzhokhar Dudayev concurred not to continue the conflict between the Russian Army and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, or the confrontation between the Chechen “Government in Exile” and the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens; nevertheless, on December 11, 1994, the Russian Army desecrated the conciliation and defiled the claims of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; the Air Force of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was not only defeated but entirely decimated in just 2 hours.

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin commanded the Russian Army to campaign against Groznyy, the capital city of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; however, Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Eduard Vorobyov, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Russian Army, contoverted with Boris Yeltsin against the campaign against Groznyy and castigated the campaign against the Russian citizens of Groznyy. Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Eduard Vorobyov, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Russian Army, did not comply with the commands of Boris Yeltsin and did not concur with the counsels of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense.

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85 “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, August 2004
86 “Salafism and Wahhabism in the Caucasus; The Chechen Adventure”, Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion, July 2005
Emil Pain, the Advisor on Nationality and Ethnicity Issues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, discredited the commands of Boris Yeltsin and deprecated the counsels of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense as far as the campaign against Groznyy is concerned; moreover, Emil Pain deflected from the compliance to the credentials of Kremlin and demonstrated his condemnation of the corruption of Moscow which debilitated and degenerated the combat against the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens.

Furthermore, Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Boris Gromov, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, discredited the commands of Boris Yeltsin anddeprecated the counsels of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense as far as the campaign against Groznyy is concerned; Colonel-General of the Russian Army Boris Gromov deplored the comfort to the cerifications of Kremlin and depraved the corcondance to the comprehensions of Moscow.

Major-General of the Russian Army, Borys Poliakov, who had defeated the Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens in the Battle of Kandahar and had decimated the Pakistanis Islamic Mujahadeens in the Battle of Kabul in the Afghan Civil War, defied the commands of Boris Yeltsin and denigrated the counsels of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense as far as the campaign against Groznyy is concerned; therefore, he denounced the contemplations of Moscow about the Chechen War.

Major-General of the Russian Army, Borys Poliakov reclaimed the commission of Moscow to conquer the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and devalued the conformation of Kremlin to capture the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens. Thus, Colonel-General of the Russian Army Eduard Vorobyov, Emil Pain, and Colonel-General of the Russian Army Boris Gromov and Major-General of the Russian Army, Borys Poliakov were discharged and demoted from the Russian Army by Boris Yeltsin.

Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, savaged Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Eduard Vorobyov and Emil Pain and scavenged Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Boris Gromov and Major-General of the Russian Army, Borys Poliakov; Boris Yeltsin slandered Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Eduard Vorobyov as sanctimonious and scurrilous and slurred Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Boris Gromov as sumbissive and servile. Moreover, Boris Yeltsin scolded Emil Pain as sententious towards the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and scorned Major-General of the Russian Army, Borys Poliakov as scrupulous and scavenging.

The Russian Army was permeated with the propaganda of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation which prognosticated the defeat and decimation of the Russian Army and was percolated with the promulgations of Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Boris

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87 "The Chechen War and the Russian Amy: Intrigue, Dispute and Confrontation”, Department of Military History, Institute of Political Sciences, United States Agency for International Development, March 2007
88 "The Chechen War and the Russian Amy: Intrigue, Dispute and Confrontation”, Department of Military History, Institute of Political Sciences, United States Agency for International Development, March 2007
Gromov who predicated the destruction of the Russian Army. Boris Yeltsin prescribed that the propaganda of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation predisposed negatively the Russian Army and proscribed that the promulgations of Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Boris Gromov prejudiced the Ministry of Defense; thus, Boris Yeltsin pressurised the Ministry of Internal Affairs to propagate the victory of the Russian Army.

However, the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment was discommode in the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia and was debilitating by the Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens; the Abkhazians and Dagestanis Islamic Mujahadeens disconvenienced the 236th Motorized Rifle Regiment in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia and decoyed the Russian Field Commander of the Caucasus Mountains. Moreover, the 12th Airborn Division of the Spetnaz (Special Forces) of the Russian Army was disheartened and demoralized in Dolinskoye after the Chechen Mujahadeens defeated them and defected.

On December 21, 1994, Boris Yeltsin declared an amnesty for the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Field Commander of the Caucasus Mountains, deliberated an amnesty for the Abkhazian, Afghan, Ingush and Dagestanis Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains; however, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens desecrated the amnesty and decoyed the Russian Army into an ambush. The 226th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Russian Army was defeated and dispersed.

From December 1994 to January 1995, military detachments of mobile artillery contingents and military detachments of aircraft contingents assailed Groznyy, the capital of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and military detachments of motorized rifle regiments and military detachments of armored infantry brigades attacked the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in the outskirts of Groznyy. The Russian and Chechen civilians of Groznyy were decimated by the aerial bombardments and the ground battles and were deprived of medical and pharmaceutical treatment, food and water supply and electrical facilities.

On New Year’s Eve, the Ground Forces of the Russian Forces invaded Groznyy, insinuated in the Military Barracks of the Chechen National Guard and infiltrated as far as the Presidential Palace of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; however, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens intercepted the 67th Armored Infantry Division and inflicted the Maikov Motorized Rifle Regiment. Many Russian and Chechen conscripts (of the Chechen Government in Exile) were captured by the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens.

On January 7, 1995, the Ground Forces of the Russian Forces conquered Groznyy and captured the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens; however, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria did not capitulate and correlated the capital to the city of Novogronesk. The Russian Army deflected to atrocities against the Chechens and desecrated the amnesty; 16, 345 Chechen males demised, 1,234 Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens were decapitated, 6,784 Chechen

females were deflorated and 4,196 Chechen children were deported to the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan in the Volga River.\(^{90}\)

The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe castigated the Russian Federation for the destruction of Groznyy, former capital city of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and condemned the Russian Army for the discarding of the captives of the Chechen National Guard; Helmut Kohl, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, contovered with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, against the depression of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and conjectured the Commonwealth of Independent States for the duplicity in the “genocide of the Chechen people”.

Dzhokhar Dudayev recriminated the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation against the cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, reprimanded the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of the Commonwealth of Independent States against the collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and remonstrated to the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States against the compromise with the Chechen “Government in Exile”. Moreover, Dzhokhar Dudayev reproached the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the records with the Russian Army in Groznyy and repressed the reconciliation with the Chechen “Government in Exile”.

Moreover, Dzhokhar Dudayev rescinded the configuration with the Russian Federation and relegated the conglomeration with the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Alma Ata Conference in April 1995; Dzhokhar Dudayev remitted from the repression of the National Guard of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the capitulation in Groznyy and the reprieved from the redemption of criticism of the Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains till the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria recuperated from the conquest of Groznyy and recovered from the disastrous campaign in Khankala.

The Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens retrogressed to the Caucasus Mountains in the South of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Ingush Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains retreated in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan; any Chechen Muslim who collaborated with the Russian Army was revenged, any Chechen Muslim who cooperated with the Chechen “Government in Exile” was requited, any Chechen Islamic Mujahadeen who combated the Russian Army was revered and any Afghan and Ingush or Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeen who confronted the Russian Army was recompensated.\(^{91}\)

Moscow reformed the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation and Kremlin redesigned the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, reassigned the Union of the Moslems of the


Russian Federation lest the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States ruptured the Euro-Islam of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan and relegated the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan. The Global Islamic League did not ratify the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and did not reciprocate the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan.\textsuperscript{92}

The Russian Federation espoused the eradication of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and endorsed on the elimination of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains; Boris Yeltsin elucidated the extirpation of the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and enunciated the erosion of the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from the Caucasus Mountains. However, the Russian Federation was emasculated by the Chechen War and the Republic of Armenia was enervated by the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Muslims of the Caucasus Mountains were exonerated from the entrapments of the Neo-Jaddist Movement and expiated the evangelization of the Islamic Jihad; thus, the Muslims of the Caucasus Mountains expostulated with Kremlin against the escalation of the Chechen War.

On March 6, 1996, Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens captured an aircraft of the Republic of Cyprus so as to condemn the crimes that the Russian Army and the Chechen “Government in Exile” committed against the civilians of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; moreover, Turks Muslims captured a ship of the Turkish Republic which conveyed Russian tourists to Izmir (Smyrna) and castigated the crimes that the Russian Army committed after the conquest of Groznyy.

Dzhokhar Dudayev idealized the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and immortalized the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which inflamed the Islamic Jihad in the Caucasian Muslims; Dzhokhar Dudayev also instigated the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan which in turn ignited the Islamic Jihad in the Caucasian Muslims. Dzhokhar Dudayev implored the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains to incite 1,634 Dagestanis, 834 Georgian and 1,286 Abkhazian Muslims to be immolated as Islamic Martyrs and importuned the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation for the indication of 601 Ingushes, 734 Azeris and 2,567 Tatars to be immolated as Islamic Martyrs.\textsuperscript{93}

Dzhokhar Dudayev ingratiated the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic Sates for the incorporation of 296 Iranians, 321 Arabs and 863 Afghans and interceded with the Global Islamic League for the ingestion of 564 Turks and 128 Pakistanis in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; the Caucasus Front of the Chechen War was inaugurated and the “Guerilla Warfare of the Russian Cities” was innovated. Thus, “Terrorism and Brutality” were imputed to Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens.

\textsuperscript{92} “Salafism and Wahhabism in the Caucasus; The Chechen Adventure”, Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion, July 2005

\textsuperscript{93} “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, August 2004
In March 1995, the Russian Army repulsed the Chechen and Tatar Islamic Mujahadeens from Kaskatli and repelled the Dagestanis and Georgian Islamic Mujahadeens from Krudentli; the Abkhazian and Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens retreated to the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia and the Turks and Azeris Islamic Mujahadeens retrogressed to the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan. The Russian Army ravaged the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia with repercussions against the Ingush Muslims and retributions against the Chechen and Russian refugees.

The Health Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia was reputed to have been reduced by the Russian Army due to the remonstration to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation against the repercussions against the Ingush Muslims and the recrimination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation against the retributions against the Chechen refugees. The Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev reprimanded the Russian Army for the ravaging of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia.

The Cossacks of the Don River and the Cossacks of the Kuban Peninsula supported the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, succored the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains and sabotaged the Russian Federation; moreover, the Cossacks of the Don River sensitized the Autonomous Republic of Adyghea for the savaging and scavenging of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and sanitized the Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria against the slurs and slanders of the Russian Federation. However, the Cossacks of the Don River and the Cossacks of the Kuban Peninsula scorned Dzhokhar Dudayev and scolded the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens because they were stigmatized for the Guerilla Warfare of the Russian Cities”.

On March 6, 1996, 1,500 Afghan, Tatar and Turkish Islamic Mujahadeens insinuated Shatoy and 2,000 Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens infiltrated Grozny; the Russian Army in Grozny was annihilated and the Army of the Chechen “Government in Exile” abandoned Shatoy. Ibn al-Khattab, Field Commander of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, destroyed the Reconnaissance Company of the 112th Infantry Division and defeated the 2nd Motor Rifle Battalion of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment near Shatoy; however, the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 324th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the Battalion of the 104th Airborne Division and Battalion of the 7th Airborne Division, assaulted Shatoy and assailed Shalayef which were conquered.94

On April 21, 1996, the Russian Army defeated the National Guard of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and discarded Dzhokhar Dudayev. The Russian Federation was deceived by the duplicity of the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens and was defrauded by the debilitation of the Republic of Ichkeria, and as a result, Moscow declared that the Chechen War was deciphered; however, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens were not disheartened or demoralized by the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev…

More than 1,500 Chechen fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, (Field Commander of the Republic of Ichkeria), again moved in by trucks and cars in a carefully orchestrated assault against Groznyy. Within hours, they had overrun the key districts, and laid siege to the Russian posts and bases and the government compound in the centre, in spite of the fact that the Russians had about 12,000 troops in and around Grozny. Russian troops in Argun and Gudermes were also surrounded in their garrisons. A number of Chechens deemed to be collaborators were rounded up, detained, and executed; reliable sources have stated that the execution list for one region of Grozny comprised more than 200 names.

Several attempts by the Army armored columns to rescue the mainly MVD units, which were trapped by the Chechens, were repelled with heavy Russian casualties; the 276th Motorized Regiment of 900 men lost 450 dead or wounded in a two-day attempt to reach the city centre. Russian military officials said that more than 200 soldiers had been killed and nearly 800 wounded in five days of fighting, and that an unknown number were missing; Chechens put the number of Russian dead at close to 1,000. Thousands of demoralized, hungry, and thirsty troops were either taken prisoner or surrounded and largely disarmed, their heavy weapons and ammunition commandeered by the rebels. On August 12 and again on August 17, 1996, a truce was announced in Grozny, but fighting resumed after a while between the warring fractions.

On August 19, 1996, despite the presence of 50,000 to 200,000 both Chechen and Russian civilians, as well as thousands of federal servicemen in Grozny, the Russian Commander of the Russian Army, Konstantin Pulikovsky gave an ultimatum for the Chechen fighters to leave the city of Groznyy in 48 hours, or the capital city of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria would be leveled in a massive aerial and ground bombardment. Confusion reigned in Grozny, where terrified refugees stumbled out of their cellars and ruined homes on foot through an afternoon of Russian shelling and airstrikes, trying to save themselves from the threat of even more deadly bombing in the morning.

The bombardment was halted by a ceasefire brokered by Yeltsin's national security adviser Alexander Lebed on August 22, 1996. The ultimatum, issued by Gen Pulikovsky, now replaced, had been a "bad joke", Gen Lebed said. During eight hours of subsequent talks, Lebed and Maskhadov drafted and signed the Khasav-Yurt Accord on August 31, 1996. It included: technical aspects of demilitarization, the withdrawal of both sides' forces from Grozny, the creation of joint headquarters to preclude looting in the city, the withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya by December 31, 1996, and a stipulation that any agreement on the relations between the Chechen Republic Ichkeria and the Russian federal government need not be signed until late 2001.

Six months later, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov traveled to Moscow where the Presidents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation signed a formal treaty “On Peace and the Principles of Russian-Chechen Relations” that Maskhadov predicted would demolish “any basis to create ill-feelings between Moscow and Grozny”.

Amnesty International deduced in January 1997 that 1058 Russian soldiers and officers were still detained by Chechen fighters who negotiated their release in exchange for Chechen rebels. On October 30, 1996, Amnesty International conducted that 1,457 Chechen militants were captured by the Russian Army, although Chechen leading figures claim that the Russian Army had captured 4,753 Chechens.

Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who became the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s second President following Dudayev’s tragic death, made overtures to the Islamic Mujahadeens and yielded to the pressures of the radical Islamists. As a confident supporter of the “Islamic model”, he declared Islamic law and the Arabic language compulsory subjects in his first presidential decree. He modeled the Penal Code for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on the Sudan's Shari'ah Penal Code.

In comparison, Jokhar Dudayev’s original scheme of the Chechen Constitution had leaned on the Constitution of the Estonian Republic. During Yandarbiyev’s rule, the statues of the Penal Code were enforced through a military-Shari’a tribunal, falling under the Supreme Shari’a Court. The sale of alcohol and drugs was forbidden and the authorities started punishing those caught using either substance by publicly thrashing them with a truncheon. In mid-1998, Maskhadov formed a special Shari’a regiment responsible for ensuring individual citizens adhered to the Shari’a norms. Shari’a courts were set up throughout the country and public executions—usually by firing squad followed.

According to the Chechen scholar Vakhit Akaev, head of the Islamic Institute of Groznyy: “With only a few exceptions, we can label Wahhabi groups that emerged in Dagestan and Chechnya as protesting religious organizations. Originally, their activities were of an enlightening nature. They directed their critical zeal against local bribers and the official clergymen who associated with them, and this gained them new believers who had become disenchanted with the regime. Wahhabism’s critical shots were aimed against the traditionalist clergy of the northern Caucasus Mountains, who were being accused of ignorance, of distorting Islam, and of close ties with a corrupt government.”

In his televised address of January 20, 1999, the Chechen President condemned what he perceived as Wahhabism: “The worst thing about it is the fact that it seeks to divide us

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97 “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, August 2004
98 “Salafism and Wahhabism in the Caucasus; The Chechen Adventure”, Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion, July 2005
according to our faith. And this happens in every place that Islamism wins over. They divide us according to faith, which subsequently leads to civil war.... They say that only they are Allah’s chosen ones that only they are walking along the true path. And everyone else is their enemy.... We have always been proud of the fact that we are Chechens. And now they are telling us: ‘...Do not say that you are the Chechen nation.’

“They want to deprive us of the faith of our fathers, our sheikhs and ustadhs. They want to rob us of our customs and traditions and adats.... They are not even content with the fact that we call Chechnya an Islamic state.... They say that the president, the parliament, and the grand mufti are meaningless. Everything is to be in the hands of the Emir. The Emir who, I must add, came here from God knows what country and who furthermore is not even Chechen.... They take the Koran in...and find words in it that claim it is permissible to abduct people...that they can use them as a source of income.... Their calls for the immediate start of a war in Dagestan aim to pit Chechnya and Dagestan against one another”

In the spring of 1995, Chechnya saw the rise of a division of predominantly Islamic volunteers (mujahids) operating under the name Jama'at Islami (Islamic Assembly), which was originally led by the Jordanian Chechen Ash-Shashani who was openly in opposition to the idea of “National Islam”. After Ash-Shashani's death in 1997, his compatriot Khattab succeeded him. The next year, an education and training center called “Caucasian Center of the Islamic Mission” was established (with the help of Chechens in Jordan) near the village of Serzhan-Yurt in the Shali District.

In 1995, the Islamist Wahhabis attempted to destroy the “ziyarat” devoted to Khedi, mother of the venerated Kunta-haji. Despite the efforts of some highly respected Field Commanders of the Foreign Mujahadeen Legion to mitigate the ensuing conflict, this led to armed skirmishes throughout the entire country. In battle, the Wahhabis were not deterred from setting up military positions at memorials and nearby “ziyarats”.

Moreover, the Islamist Wahhabis did not even hesitate to murder traditionalist clergymen who spoke openly against Wahhabi sectarians. Additionally, they often reprimanded Chechen women and girls for being “insufficiently clothed” or for not wearing veils. Since the custom of covering women's hands and faces had never been practiced among the Muslim Caucasian highlanders, such censure was beyond the comprehension of even conservative Chechen men. Clashes between Wahhabis and “tariqists” soon became a more or less common phenomenon.

Aslan Maskhadov tried a policy of accommodation. For instance, in April 1998, he called for the establishment of an Islamic State governed by Shari’a norms. But his intensifying Islamic rhetoric did nothing to earn him the favour of the Islamist Wahhabis. Their number and influence among leading representatives of the Chechen military-political elite dissatisfied with the existing distribution of power or with the president himself, gained

100 “Nation-Building and Radical Islamism in Chechnya: Collegues or Adversaries?”, Department of Political Sciences, Insitute of Intrnational Affairs and Politics, University of Harvard, September 2003
strength concurrently with society's frustration over the adverse socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the first Vice-Chairman of the Chechen Government, Shamil Basayev, began to lean toward the Islamist Wahhabis.

However, within the bounds of the policy of social consensus, Aslan Maskhadov continued his endeavors to use this influential Field Commander and highly respected personality in public life. This task appeared to have been accomplished on January 15, 1998, when Shamil Basayev was named Vice-President, and later Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, although Aslan Maskhadov had originally wanted to keep that position for himself, as the Chechen Constitution required. Shamil Basayev’s younger brother, Shirwani, occupied the lucrative post of Director of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria's State Committee for Energy Resources.101

A turning point occurred on June 14, 1998, in Gudermes, where defiant armed Islamist Wahhabis challenged Aslan Maskhadov's military regiments. The ensuing clash claimed the lives of at least fifty people, mostly Islamist Wahhabis. The sectarians then fled to Urus-Martan which became the center of Chechen (and Dagestani) Wahhabism. The Wahhabis' armed protest and their debates concerning plans to topple the elected Chechen president actually left Aslan Maskhadov with no choice.102

The “Chechen Lion” dismissed Ministers of the Chechen Government who were members of or who sympathized with the Wahhabi Islamic Order (Khamidov, Udugov, Vahidov, and Shamil Basayev) and urged Chechen believers to expel Islamist Wahhabis from their towns and villages. Together with Akhmad Kadyrov and Chechen Grand Mufti, Aslan Maskhadov began a systematic effort to discredit the Wahhabi doctrine. In the autumn of 1998, a congress of the Muslim clergy was held in Grozny on Kadyrov's initiative. During the assembly, the Wahhabis were accused of extremism, craving power, and their interpretation of Islam was not deemed genuine.

A phony war in which both sides avoided direct armed conflict continued until August 1999. Meanwhile, on February 3, 1999, Aslan Maskhadov announced the establishment of a “full-fledged Shari'ah Government” a day before the Wahhabi opposition was to make a similar proclamation to try to discredit Maskhadov's “unholy regime”. In the short term, he succeeded in undermining the Islamist Wahhabis, several of whom returned to the Chechen Government.

From a long-term strategic perspective, however, the Chechen President found himself in an even more complicated situation. On the day Maskhadov issued the decree that rendered Shari'a effective in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Shamil Basayev stated, “Our president has finally accepted Islam. He is no longer the president; therefore, we should elect

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101 “Nation-Building and Radical Islamism in Chechnya: Colleagues or Adversaries?”, Department of Political Sciences, Institute of International Affairs and Politics, University of Harvard, September 2003
102 “Nation-Building and Radical Islamism in Chechnya: Colleagues or Adversaries?”, Department of Political Sciences, Institute of International Affairs and Politics, University of Harvard, September 2003
Through his decree, Aslan Maskhadov actually divested himself of the safeguards provided by the Chechen Constitution according to which he had been elected President. The legitimacy of his power was thus contested and, as it soon turned out, the more or less functioning Chechen state collapsed entirely.

In Vakhit Akaev’s words: “It appears that Maskhadov, who was surrounded and pressured by the opposition, failed to grasp the particulars. In his attempt to snatch the flag of Islam from the opposition’s hands, he initiated a game on a foreign pitch, where he in fact suffered a political thrashing. This enabled the Islamic opposition to provoke Russia into waging another war with Chechnya.”

A.1.e. Dagestan War


In the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan, the re-Islamization process was marked by the opening of many religious buildings. By July 1995 there were 1270 mosques, of which more than 850 were registered mosques. Attached to the mosques, there were 650 schools and groups to train young people in the basics of Islam. Working for the religious societies were 2200 Imams and Muezzins. By that time 25 madrasahs were already training clerical personnel for the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan.

It took only three years to build 388 mosques and hand back to Muslim communities nearly 300 mosques that had been converted to military and artistic uses. According to data of the Administration for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Dagestan’s Government, in April 1998 there were 1670 mosques (9 churches, 4 synagogues), 670 schools attached to mosques, 25 madrasahs and 9 higher Muslim schools in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan. By April 1998, there were more than 20 tariqah fellowships and an increased interest in “holy places” of Sufi saints.

The powerful national and Islamic resurgence in 1989–94 spawned numerous public and political movements. Dozens of associations have emerged on the political stage in recent years. These movements were structured mainly on the ethnic principle; the Kumyk people’s “Tenglik” Movement, the Lak people’s “Gazikumukh” Movement, the Avar people’s Movement named after Imam Shamil, the Nogay interregional “Birlik” Movement, the
Lezgin people’s “Sadval” Movement, the Lak “Tsubarz” Cultural Society. Without exception their programmes stressed the movements’ cultural and educational character and proclaimed the idea of preserving and augmenting their cultural values.

The first congress of the Union of Muslims of Russia (UMR) elected Nadir Khachilayev from Dagestan chairman of its Executive Committee in September 1995. The Union of Muslims of Russia opposed “national and religious extremis”, advocated settlement of all questions in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and Dagestan “taking account of the peculiarities, traditions, cultural heritage and the main provisions of Islam”. The Union of Muslim of Russia’s fulcrum was Dagestan’s Muslim population, in particular people in the Lak regions. The New Muslims of Russia All-Russia Public and Political Movement chaired by Imam Mukaldas Bubarsov was apparently founded as an alternative to the Union of Muslims of Russia.

The NUR All-Russia Muslim Public Movement was founded in 1995 in order “to protect the interests and rights of Muslims of Russia and represent them in the bodies of state authority”. There is a NUR All-Russia Muslim Public Movement branch in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan (there are altogether 72 branches and representative offices in Russia). The NUR All-Russia Muslim Public Movement developed a Comprehensive Programme of Spiritual and Moral Betterment of Society. The cultural and enlightenment programme also aimed at preparing the ground for organizing Shari’ah courts in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan, in addition to state courts to meet the needs of some parties, as well as explaining Shari’ah and the Islamic view of polygamy, marriage and divorce, publishing Islamic calendars, posters and plates with ayat and hadiths.

Early in 1999 there emerged yet another All-Russia Political Public Movement, called the All-Russia Islamic Congress. It founded a Dagestani branch on 26 March 1999 with Anvar Kadiiev, chairman of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Dagestan, as its head. The objective of the Dagestani branch is clearly formulated in its rules: “To represent in the political sphere the interests, views and will of that part of society which shares on a secular basis the ideas and values of Islam, to participate in political affairs of society, to participate in elections for bodies of state authority and to promote local government, spiritual, political, economic and cultural revival of Dagestan”.

The Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan (chairman, Abdurashid Saidov) was founded in Moscow in 1990 and then renamed the Islamic Party of Dagestan (chairman, Prof. Suraket Asiyatilov). Initially, the party raised the question of the “religious status of the Republic of Dagestan”, but subsequently this question was never dealt with due to the ramifications from the Chechen Wars.

In April 1995, the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan savaged the Russian Federation for the submission of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia and the support of the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia; the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan
scavenged the Russian Federation for the stultification of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains and the suppression of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Thus, the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan slandered the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation for the sequestration of the Islamic Jihad.

Moreover, the Autonomous Republic of Chuvasia criticized the collaboration of the Muslim Autonomous Republics, Oblasts and Okrugs of the Russian Federation with Moscow in the Chechen War; thus, the Autonomous Republics of Chuvasia, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Volga River castigated Kremlin for the campaign against the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and controverted with the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs against the constriction of Muslims. The Autonomous Republic of Dagestan condemned the capture of Groznyy by the Russian Army and criticized the crimes that the Russian Army and the Chechen “Government in Exile” had committed.

In the Kadarian Zone in the highlands of the Western Autonomous Republic of Dagestan -in the predominantly Darginian villages of Karamakhi (the birthplace of Amir Khattab's spouse), Chabanmakhi, and Kadar-, there was a rash of retaliatory murders of traditionalist and Wahhabi Imams and Muftis, and even of rank-and-file believers due to the missionary zeal demonstrated by the Wahhabi Islamists.

In May 1997, a major armed clash between Wahhabis and traditionalists occurred near the village of Chabanmakhi, claiming the lives of about a dozen people. The formal cause of this conflict was a theological dispute between two relatives loyal to opposing camps. In reaction to this event, the Dagestani Government started making a resolute effort to discredit the Wahhabi doctrine and, at the same time, to liquidate Wahhabi cells in the Western Autonomous Republic of Dagestan. In 1997, the Dagestani Parliament passed a law entitled “On the fight against Islamic fundamentalism” which triggered mass hunts for the country's sectarians.

A year later, in early 1998, villages in the Tsumadi highland District of the Western Autonomous Republic of Dagestan announced the birth of an independent Islamic republic in their territory, despite pressure by state authorities to dissuade them from this enterprise. Although the Kremlin's swift intervention managed to prevent the conflict from escalating, the villages in the Tsumadi highland District of the Western Autonomous Republic of Dagestan remained outside of Makhachkala's effective jurisdiction from this point forward. Amir Khattab's divisions launched an attack against the North Caucasian military district in Buinaksk in December 1998.

The formation of the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, headed by Shamil Basayev, publicized the expansive intentions of the Chechen and Dagestani Islamist Wahhabis. In November 1998, Shamil Basayev left no doubt as to the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan’s program: “The leaders of the Congress of the Peoples of
Ichkeria and Dagestan will not allow the occupying Russian army to wreak any havoc in the land of our Muslim brethren. We do not intend to leave our Muslim brothers helpless. “

In January 1999, Amir Khattab began the formation of an “Islamic Legion” with foreign Muslim volunteers. At the same time, he commanded the “Peacemaking Unit of the Majlis [Parliament] of Ichkeria and Dagestan”. Moreover, in April 1999, Bagauddin Magomedov, “the Emir of the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan,” made an appeal to the ‘Islamic patriots of the Caucasus Mountains to take part in the Islamic Jihad’ and to do their share in “liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus Mountains from the Russian colonial yoke.”

According to this prominent Dagestani Wahhabi’s vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the “Islamic Army of the Caucasus” that he had founded and report to the army’s headquarters (in the village of Karamakhi) for military duty. Another notable Dagestani Wahhabi, Magomed Tagayev, formed the “Dagestani Imam’s Army of Freedom Fighters” so as to assist the Islamists’ Wahhabis project. Just at that time, the Russian Air Force attacked an island on the Terek River (in Chechen territory) where a Wahhabi military base was allegedly located.

On August 10, 1999, Chechen and Dagestan Islamic Mujahadeens infiltrated the villages of Ansalta, Rakhatia, Tando and Shadroda in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan and insinuated the city of Botlikh while the Islamic Shura of Dagestan innundated the villages of Herkot, Shatal and Rota; however, the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan intercepted the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in the village of Ansalta and incommmoded the Islamic Shura of Dagestan in the village of Herkot.

On August 11, 1999, Shamil Basayev, Head of the Congress of the Chechen and Dagestan Peoples and President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and Amir al-Khattab, FILED COMMANDER OF THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC OF ICHKERIA, proclaimed the Independent Islamic Republic of Dagestan and prescribed Shamil Basayev as a President of the Independent Islamic Republic of Dagestan; Shamil Basayev prescribed the permeation of the Islamic Republic of Dagestan by the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and the proscribed the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains against the percolation of the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in the Volga River.

On August 24, 1999, the Islamic Shura of Dagestan campaigned against the Russian Army in the villages of Torda and Nahjak and the combated against the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan in the villages of Kadar, Karamakhi, and Chabanmakhi. The Russian Army circumvented the Islamic Shura of Dagestan in the village of Torda and captured the Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens in the village of Nahjak; the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan circumvented the Islamic Shura of Dagestan in the village of Kadar and the Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens capitulated in the village of
Chabanmaki. The Russian Federation challenged and championed both the Islamic Shura of Dagestan and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In August 23, 1999, the Russian Army defeated the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in Botlikh; the Independent Islamic Republic of Dagestan was dissolved; the Islamic Shura of Dagestan was decomposed and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was debilitating. The Russian Federation delineated the dedication of Kremlin to dissolve the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and demonstrated the deduction to decompose the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains.

The Islamic Mujahadeens of the “United Headquarters of Dagestan Mujahadeen” comprised of a configuration of Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens and consisted of a conglomerate of mercenaries from across the Middle and Near East and Central Asia. Nadir Khachilayev, former Leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, and Siradjin Ramazanov, Leader of the Islamic Shura of Dagestan, collaborated with the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and cooperated with the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains. Nadir Khachilayev, deprecated and depreciated Magomedali Magomedov, President of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan, and delibitated the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan. In 1998, Nadir Khachilayev campaigned against Makhachkala, the capital city of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan; however, the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan combated him. 107

According to a July 2005 report by the Russian Academy of Sciences 70 “terror attacks” occurred in Dagestan in the first six months 2005, compared with 30 for all of 2004. The attacks primarily target Russian soldiers and Dagestani police and government officials. Sources indicate that as many as 2,000 Islamic insurgents, many belonging to the Jamaat Sharia group, are involved in the Dagestani Jihad. After a string of attacks and assassinations, the Sharia Jamaat claimed legitimate power in Dagestan. On July 12, 2005, the Sharia Jamaat confirmed the death of its commander, Rasul Makasharipov.

107 War in Dagestan - Jane's Europe News (October 1999)
Map 5: Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation
Map 6: Autonomous Republics of the Russian Federation
A.1.f. Second Chechen War

The President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Mashkadov, announced in January 1996 that the accreditation of the Sharia (Islam Law) in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and advocated the adoption of the Council of Muftis of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; thus, Aslan Mashkadov abrogated the abdication from the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation and abstained from the abandonment of the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Moscow Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate was abominated!

Aslan Mashkadov, abjured the advocating of the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and adjured the adoption of the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; Aslan Mashkadov adumbrated the accreditation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as the “Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria” asseverated the abortion from the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains. However, Moscow did not acquiesce in the acclamations of Aslan Mashkadov and attempted to acquit him of the aberration of the Presidency of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

On December 16, 1997, the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan defeated the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army in Buynask, in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan and decimated the Reconnaissance Company of the 76th Infantry Division in Murmansk, in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan.

On September 16, 1999, the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan dynamitized the hotels and motels of the Russian Army in Buynaksk in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan and detonated the hotels and motels of the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan; 123 casualties (64 demised).

On September 8, 1999, the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan dynamitized the lodgements on Kashirskoye Hifhway in Southern Moscow and detonated the lodgements on the Pechatniki; 231 casualties (94 demised). The Russian Federation deprived the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and deprecated the Islamic Jihad.108

On September 13, 1999, the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan dynamitized the lodgements on Kashirskoye Hifhway in Southern Moscow and detonated the lodgements on the Pechatniki; 367 casualties (118 demised). The Russian Federation deprived the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and decimated the Islamic Shura of Dagestan.

108
The Russian Federation savaged the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the shattering of Moscow and scavenged the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains of the Caucasus Mountains for the support of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; moreover, Kremlin slandered the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan as sanguinary and scrupulous and slurred the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens as sanctimonious and scurrilous. The Russian Federation scorned the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States for the suggestion to the Kremlin to subsidise from the Caucasus Mountains and scolded the Commonwealth of Independent States for the surrogating to Moscow to stultify the Second Chechen War.

On September 22, 1999, the FSB (Intelligence Secret Agency of the Russian Federation) orchestrated to obliterate the lodgements in Ryazan District in the Russian Federation; however, the Police and National Guard of Ryazan obstructed and obviated the FSB to obliterate the lodgements in Ryazan; the Head of FSB, Nikolai Patushev was ostracized and the Supreme Criminal Court osculated the obstruction and opposing of the inquiry and the investigation of the “Ryazan Incident”. The Russians oscillated between the oaths of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the omens of the Movement of the Russian Mothers for the Chechen War.

The Supreme Criminal Court of the Russian Federation condemned Amir al-Khattab and Abu Omar, Field Commanders of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and criticized Achemez Gochiyayev for the “Ryazan Incident”; the Russian Federation conjured the campaign against the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and conjectured the combat against the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan. Moscow congregated the Russian Army in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan and conglomerated the Spetsnaz (Special Forces) the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia.

On August 26, 1999, the Russian Air Force assailed Shatoy and attacked Groznyy in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation admitted that 88,500 Chechens abandoned the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and accounted 7,345 Chechens abortions. The Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia accommodated 64,000 Chechens and the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan accumulated 8,000 Chechens in only 5 days.109

On October 1, 1999, Vladimir Putin deprecated the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Aslan Mashkadov) and deplored the Parliament of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; Vladimir Putin delineated that the Ground Forces of the Russian Army would be deployed as far as the Terek River and declared that the Ground Forces of the Russian Army would designate a “cordon sanitaire” against the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan.

On October 5, 1999, the Ground Forces of the Russian Army conquered the “cordon sanitaire” of the Terek River in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and captured Elistanzhi
from the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan. The Russian Army discarded 1,345 Chechen males, deflorated 432 Chechen women and deported 541 Chechen children to the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan.

On October 12, 1999, the Ground Forces of the Russian Army insinuated the Central Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and inundated the Eastern Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; the Northern Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was incorporated in the Russian Federation and the Southern Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was infiltrated by the Air Force of the Russian Army and the Airborne Divisions and Special Forces (Spetsnaz) of the Russian Army.

Aslan Mashkadov recriminated the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation against the cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, reprimanded the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of the Commonwealth of Independent States against the collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and remonstrated to the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States against the compromise with the Chechen “Government in Exile”. Moreover, Aslan Mashkadov reproached the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the records with the Russian Army in Groznyy and repressed the reconciliation with the Chechen “Government in Exile”.

Moreover, Aslan Mashkadov rescinded the configuration with the Russian Federation and relegated the conglomeration with the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Dushanbe Conference in October 1999; Aslan Mashkadov remitted from the repression of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan for the capitulation in the Terek River and the reprieved from the redemption of criticism of the Islamic Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains till the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria recuperated from the conquest of the Terek River and recovered from the campaign in Khankala.

The Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens retrogressed to the Caucasus Mountains in the South of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Dagestani and Ingush Mujahadeens of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains retreated in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan; any Chechen Muslim who collaborated with the Russian Army was revenged, any Chechen Muslim who cooperated with the Chechen “Government in Exile” was requited, any Chechen Islamic Mujahadeen who combated the Russian Army was revered and any Afghan and Ingush or Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeen who confronted the Russian Army was recompensated. 110


110
ratify the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and did not reciprocate the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan.

The Russian Federation espoused the eradication of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and endorsed on the elimination of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains; Boris Yeltsin elucidated the extirpation of the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and enunciated the erosion of the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from the Caucasus Mountains. The Russian Federation was no longer emasculated by the Chechen War and the Republic of Armenia was no longer enervated by the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Moreover, the United Tajik Islamic Opposition did not evangelize any more the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and excommunicated the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in Central Asia. The Muslims of the Caucasus Mountains were exonerated from the entrapments of the Neo-Jaddist Movement and expiated the evangelization of the Islamic Jihad; thus, the Muslims of the Caucasus Mountains expostulated with Kremlin against the escalation of the Chechen War. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was entangled in the Islamic Jihad all alone and was embroiled in the Caucasus Front all alone.

However, Movladi Udugov, propagator of the Chechen paramilitaries, proclaimed that “Chechens propitiate Prophet Mohammad and Allah with prescriptions of Slavs. Chechen Muslims do not plagiarize the commotions and compromises of the Christian Slavs or promulgate the conciliations and connotations of the Chechen privateers (Federal Chechens). Prophet Mohammad and Allah were not only perspicacious to predict the collapse and capitulation of Christian Slavs to Muslims but also peremptory to promise the conquest of Paradise to Mohammedans.

Christian Slavs will be subjected to abduction, atrocities and assassination, {...}
Christian Slavs will suffer extortions, expropriations, expostulations and extirpation, {...}
Christian Russians will be susceptible to retributions, reimbursements, reinstatements, relegations, relinquishments so that repercussions would be reprieved to the sacrilege and stigma allocated and afflicted to the Eastern Slavs”\textsuperscript{111}.

On October 21, 1999, the Air Force of the Russian Army annihilated the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan in the villages of Goragorsky and Tersky, (Western Groznyy) and assaulted the Red Cross and the BBC and CNN News Broadcast Agencies in Saraty. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe animadverted with the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation against the assailment on the Red Cross and the BBC and CNN News Broadcast Agencies and accused the Air Force of the Russian Army for atrocities against the Chechens who abandon the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

\textsuperscript{111} The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006,Review of Jamestown Foundation
On November 12, 1999, the Ground Forces of the Russian Army conquered Guderemes (second largest city of the Chechen Republic of Chechenya) and commended the Yamadayev Brotherhood for the collaboration and cooperation with the Russian Army and the condemnation and castigation of the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan. On November 14, the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens defeated the Ground Forces of the Russian Army in the village of Kullary, but the Air Force of the Russian Army decimated the Chechen and Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens hours later.

On December 1, 1999, the Ground Forces of the Russian Army conquered Alkhan-Yurt and captured the Afghan and Turk Islamic Mujahadeens. Although the Islamic Mujahadeens of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria were defeated, the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan was not dissolved. Moreover, the Ground Forces of the Russian Army conveyed dead and casualties at a high rate.


Aslan Mashkadov idealized the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and immortalized the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which inflamed the Islamic Jihad in the Caucasus Muslims; Aslan Mashkadov also instigated the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan which in turn ignited the Islamic Jihad in the Caucasus Muslims. Dzhokhar Dudayev implored the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains to incite 744 Dagestanis, 207 Georgian and 456 Abkhazian Muslims to be immolated as Islamic Martyrs and importuned the Council of Muftis of the Russian Federation for the indication of 45 Ingushes, 124 Azeris and 987 Tatars to be immolated as Islamic Martyrs.

Aslan Mashkadov ingratiated the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic Sates for the incorporation of 204 Iranians, 342 Arabs and 423 Afghans and interceded with the Global Islamic League for the ingestion of 213 Turks and 78 Pakistanis in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; the Caucasus Front of the Chechen War was inaugurated and the “Guerilla Warfare of the Russian Cities” was innovated. Thus, “Terrorism and Brutality” were imputed to Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens. The dynamitization of motels and lodgings in the Russian Federation, the detonations of vehicles in the Autonomous Republics of the Caucasus Mountains and the capture of theatres, cinemas, railway stations and schools was inaugurated so as to impede the Russian Federation from insinuating the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and inundating the Caucasus Mountains.\textsuperscript{112}
On February 2000, the capital city of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Groznyy, was captured and the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan capitulated to General Victor Kazanstsev, Commander of the Russian Army in the Northern Caucasus Mountains; the Russian Army destroyed the Parliament of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and dismantled the Grand Mosque of Groznyy; the Russian Army discarded 7,786 Chechen males, decapitated 1,209 Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens, deflorated 1,456 Chechen females, dismembered 2,793 Chechen females and deported 34,123 Chechens to the Autonomous Republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan.

On February 29, 2000, the Commander of the United Army Group of the Russian Army, General Gennady Troshev, declared that the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan was debilitated and declaimed that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria would disrupt the dominance of the Russian Federation. Moscow devolved upon the Commander of the United Army Group of the Russian Army, General Gennady Troshev, the dedication to dissolve the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan.

On February 29, 1999, the Arab and Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens defeated 3 VDV Battalions and a Vympel Group of the Russian Army and decimated a VDV Company of the Special Forces (Spetnaz) of the Russian Army. Although the Arab and Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens defeated the VDV Company of the Special Forces (Spetnaz) of the Russian Army, the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan was depleted. Thus, the Battle of Hill 776 was celebrated by the Russian Army and commemorated by Moscow for the self-denial and self-sacrifice of the Special Forces (Spetnaz) of the Russian Army.

In March 6, 2000, the Russian Army campaigned against the Chechen and Arab Islamic Mujahadeens in the village of Komsomolskoye and combated the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan. The Russian Army captured the village of Komsomolskoye and the Chechen and Arab Islamic Mujahadeens capitulated. The Russian Army discarded the Chechen and Arab Islamic Mujahadeens because they had depleted the 234th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 7th Motorized Vehicle Division.

On April 23, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens ambushed the 56th Motorized Rifle Brigade and attacked the 27th Motorized Vehicle Division in Vedeno-Gorge; the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens annihilated the Ground Forces of the Russian Army and aborted the advance of the Russian Army to Skayatli. However, the Air Force of the Russian Army assailed the Central Front of the Liberation of Caucasus and Dagestan in Skayatli and annihilated the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens.113

On July 3, 2000, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the Command Center of the Russian Army in the North Caucasus Mountains in Groznyy and detonated the Coordination Center of the Chechen ‘Government in Exile’; 123 casualties (54 demised). On November 29, 2001, a Chechen female Islamic Mujahadeen dynamitized the

On December 27, 2002, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the Government Headquarters of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya and detonated the Coordination Center of the Chechen ‘Government in Exile’; 287 casualties (74 demised); on My 12, 2003, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the Headquarters of FSB (Intelligence Secret Agency) in Znamenskoye and detonated the Headquarters of the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya; 265 causalities (64 demised).114

On August 1, 2003, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the Military Hospital of the Russian Army in Mozdok in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia and detonated the Military Hospital of Groznyy; 345 casualties (54 demised). On December 5, 2003, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the train compartments in the railway station of Stavropol in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya and detonated the Centre of Services of Civilians in the Red Square in Moscow; 262 casualties (53 demised).

On February 6, 2004, the Chechen and Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized the metro compartments in the metro station in Moscow and detonated the train compartment in the railway station of Pavlovsk in Moscow; 123 casualties (42 demised). On August 27, 2004, 2 female Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens dynamitized 2 aviation aircrafts and discarded 90 Russians over the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia.

On September 17, 2001, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens destroyed a VIP Mi-8 helicopter of the Air Force of the Russian Army in Groznyy; Major-General of the Russian Army and Member of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Anatoli Pozdnyakov, Major-General of the Russian Army and Deputy Director of the Defense Ministry of the Russia Federation, Pavel Varfolomeyef, 8 Colonels of the Russian Army and 3 members of the crew of the helicopter were discarded. According to the demised journalist and author, Anna Politkovskaya, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces delineated the destruction of the VIP Mi-8 helicopter.115

On Jaanuary 27, 2002, a VIP Mi-8 helicopter of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation was destroyed by the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens in Nadterechny District of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya; Lieutenant-General and Deputy Interior Minister of the Russian Federation and Commander of the Southern Federal District of the Caucasus Mountains, Mikhail Rudchenko and Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops and Major-General of the Russian Army, Nikolai Goridov and Colonels of the Russian Army, Oriyenko, Stepanenko and Tratimov were discarded. On August 19, 2002, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens destroyed a Mi-26 transport helicopter in the village of Dyshne-Vedeno in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya; 6 members of the crew of the helicopter and 127 soldiers were discarded, thus ranking it as the

114 The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation
greatest loss of life in the history of helicopter aviation. On September 11, 2006, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens destroyed a VIP Mi-8 helicopter of the Air Force of the Russian Army; Major-General of the Russian Army and Chief of Logistics of Russia’s North Caucasus Mountains Military District, Vladimir Sorokin and 12 members of the crew of the helicopter were discarded.116

On May 31, 2000, the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens assassinated Sergei Zveryev, who had been appointed as the Chief of Logistics in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya and Deputy Director of the Council Chambers of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya. On March 12, 2000, the FSB of the Russian Federation assassinated with a poisoned later Ami Khattab, who had been appointed as the Field Commander of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

On November 16, 2002, Lieutenant-General of the Russian Army and Head of the Glavspetzstroi (Main Directorate of Special Construction of the Ministry of Defense), Igor Shifrin, was assassinated by Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens, who had been accused of war crimes by the European Court of Human Rights and Political Liberties. On March 5, 2003, Dzhabrail Yamadayev, Police Commander of the OMON was assassinated in Dyshne Vedeno in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya.

On May 9, 2004, Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens assassinated the President of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov in Uvays Akhatayev Stadium in the Russian Victory Day which aspired the Great Patriotic War. The Chairman of the State Council of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, Hussein Isayev, the Military Commander in the North Caucasus Mountains and Colonel-General of the Russian Army, Valery Baranov, the Chechen Interior Minister, Alu Alkhanov and the Military Commandant of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya and Major-General of the Russian Army, Grigory Fomenko were also assassinated.

On February 2, 2005, the Dagestani Islamic Mujahadeens assassinated the Major-General of the Russian Army and Deputy Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan Magomed Omarov, in the capital city of Makhachkala; on May 17, 2006, the Ingush Islamic Mujahadeens assassinated Dzhabrail Kostoyev, the Chief of Police and the Deputy Interior Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia. The Caucasus Front of the Second Chechen War accessed the Autonomous Republics of the North Caucasus Mountains and accentuated fear and terror.

On June 25, 2004, a former top official in Chechnya’s pro-Moscow administration, Lieutenant-General of the National Guard of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, Yan Sergunin, was shot point-blank and killed by an assailant riding a motorcycle in downtown Moscow, and his Chechen wife was wounded. Sergunin served as Chechnya’s Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff for the late President of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, between 2001 and 2003.
On October 7, 2006, the Russian journalist and author Anna Politkovskaya was found shot dead in the elevator of her apartment block in central Moscow with four gunshot wounds, news agencies reported. She was a prominent critic of the Chechen War and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Politkovskaya's Novaya Gazeta said it believed her murder was either revenge by Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov or an attempt to discredit him. Politkovskaya also angered other powerful people—including the Russian military— with her investigative reporting and human rights advocacy.

On February 13, 2004, the former President of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was assassinated by a car bomb in Qatar. The Russian government denied involvement in the attack by blaming infighting among rebel factions and a dispute over money. Moscow had, at the time, been involved in a bid to extradite Yandarbiyev to Russia to face terrorism-related charges. A Qatari court convicted two Russian government Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) agents in the bombing.

On March 23, 2003, a new Chechen Constitution was passed in a controversial referendum. The 2003 Constitution granted the Autonomous Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, but still tied it firmly to the Russian Federation and Moscow's rule, and went into force on April 2, 2003. The referendum was strongly supported by the Russian government but met a harsh critical response from Chechen separatists; many citizens chose to boycott the ballot.

Since December 2005, Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the pro-Moscow militia leader known as “kadyrovites”, has been functioning as the “de-facto” ruler of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya. Kadyrov, whose irregular forces are accused of carrying out many of the abductions and atrocities, has become Chechnya's most powerful leader and on February 2007, with support from Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov replaced Alu Alkhanov as President of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya.

Russian officials have accused the bordering Republic of Georgia of allowing Chechen rebels to operate on Georgian territory and permitting the flow of guerrillas and materiel across the Georgian border with Russia. In February 2002, the United States began offering assistance to the Republic of Georgia in combating “criminal elements” as well as alleged Arab Islamic Mujahadeen activity in Pankisi Gorge as part of the “War on Terrorism” unleashed by President George Bush. Without resistance, Georgian troops have detained an Arab man and six criminals, and declared the region under control. In August 2002, the Republic of Georgia accused Russia of a series of secret air strikes on purported rebel havens in the Pankisi Gorge in which a Georgian civilian was reported killed.117

On October 8, 2001, a UNOMIG helicopter of the Air Force of the Russian Army carrying observers was shot down in the Republic of Georgia in Kodori Valley gorge near Abkhazia, resulting in the deaths of all nine people aboard. The Republic of Georgia denied having troops in the area, and the suspicion fell on the armed group headed by Chechen

117
warlord Ruslan Gelayev, who was speculated to have been hired by the Georgian government to wage proxy war against separatist Abkhazia. On March 2, 2004, following a number of cross-border raids from the Republic of Georgia into the Autonomous Republics of North Caucasus Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, Gelayev was killed in a clash with Russian border guards while trying to get back from the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan into the Republic of Georgia.

On March 8, 2005, Maskhadov was killed in an operation by Russian security forces in the Chechen community of Tostoy-Yurt, northeast of Grozny.

Shortly following Maskhadov's death, the Chechen rebel council announced that Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev had assumed the leadership, a move that was quickly endorsed by Shamil Basayev. On February 2, 2006 Sadulaev made large-scale changes in his government, ordering all its members to move into Chechen territory. Among other things, he removed First Vice-Premier Akhmed Zakayev from his post (although later Zakayev was appointed a Foreign Minister. Sadulaev himself was killed in June 2006, after which he was succeeded as the rebel leader by the veteran guerrilla commander Doku Umarov.

There were at least seven amnesties for guerrilla fighters, as well as federal servicemen who committed crimes, was declared in Chechnya by Moscow since the start of the Second Chechen War. The first one was announced in 1999 when about 400 Chechen switched sides. (However, according to Putin's advisor and aide Aslambek Aslakhanov most of them were since killed, both by their former comrades and by the Russians, who by then perceived them as a potential fifth columnists)

Some of the other amnesties included one during September 2003 in connection with the adoption of the new Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, and then another between mid-2006 and January 2007. According to Ramzan Kadyrov, himself former rebel, more than 7,000 separatist fighters defected to the federal side ("returned to the peaceful life") by 2005. In 2007 the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights published a report entitled “Amnestied People as Targets for Persecution in Chechnya”, which documents the fate of several persons who have been amnestied and subsequently abducted, tortured and killed.118

cannot be solved by local authorities, adding that a special commission has to be created on the level of the Russian Federation.

On May 12, 2006, Dmitry Grushkin of the Memorial Human Rights Group told Interfax that at least 1,893 residents of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya have been kidnapped since 2002; of those “abducted residents”, he said, 653 were found alive, 186 were found dead, and 1,023 “disappeared”. Memorial monitors kidnappings for only 25-30 percent of territory of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya.

On November 13, 2006, Humans Rights Watch published a briefing paper on torture in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya that it had prepared for the 37th session of the United Nations Committee Against Torture. The paper covered torture by personnel of the Second Operational Investigative Bureau (ORB-2), torture by units under the effective command of Ramzan Kadyrov, torture in secret detention and continuing "disappearances." According to Humans Rights Watch, torture “in both official and secret detention facilities is widespread and systematic in Chechnya. Based on extensive research, Humans Rights Watch concluded in 2005 that forced disappearances in Chechnya are so widespread and systematic that they constitute crime against humanity.”

On March 15, 2001, 3 Chechens Islamist Mujahadeens hijacked a Russian Tu-154 plane with 174 people after it left the Republic of Turkey; they forced a landing in Medina, in the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabia Peninsula. On March 16, Saudi commandos freed over 100 hostages, killing three people including a hijacker, a female flight attendant and a Turkish passenger. On April 22, 2001, in the Republic of Turkey gunmen who sympathised with the Chechen cause seized up to 100 hostages at a luxury hotel in Istanbul (Constantinopole). The standoff involving had lasted nearly 12 hours before the hostage-takers armed with automatic rifles surrendered; police said they had encountered no resistance from the gunmen and there were no reports of anybody being injured.

The first trial European Court of Human Rights and Political Liberties concluded in February 2005 and ruled that the Russian Government violated articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Political Liberties, including a clause on the protection of property, a guarantee of the right to life, and a ban on torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, and ordered the Russian Government to pay compensation to the six plaintiffs of the judiciary case.

The cases concerned the Russian federal forces’ indiscriminate aerial bombing of a civilian convoy of refugees fleeing Grozny in October 1999; the "disappearance" and subsequent extrajudicial execution of five individuals in Grozny in January 2000; and the indiscriminate aerial and artillery bombardment of the village of Katyr-Yurt in February 2000. The compensations were not paid, Non-Governmental Organizations claim that applicants to the court are met with repressions, including murders and disappearance.

\[119\] The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review Jamestown Foundation
In summer 2006 the European Court on Human Rights and Political Liberties decided the first cases concerning forced disappearances from Chechnya; more than 100 disappearance cases related to Chechnya were pending in the European Court on Human Rights and Political Liberties. The cases included one case where the court ordered Russia to pay 35,000 euros to the mother of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev for violating her son's "right to life" as well as failing "to conduct an effective investigation" into his February 2000 abduction and disappearance.\[120\]

Key evidence in the case, according to court documents, was video footage filmed by a reporter for NTV and CNN television showing an army officer, later identified by CNN reporters as Colonel-General Alexander Baranov, ordering soldiers to "finish off" and "shoot" Yandiyev. Baranov has since been promoted and awarded a Hero of Russia medal and is now responsible for all Defense Ministry forces in the North Caucasus Mountains.\[121\]

This conflict was linked to the rising brutality and general criminalisation of the Russian police forces. According to human rights activists and journalists as well as Non-Governmental Organizations, tens of thousands of police and security forces who have been recruited to fight in Chechnya, learned patterns of brutality and impunity and brought them to their home regions, often returning with disciplinary and psychological problems. Torture of detainees is endemic, according to Amnesty International.

In the most extreme cases, hundreds of people were rounded en masse on streets at random and arbitrary arrested, beaten, and raped by special police forces in the actions resembling notorious zachistka security sweeps in Chechnya. Reliable numbers on police brutality are hard to come by, but in a statement released January 31, 2006, the Internal Affairs Department of Russia's Interior Ministry said that the number of recorded crimes committed by police officers rose 46.8 percent in 2005. In one nationwide poll in 2005, 71 percent of respondents said they didn't trust their police at all; in another, 41 percent Russians said they lived in fear of police violence.

The wars in Chechnya, and the associated Caucasian terrorism in Russia, were a major factors in the grow of intolerance, xenophobia and racist violence in Russia, directed in a great part against the people from Caucasus Mountains. The Russian authorities were unlikely to label random attacks on people of non-Russian ethnicity as racist, preferring calling it hooliganism. The number of murders officially classified as racist more than doubled in Russia between 2003 and 2004, including acts of terrorism such as 2006 Moscow market bombing which killed 13 people.

In 2006, some 53 people were killed and 460 others were injured in apparent hate crimes. In 2007, 18-year old Artur Ryno claimed responsibility for over 30 racially-motivated murders in the course of one year, saying that "since school [he] hated people from the Caucasus Mountains". Massive anti-Chechen pogrom-style riots took place in several regions.
of Russia, with fatalities among the Chechens and the locals. The Caucasians also face ethnic violence in the ranks of Russian Army.

United States’ President Bill Clinton said Russia would "pay a heavy price" for its current tactics, facing international isolation. The European Union also urged Russia to end what they called disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Robin Cook has "wholeheartedly condemned" the Russian ultimatum to the people of Grozny to flee or die. "We condemn vigorously what Milosevic did in Kosovo and we condemn vigorously what Russia is doing in Chechnya," he said. On November 18, 1999, George W. Bush strongly criticised Russia over its military campaign in Chechnya, saying foreign aid to Russia should be suspended if Russian policy did not change. "I think Russia has stepped over the bounds," President Bush said.

United States Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright noted in her March 24, 2000, speech to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

“We cannot ignore the fact that thousands of Chechen civilians have died and more than 200,000 have been driven from their homes. Together with other delegations, we have expressed our alarm at the persistent, credible reports of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya, including extrajudicial killings. There are also reports that Chechen separatists have committed abuses, including the killing of civilians and prisoners. …”

“The war in Chechnya has greatly damaged Russia's international standing and is isolating Russia from the international community. Russia's work to repair that damage, both at home and abroad, or its choice to risk further isolating itself, is the most immediate and momentous challenge that Russia faces”.

“The Russian Federation was subjected to the humanitarian and military casualties of 2,345 abductions, 1,417 assassinations, 6,682 suicide attacks, 11,256 demised soldiers, 2,587 soldiers missing, 351,000 soldiers suffering from the Chechnya syndrome, 4,032 dispatched civilians, 754 civilians missing and 85,000 civilians dislocated”.

“The Autonomous Republic of Chechnya suffered the humanitarian and military casualties of 44,425 demised insurgents, 8,476 irregulars missing, 13,456 detained Islamists or Mujahadeens, 186,412 dispatched civilians, 23,874 civilians missing, 267,000 civilians dislocated, 3 deaths or dismemberments per week due to landmines, 364 deaths per month due to disease or food deplumation, 92.47 percent of the population confronting unemployment and financial unrest,

“…Moreover, 84.52 percent of the population complying with damaged or destructed institutions and infrastructure, 71.03 percent of the industries and instituted damaged or demolished, 12.74 percent of the population cooperating with “white flesh commerce” or “organ commerce”, 36.81 percent of the population coinciding with corporations which produce and promote drugs, medicines, arms, prostitutes and mercenaries.”
On December 9, 1999, at a meeting with Li Peng, People's Republic of China's legislative Chairman and the Communist Government's most hard-line leader, Boris Yeltsin told reporters he wanted to send a message to Clinton, who had criticized Russia for causing civilian casualties in Chechnya. "It seems Mr. Clinton has forgotten Russia is a great power that possesses a nuclear arsenal. We aren't afraid at all of Clinton's anti-Russian position. I want to tell President Clinton that he alone cannot dictate how the world should live, work and play. It is us who will dictate," Yeltsin said.

Yeltsin and President of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin discussed both criticizing the global dominance of the United States of America. "Jiang Zemin completely understands and fully supports Russia's actions in combating terrorism and extremism in Chechnya," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said afterwards. Chinese Foreign Ministry said that China "understands and supports the efforts made by Russia in safeguarding national unity and territorial integrity."

In June 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) examined Russia's progress in honouring the obligations and commitments it undertook on joining the Council of Europe in 1996. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed Resolutions 1323 in 2003 and 1403 in 2004 which stated that there had been very little progress in relation to the obligation to bring to justice those responsible for human rights violations. The Resolutions 1323 in 2003 and 1403 in 2004 called on the Russian authorities to "take effective action to put an immediate end to the ongoing 'disappearances', torture, arbitrary detention in illegal and secret facilities, and unlawful killings" reported in Chechnya by Non-Governmental Organizations.

On April 20, 2001, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) adopted Resolution 1297 RTS condemning human rights violations in Chechnya perpetrated by federal forces, citing "forced disappearances, extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, torture, and other inhuman and degrading treatment." The Resolution 1297 RTS called on Russia to "ensure that both civilian and military prosecutor's offices undertake systematic, credible and exhaustive criminal investigations and prosecutions" of all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights reiterated its requirement, also made in the 2000 Resolution 5673 RTS, for Russia to establish a national commission of inquiry to investigate crimes in Chechnya; despite Russia's failure to create such a commission or ensure effective prosecutions after the 2000 resolution, the commission declined to call for the creation of an international commission of inquiry. In 2001, the Holocaust Memorial Museum depicted Chechnya on the Genocide Watch List to delineate the effects and envenoms of the Russian-Chechen conflict.

According to the 2001 annual report by Amnesty International: "There were frequent reports that Russian forces indiscriminately bombed and shelled civilian areas. Chechen
civilians, including medical personnel, continued to be the target of military attacks by Russian forces. Hundreds of Chechen civilians and prisoners of war were extra judicially executed. Journalists and independent monitors continued to be refused access to Chechnya. According to reports, Chechen fighters frequently threatened and killed members of the Russian-appointed civilian administration and executed Russian captured soldiers.\footnote{Anna Politkovskaya: Putin's Russia, The Harvill Press 2004}

**Caucasus Front (Chechen War)**

On May 29, 2001, Russian Deputy Director of the Council Chambers of the Russian Federation and Advisor of the President, Sergei Yastrzhembski announced that 3,096 federal servicemen have been killed in Chechnya since October 1999. This number was in contrast with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s announcement on the previous day, according to which the Center for Registration of Servicemen listed 2,682 killed soldiers since August 1999, including 2,026 Defense Ministry servicemen.

On October 24, 2003, Colonel-General of the Russian Army and Chief of the Internal Troops Staff, Nikolai Rogozhkin, stated that a total of 2,898 Russian Army soldiers and 4,720 soldiers of other law enforcement agencies died since October 1, 1999. Russia also claimed her forces had killed more than 15,000 rebels since August 1999. By December 17, 2002, the official death toll for Federal Troops was about 4,705.\footnote{The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation}

On November 19, 2004, the chairman of Chechnya's pro-Moscow State Council, Taus Djabrailov, said over 200,000 people have been killed in the Autonomous Chechen Republic since 1994, including over 20,000 children. On June 26, 2005, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, a deputy prime minister in the Kremlin-controlled Chechen administration, stated that about 300,000 people of both nationalities have been killed during two wars in Chechnya over the past decade; he also said that more than 200,000 people have gone missing. “Every resident of Chechnya has scores of relatives who have been killed or gone missing”, he claimed.\footnote{The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation}

In September 2007, Russian Deputy Interior Minister Arkady Yedelev of the Regional Tactical Command reported that almost 1,000 Russian police officers were killed in Chechnya. In September 2007, Major-General of the Russian Army and the Head of the Memorial Center of the Armed Forces, Alexander Kerilin, alleged that over 6,600 soldiers had been killed in Chechnya. In October 2007, Chechnya's Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov said that 1,045 Chechen police officers have died, 2,852 were wounded, and 106 were disabled during anti-terrorist operations.

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\textsuperscript{125} Anna Politkovskaya: Putin's Russia, The Harvill Press 2004  
\textsuperscript{126} The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation  
\textsuperscript{127} The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation
For the period from 1994 to 2003 estimates for the number of casualties ranged from 50,000 to 250,000 civilians and 10,000 to 50,000 Russian servicemen killed. Given that almost certainly both sides have tended to exaggerate enemy military casualties while minimizing their own and grossly underestimating its responsibility for civilian losses, the Russian-Chечен Friendship Society set the conservative estimate of death toll in this time period at about 150,000 - 200,000 civilians, 20,000 to 40,000 Russian soldiers, and possibly the same amount of Chechen rebels.

In February 2003, the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, estimated that some 11,000 servicemen have been killed, with another 25,000 wounded, since 1999. The Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia also estimated the civilian death toll at about 20,000 people. Their estimate for the earlier Chechen war was 14,000 dead troops as compared with the official figure of 5,500.128

In 2006 Alexander Cherkasov of the Human Rights Group Memorial pointed out that the Russian government did not make any attempt to count civilian casualties in the war of 1994-96, nor after 1999. Many figures have been quoted, some greatly exaggerated; a figure of 250,000 dead in the two wars is sometimes repeated, but without there being adequate substantiation of such a number; he said. Cherkasov’s concluded: The total number of peaceful residents of the Chechen Republic who perished during the two wars may have reached 70,000. (...) [In the second war] the total number of civilians killed, including those who disappeared, adds up to between 14,800 to 24,100. However, he admitted that the accuracy of his estimates was not high.129

While the anti-Russian local insurgencies in the North Caucasus Mountains started even before the war, two months after Aslan Maskhadov's death (the Chechen Rebel President), the Chechen separatists officially announced that they had formed a Caucasus Front within the framework of "reforming the system of military-political power." Along with the Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush sectors of rebel activity, the Stavropol Krai, the Krasnodar Krai and the Islamic Jamaats of the Autonomous Republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Adyghe were included in it.

This, in essence, means that practically all the regions of the South of the Russian Federation between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea would be involved in the hostilities that the Chechen Islamic Mujahadeens initiated. The Chechen separatist movement has taken on a new role as the official ideological, logistical and, probably, financial hub of the new insurgency in the North Caucasus Caucasus. Increasingly frequent clashes between federal forces and local militants continue in the Autonomous Republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia, while sporadic fighting erupts in the other regions of the South of the Russian Federation.

The Moscow theater hostage crisis was the seizure of a crowded Moscow theatre on October 23, 2002 by about 40 armed Chechen Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) militants who claimed allegiance to the separatist movement in Chechnya. They took 850

129 The Chechen Resistance Movement: 2006, Review in Jamestown Foundation
hostages and demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya and an end to the Second Chechen War. The hostage taking took place at the Theatrical Center (TC) of State Ball-Bearing Plant Number 1, a Moscow theater named after its former owner, in the Dubrovka area of Moscow. During Act II of a sold-out performance of Nord-Ost, 42 heavily-armed men and women drove in a truck to the theater and entered through the scene.

A videotaped statement was acquired by the media in which the gunmen declared their willingness to die for their cause. The statement contained the following text:

"Every nation has the right to their fate. Russia has taken away this right from the Chechens and today we want to reclaim these rights, which Allah has given us, in the same way he has given it to other nations. Allah has given us the right of freedom and the right to choose our destiny. And the Russian occupiers have flooded our land with our children's blood. And we have longed for a just solution. People are unaware of the innocent who are dying in Chechnya: the sheikhs, the women, the children and the weak ones. And therefore, we have chosen this approach."

"This approach is for the freedom of the Chechen people and there is no difference in where we die, and therefore we have decided to die here, in Moscow. And we will take with us the lives of hundreds of sinners. If we die, others will come and follow us - our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice their lives, in Allah's way, to liberate their nation. Our nationalists have died but people have said that they, the nationalists, are terrorists and criminals. But the truth is Russia is the true criminal." 130

Early Saturday morning, October 26, 2002, forces from Russia's OSNAZ (or "special purpose") from the FSB, with the assistance of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) SOBR unit, surrounded and stormed the theater, first through the gay bar below the building. Representatives of emergency operations HQ reported that the assault operation was triggered when the terorists allegedly started shooting hostages. At least 33 terrorists and 129 hostages died during the raid or in the following days. Doctor Andrei Seltsovsky, Moscow's health committee chairman, announced that all but one of the hostages killed in the raid had died of the effects of the unknown gas rather than from gunshot wounds.

The Beslan school hostage crisis (also referred to as the Beslan school siege or Beslan Massacre) began when a group of armed Chechen separatists and supporters took more than 1,200 schoolchildren and adults hostage on September 1, 2004, at School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. After an exchange of gunfire with local police and an armed civilian (Ruslan Gapoyev, who was killed in the exchange), in which it was reported one attacker was shot, the attackers seized the school building, taking approximately 1,300 hostages.

The 2 September 16:45 letter sent along with Ruslan Aushev: "From Allah's servant Shamil Basayev to President Putin.

130 Anna Politkovskaya: Putin's Russia, The Harvill Press 2004
Vladimir Putin, it wasn't you who started this war. But you can finish it if you have enough courage and determination of de Gaulle. We offer you a sensible peace based on mutual benefit by the principle—indeedindependence in exchange for security. In case of troops withdrawal and acknowledgement of independence of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, we are obliged not to make any political, military, or economic treaties with anyone against Russia, not to accommodate foreign military bases on our territory even temporarily, not to support and not to finance groups or organizations carrying out a military struggle against the Russian Federation, to be present in the united ruble zone, to enter the Commonwealth of Independent States or be subordiante to the Counsil of Muftis.

Besides, we can sign a treaty even though a neutral state status is more acceptable to us. We can also guarantee a renunciation of armed struggle against the Russian Federation by all Muslims of Russia for at least 10 to 15 years under condition of freedom of faith. We are not related to the apartment bombigns in Moscow and Volgodonsk, but we can take responsibility for this in an acceptable way. The Chechen people is leading a nation-liberating struggle for its freedom and independence, for its self-protection rather than for destruction or humiliation of Russia. We offer you peace, but the choice is yours’”.

Allahu Akbar Signature 30 August”

Russian special forces, fied powerful RPO-A Shmel (Bumblebee) rockets at the school’s roof and attic, setting parts of the school ablaze (a total of nine empty disposable tubes were later found on the rooftops of nearby apartment blocks). A chaotic battle broke out as two special forces groups fought to enter the school and militants counterattacked. The assault forces included the assault groups of the FSB OSNAZ, and the associated troops of the Russian Army and the Russian Interior Ministry, supported by several tanks from the Russia's 58th Army, BTR-80 wheeled armoured personnel carriers, and at least one Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunship.

At least 396 people, mostly hostages, were killed during the crisis. The first of the many funerals were conducted on September 4, the day after the final assault, with more the following Sunday, and mass burials of 120 people on Monday. Russia's deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Fridinsky said that 31 of the 32 hostage-takers had been confirmed dead and one had been captured alive. During the operation, at least 11 soldiers of the OSNAZ special forces groups Alfa and Vympel were killed, among them the commander of Alfa, while more than 30 suffered wounds of varying severity. It was the highest official number of casualties in a single engagement in the history of these units.

The Nazran raid was carried out a large-scale raid on the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia, Russian Federation, on the night of June 21-22, 2004, by a large number of mostly Chechen and Ingush fighters led by Shamil Basayev. The overnight attacks targeted 15 government buildings in the former Ingush capital and the largest city, Nazran, and at least

three towns and villages located on the Baku-Rostov highway that crosses the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia from east to west. The targets of simultaneous attacks included the Interior Ministry (MVD) Headquarters in Nazran, the base of an FSB border guard unit in Nazran, and also arms depots, Municipal Police Headquarters and OMON Headquarters in settlements northeast of Nazran.

According to the official figures of the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia's pro-Moscow administration, 90 people were killed in the raid, a number revised downward from 98. The final figure included 24 Ingush policemen, ten members of the federal special forces, eight FSB agents, six federal soldiers, five officials from the local prosecutor's office, three Ingush MVD soldiers, two Chechen policemen, three unidentified people, 27 civilians, and at least two guerrillas. About 100 people were injured.

According to a July 2005 report by the Russian Academy of Sciences, there were 70 "terror attacks" in the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan in the first six months of 2005, compared with 30 for all of 2004. The attacks, which were becoming more sophisticated and deadly, primarily targeted Russian soldiers and the local police and government officials. Sources indicated that as many as 2,000 Islamic insurgents, many belonging to the Sharia Jamaat Group, were involved in the Dagestani Islamic Jihad.

The 2005 Nalchik attack was a raid by a large group of militants on Nalchik in the Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkar of the Southern Russian Federation, on 13 October 2005. According to the Russian news source Agentura, fighting began about 9 AM on the morning of October 13, while a statement made by Shamil Basayev on the Kavkaz Center website asserts the exact time at 9:14. The initial attack included nine targets: the Center T.F. Anti-terrorist Service of the Interior Ministry, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB) state security organisation, the FSB Border Guard, the Paramilitary OMON Riot Militiya Unit, the Road Patrol Police Regiment (PPSM), the Federal Tax Service Directorate, the Military Registration and Enlistment Office (Voyenkomat), the Nalchik Airport and the regional Headquarters of the Russian Penitentiary System.132

The Russian Government and the rebels have published significantly different casualty figures. According to the Russian officials, 89 attackers were killed and 36 captured, while 35 federal servicemen and 14 civilians also died. At 15:40 GMT, CNN reported that 97 people were hospitalized in connection with the attack, according to the Russian Health Ministry. According to local sources, many of the dead classified as terrorists were actually civilians accidentally killed in the crossfire. There were also reports that young men have simply vanished without a trace despite having no proven connection to the raid, some other allegedly detained in the day after the raid and then presented dead as the killed insurgents. Despite public protests by family members, the bodies were not released.

A year later, many relatives were still demanding in vain that authorities return for proper burial the bodies of 92 men allegedly killed during the attacks; a number of families

132
have taken cases to the European Court of Human Rights and Political Liberties in Strasbourg to petition for the return of bodies. In June 2007 the government said it had cremated the bodies of the 95 suspects on June 22, 2006.

On July 26, 2007, a massive security operation was launched in the Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia, sparked by a series of attacks including an assassination attempt on President Murat Zyazikov. Moscow sent in an additional 2,500 MVD troops, almost tripling the number of Special Forces (Spetsnaz) in Ingushetia. In the next few days hundreds of men have been rounded up in the sweeps, while several security officers were killed and wounded in the continued attacks. By October 2007, police and security forces in Ingushetia were issued orders to stop informing the media of any incidents of a terrorist nature.133

In the Vedeno ambush on September 7, 2007, at least four local Russian troops were killed and 16 hospitalized when a convoy of vehicles carrying Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs soldiers and policemen was ambushed in the volatile Vedeno region of Chechnya. The attack was one of the deadliest in several months. On September 18, 2007, the Chief Dagestan commander Rappani Khaļļov and his right-hand man killed in the 12-hour battle with hundreds of Russian OSNAZ commandos and soldiers.

A.2. Central Asia

We should distinguish the Independent Republics of Central Asia that share a frontline border with the (former Taliban) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; literally, between the Republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and the Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the other hand. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan deluges the Salagi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in Central Asia and disseminates the Whabbite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between the “Muslim” Republics of Central Asia that share frontline borders with the Ferghana Valley; literally, the Republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, on the one hand, and the Independent Republics of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The Ferghana Valley demonstrates the Neo-Jaddist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan of the Volaga River and deciphered the cradle of the Kharezmian Empire and the Mongol Changatai Khanate.

Furthermore, a distinction should be drawn between the Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that contain large European minorities and the Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan which do not corporate large European minorities. The Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have conjectured the celebration of Islam and

133
Christianity and the commemoration of the European Convention of the Human Rights and Political Liberties; however, the Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan conjured the chastening of Christianity and Islam and the conformation to the State and the chastization of Communists or Marxists and the certification to the Government.

Moreover, we should distinguish the Independent Republics of Central Asia that share a frontline border with the Islamic Republic of Iran; literally, between the Republic of Turkmenistan on the one hand, and the Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the other hand. Moreover, the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus Mountains delineates the Shia Muslim doctrine and the Imamate Movement denomination which was disseminated from the co-religionists and co-ethnic Indo-Iranian peoples and populations of the Iranian Plateau.

The Salafi Mazhab (that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan incites) has insinuated the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia and the Whabbite Mazhab (that the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula instigates) has inundated the Commonwealth of Independent States in Central Asia; the Sunni-Muslim Neo-Jadist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan has infiltrated the Central Asian Republics and the Shia-Muslim Imamate Movement of the Islamic Republic of Iran has innovated the Shiite Moslems of Central Asia.

The disintegration of Communism and Marxism and the decomposition of Leninism and Stalinism, delibitated the Socialist Movement in Central Asia and the Caucasus Mountains and deciphered the Neo-Jadist Movement of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan; thus, Islam and Prophet Muhammad have devolved upon the Muslims of the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia as defenders of the nationalist and religious dissidency from the Russian and Ukrainian Slavs or the German Teutones and have been devoted by the Muslims of the Commonwealth of Independent States as deviators from the disdain and despise of the Financial and Cultural Globalisation for national and religious identification and consciousness.

The Muslims of Central Asia and the North Caucasus Mountains that indulged in Muslim Jihad idealized the Wahhabite Mazhab of the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula and immortalized the Salafi Mazhab of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; they importuned the Global Islamic League for the inculcation of the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) and the Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan among Muslims and implored the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States to imperil the Russian Federation and the ex-Soviet Socialist Republics.

Due to the fact that the majority of Muslims impugned the influence of the Global Islamic League and ingratiated the Islamic Relief to indemnify the Muslims of the conflicts and confrontations in Central Asia and the North Caucasus Mountains; they also interceded with the Russian Federation to intercept the Muslim Jihadis. The Russian Motherland was not insinuated by the Muslim Jihad as the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States had invested on the Islamic Emirate of Ichkeria (Chechnya) to ingest.
The majority of the Muslims of Central Asia did not endorse on the Salafi Mazhab (that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan elucidates) and did not espouse on the Whabbite Mazhab (that the Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula enunciated); the Neo-Jadist Movement (that the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan expounds) was enervated by the excommunication of the Governments of the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia and the Imamate Movement (that the Islamic Republic of Iran explicates) was emasculated by the eradication from the Commonwealth of Independent States; thus, the Muslims of Central Asia were exonerated from the establishment of Islamic Emirates or Sultanates and expiated the erosion of Islamic Extremism and Terrorism.
Map 7: Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia’s Republics
Map 8: Muslim Peoples in the Soviet Union
A.2.a. Civil War in Tajikistan

In March 1990, the Spiritual Board of Muslims in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan condemned the Soviet Communist Party of Dushanbe for complicity with the Russian Federation in the campaign against Islam and Prophet Muhammad and castigated the Cousil of Imams of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan for compunction with the Soviet Communist Party of Dushanbe in the criticism of the Shia Muslims. The Spiritual Board of Muslims in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan did not conform to the conditions of the Soviet Communist Party of Dushanbe and was not condoned.

The Spiritual Board of Muslims in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan instigated the Tajik Muslims to impeach the Supreme Soviet Council of Dushanbe for the immolation of the Afghan Muslims in the Afghan Civil War and incited the Tajik Muslims to implicate the Government of Tajikistan for the infriengment upon the Mohammedans of the...
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The Tajik Muslims were infuriated and inflamed because the Supreme Soviet Council of Dushanbe inculcated Marxism and Leninism in the Islamic Institutes and Estates.


In April 1991, President Rakhmon Nabiyev and Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Council of Dushanbe Safarali Kenjayev ostracized the United Tajik Opposition to the East of the Republic of Tajikistan, orchestrated the People’s Party of Tajikistan, oscillated the Soviet Communist Party of Tajikistan, opposed the Socialist Party of Tajikistan and obstructed the Supreme Soviet Council of Dushanbe to the Tajik Muslims; thus, Moslems in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan oscillated between the obligations of the Government of Tajikistan and the offers of the United Tajik Opposition.

In May 1992, Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens in the the Autonomous Oblasts of Garm and Gorno-Badakhsan asserted the abdication of President Rakhmon Nabiyev and acclaimed the abnegation from the Commonwealth of the Independent States. However, the Communist Party of Tajikistan, the Socialist Party of Tajikistan and the People’s Democratic Paarty of Tajikistan amalgamated so as to assail the United Tajik Opposition and abort the assignment of the “Islamic Emirate of Takistan”.

The United Tajik Opposition coalesced with the Islamic Renaissance Party and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan; also, it collaborated with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and and cooperated with Rastakhiz and the Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens and confronted a coalition of the Tajikistan Government, People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Socialist Party of Tajikistan, Communist Party of Tajikistan. Later, the insurgency of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan caused the intervention of the Government of Uzbekistan and the initiative of the Al-Qaeda to infringe upon the Republic of Tajikistan conducd to the Moscow involvement.

By November 1992, the United Tajik Opposition had succumbed to the cooperation of the Governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation and was subjected to capitulation. The Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation condemned the cooperation of the Ground Forces of the Russian Army (124th Motorised Rifle Battalion and 87th Infantry Division) in the frontier line of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the National Guard of the Republic of Tajikistan against the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens and criticized the crimes committed by the Russian Army.

In December 1992, Emomali Rahmonov was elected President of the Republic of Tajikistan, exonerated the Islamic Mujahadeens of Leninabad from the establishment of
the “Islamic Emirate of Takistan” and expiated the Kulyab for the elimination of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan; moreover, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan exorcized the Tajik Muslims from the evangelization of the Islamic Jihad and expostulated with the Tajik Moslems from the Islamistic Extremism and Terrorism.

However, in February 1993, Afghan and Garmi and Pamiri Islamic Mujahadeens inflamed the Tajik Civil War and instigated the Comminist-Islamic War. Nevertheless, by May 1993, the Government of Tajikistan suppressed and subjugated the Garmi and Pamiri Muslims and shattered the Afghan Islamic Mujahadeens; the Government of Tajikistan stultified the scheme for the “Islamic Emirate of Tajistan” and submerged the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens. The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution supported the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens but they were smitten by the Russian Army.


On 27 June 1997 the President of the Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmonov and the United Tajik Opposition Leader Sayeed Abdullo Nuri signed the “General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan” in Moscow. Integral parts of the General Agreement are:

- Protocol on main principles of establishment of peace and national accord in the Republic of Tajikistan dated 17 August 1995
- Protocol on political issues dated 18 May 1997; Agreement of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition Leader on the outcomes of Moscow meeting dated 23 December 1996
- Protocol “On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 23 December 1996
- Provision “On the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 21 February 1997
- Additional Protocol to Protocol “On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 21 February 1997
- Protocol on military issues dated 8 March 1997
- Protocol on the refugees’ issues dated 13 January 1997

Main mechanism of the implementation of the General Agreement was National Reconciliation Committee (NRC), which consisted of 26 members – Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and United Tajik Opposition represented 13 members each. The Chairman of NRC became the United Tajik Opposition Leader Sayeed Abullo Nuri and Deputy Chairman Abdulmajid Dostieev, Deputy Speaker of Majlisi Oli. The NRC consisted of four sub-committees on military, political, juridical and refugee issues, in which 3 people from both the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition were represented.

Amendments have been introduced to the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan through holding nationwide referendum; bills on political parties, social unions, mass media, and elections to the parliament of the country have been drafted. Moreover, a ban has been lifted on the activity of oppositional political parties and movements as well as mass media. One of the most ponderable achievements of the National Reconciliation Committee was the disarmament and disbandment of the United Tajik Opposition combatants consisting of 7,125 fighters as well as simultaneous reform of power structures of the Government Cabinet of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Almost 813,000 Tajik refugees have been repatriated to the homeland from the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Commonwealth of Independent States’ countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees revered the rehabilitation of Tajik and Uzbek refugees and requested the return of the Garmi and Pamiri minority nationalities. However, the repatriation of the Tajik, Uzbek, Pamiri and Garmi refugees was ruptured by the remorses of the Tajik Civil War.

According to the latest census of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in 1989, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan accommodated 5,092,603 inhabitants, of whom Tajiks accounted for 3.17 million, or 62.3 percent. The other major nationalities living in the Republic of Tajikistan were Uzbeks, 23.5 percent (1,197,841); Russians, 7.6 percent (388,481); Tatars of the Volga River, 1.4 percent (72,228); and Kyrgyz, 1.3 percent (63,832). In order of size, the remaining 3.9 percent inhabitants included populations of Ukrainians, Germans, Turkmen, Koreans, Jews (including European Jews and "Bukhara Jews."), Byelorussians, Tatars of the Creimean Peninsula, and Armenians.

The Republic of Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, jural, secular and unitary state. The President of the Republic of Tajikistan is the head of state and of executive power, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan. The Tajik Government consists of the Prime Minister, his Deputies, Ministers, Chairmen of Committees and Heads of National Establishments. The Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan is influenced by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The Tajik Parliament (Majlisi Oli) consists of two houses: Majlisi Milli (National Assembly) and Majlisi Namoyandagon (Assembly of Representatives). The Lower house consists of 63 deputies, 41 (65 percent) of whom are elected through a single-mandate constituency, and 22 deputies (35 percent) -according to party wide lists. Upper house consists of 33 people, 25 of whom (75 percent) are elected in the deputies’ sessions in the
In regards to administrative and territorial division, the Republic of Tajikistan consists of Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, Khatlon and Sughd Oblasts and Direct Ruled Districts. There are a total of 62 districts, 23 cities and towns, 47 settlements and 360 Jamoat (sub-district level). As a consequence of contrast and multiplayer geographic location, peculiarities of relief, climate and combination of high altitude, Tajikistan is conditionally divided into four large zones: Northern (main part of Sughd Oblast), Kuhistan (Zarafshan Valley of Sughd Oblast and Direct Ruled Districts in Rasht Valley), Southern Tajikistan (the area of Khatlon Oblast and Hisor Valley as well as Dushanbe city) and Pamir (the area of Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast).

In these conditions international communities’ aid is vitally essential for the Republic of Tajikistan. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan highly appreciates the outcomes of international consultative groups meetings of donor countries for the Republic of Tajikistan supported by the Organization of the United Nations and the World Bank with a view of sustainable and stable peace-building in Tajikistan after the Civil War in Tokyo (31 October 1996, US$ 185mln were pledged); 24 in Vienna (November 1997 – US$56.5mln); 25 again in Tokyo (16-18 May 2001 – US$ 430mln); 26 in Dushanbe (2-3 May 2003 - US$900mln, of which US$ 200mln as a humanitarian aid and about 2/3 as grants), 27 in London (9-10 February 2004, rendering assistance to the Republic of Tajikistan and ensuring their efficient use).

Human Rights Watch has concluded that the campaigns of the Government of Tajikistan were catastrophic for minority nationalities of the Republic of Tajikistan. For instance, Qurgonteppa, homeland of the Garmi minority nationality and Gorno-Badakshan, heaven of the Pamiri minority nationality, were defiled and destructed. As many as 12,350 Pamiri and 4,178 Garmi minority nationals demised while 123,000 Pamiri and 77,000 Garmi minority nationals were dislocated to the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and dislodged to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Moreover, the Civil War in the Republic of Tajikistan claimed the lives of 76,456 civilians and 16,741 combatants according to Amnesty International; 2,006,000 civilians lost their homes to flee the Republic of Tajikistan and flood the Republic of Uzbekistan. It should be noted that the majority of the Uzbek nationality, approximately 645,000 civilians, fled to their homeland, the Republic of Uzbekistan.135

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“Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya” (The Islamic Party of Liberation) was founded in 1952-1953 by Shaykh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in East Jerusalem, heartland of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan then, which fomented the Jadiest Movement and fostered the Pan-Islamic Movement. “In the forthcoming days Muslims will conquer Rome and the dominion of the [nation] of Muhammad will complete the whole world and the denomination of Muslims will reach as far as the day and night.” (‘Rome’ is characteristically conveyed to the United States of America.) “Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya” is celebrated in the Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and commemorates both Marxism-Leninism and Islam-Prophet Muhammad.

“Akramiya”, was established in 1992 in Andijan in the Republic of Uzbekistan and emerged after the name of its leader Akram Yuldashev; “Akramiya” emanated as a sub-division of the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya and erased as a sub-ordinate of the Nur (Light) of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Hizb un-Nusrat (the Party of Assistance) was entitled as sub-division of the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya in Tashkent in the Republic of Uzbekistan in March 1999 and enthroned as successor of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formed in 1992 by Tahir Yuldashev, in Otavalihon Mosque, in Namangan Province of the Republic of Uzbekistan and fostered the Islamic Institutes of Adolat (Justice), Baraka (Blessings), Tauba (Repentance), and fomented Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam). The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) achieved the restoration of the Uzbek religious authorities, accomplished the registration of Islamic judicial and jurisdiction authorities according to the responsibility and regulations of the Islamic Sharia Law.

The Headquarters of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in Namangan Province were seized by Uzbek Militant Islamists in December 1991 in order to savage the Mayor of the city of Namangan for the stultification of the new mosque as well as the sequestration of the old mosques and the sequester of old madrassas (which would serve as cinemas and theatres); moreover, the Uzbek Militant Islamists seized the Headquarters of the Police so as to slander the Government of Uzbekistan for the suborne of the Council of Muftis of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the sequelement of the Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam) to the Russian Federation (after the supplication of Moscow).

In February 1992, Adolat, Birlik, Erk, and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan challenged Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and contested the Government of Uzbekistan; Islam Karimov conjured the Uzbek Islamic Militants to capitulate and conjectured the Uzbek Muslims to castigate the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Abdullah Utaev, leading figure of the Islamic Renaissance Party of
Uzbekistan, was detained in December 1992; moreover, Adolat, Birlik, Erk, Baraka and Islam Lashkarlari were discommoded from heralding the message of Wahhabbi Islam in January 1993 and Tauba was disconvenienced from functioning as an Islamic hybrid late in December 1995 by Islam Karimov.  

Uzbeks Militant Islamists created the “Namangan Battalion” which campaigned against the Government of Tajikistan in the Tajik Civil War and combated the Ground Forces of the Russian Army; however, in December 1992, the Uzbek Militant Islamists deserted to the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after the defeat of the United Tajik Opposition and the dissolution of the Tajik Civil War. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan collaborated with the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan while the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan cooperated with the Northern-Alliance Republic of Ahmad Maashhood; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was compelled to confront the Northern-Alliance Republic in the Afghan Civil War.

One of the most important sources of support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was from the Jamiat-i Ulema Islami, a future supporter of the Taliban Islamic Movement. Funds were raised by this party to cover the costs of enlisting young Uzbek Militant Islamists in their madrasas and mosques. Hundreds of students of Islam from Central Asia in many of these madrasas and mosques, the majority of whom were Uzbeks and Tajiks, although there were also a few Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uighurs from China.

In August 1995, Abduwali Qori Mirzoev, Mufti of Andijan disappeared; the Imam of the Tukhtaboi Mosque in Tashkent, Obidkhon Nazarov, disappeared in March 1998; Islam Karimov disillusioned the Uzbek Militant Islamists for the disintegration of the Government of Uzbekistan and disproved the Organization of the Conference of the Islamic States for the dereliction of the Republic of Uzbekistan by the “Islamic Revolution” that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan dissipated.

On 27 June, 1997, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmonov and the United Tajik Opposition Leader Sayeed Abdullo Nuri concluded the contract of the “General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan” in Moscow and compromised the Tajik Civil War. Uzbek Militant Islamists were invited in the Conference of the Commonwealth of Independent States, like the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens, to be integrated in the Government of Tajikistan and inherit the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Tashkent was embittered towards Dushanbe since Islam Karimov elucidated that Dushanbe encouraged Uzbek Militant Islamists to be encompassed in the Republic of Tajikistan with the aim of eliminating the Republic of Uzbekistan; moreover, the Government of Uzbekistan was envenomed towards the Government of Tajikistan since Islam Karimov enunciated that Dushanbe emboldened the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with the

136 Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkley
purpose of eradicating the Republic of Uzbekistan. In turn, Dushanbe embarrassed Tashkent since Tashkent extoled Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, former Field Commander of the United Tajik Opposition, and exhorted the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens to enervate and emasculate the Republic of Tajikistan.

In June 1998, Mahmud Khudoiberdiev and the Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens recuperated in the Republic of Uzbekistan and revolted in Northern Tajikistan, but was the National Guard of the Republic of Tajikistan repulsed Tajik Islamic Mujahadeens who retreated to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Dushanbe reprimanded Tashkent for the rupture, reprimanded Islam Karimov for the revolt and remonstrated in the Commonwealth of Independent States against Tashkent; Dushanbe reproached the National Guard of the Republic of Tajikistan for the remorse for the Uzbek Militants Islamic, but remitted from the retributions against the National Guard.

On February 16, 1999, Uzbek Militant Islamists detonated the Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense and dynamitized the Police Station in Tashkent which caused 16 civilian deaths and 123 civilian casualties; the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov was not discarded. The Supreme Judicial Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan sentenced 6 Uzbek Militant Islamists to death and sequestered 22 Uzbek Militant Islamists to life confinement for 55 years.

Aslan Usmanov, an Uzbek politician, declassified the duplicity of the Secret State Agencies of the Republic of Uzbekistan and demystified the deductions of Islam Karimov who deceived the Uzbek Muslims so as to depress the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and defrauded the Uzbek Moslems so as to deprecate Islam. Aslan Usmanov was discarded in November 2003 by the Secret State Agencies of the Republic of Uzbekistan because he debunked the decisions of Islam Karimov.137

This explanation, in Usmanov's view, is supported by a later event when the Uzbek Secret State Agencies were supposedly involved in another assassination attempt. This time, however, it was Saparmuradov Niyazov, the President of Turkmenistan, who was the target of the operation. The incident took place three years after the 1999 Tashkent explosions, on November 25, 2002. Though Usmanov saw a link between the two, in the second case the scenario was different:

"Some political groups in Russia and Uzbekistan, in my view, clearly helped Boris Shikhmuradov (a former deputy prime-minister of Turkmenistan who turned dissident who was accused of having orchestrated the assassination attempt). One may even speak about a certain Russo-Uzbek scenario. Naturally, Shikhmuradov had secured the support of these circles and leaned on them. In the process, he overplayed his hand, as well as that of his supporters and the circles named above.

I do not believe that Shikhmuradov found support at the highest level in Russia and Uzbekistan, but nevertheless forces were found in these countries that pushed Shikhmuradov

137Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkley
to take active steps. And then his patrons simply stepped aside, leaving him to the mercy of fate and convictions...”

In March 1999, Islam Karimov declared amnesty for the Uzbek Militant Islamists who would defect from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and desert the Afghan Taliban Movement and so 36 Uzbek Militant Islamists were deceived and discarded in Kharezm in the Republic of Uzbekistan by the National Guard; however, the demise of the Uzbek Militant Islamists was disseminated and no more Uzbek Militant Islamists were defrauded by Islam Karimov and Abduwali Yuldashev.

In July 1997, Abduwali Yuldashev conveyed 456 Uzbek Islamists in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to collaborate with the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Mashkadov, and cohere the Caucasus Front of the Chechen War; the commerce of narcotic drugs, armour equipment, “white flesh” organs, molested prostitutes and abducted residents compensated the financial capabilities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and compiled its military capacities.

In the villages of Shali, Serzhen-Yurt, and Aftori-Yurt in the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan created military camps in July 1999 for Uzbek Islamic Militants who numbered 5,123 Muslim Jihadists; Abduwali Yuldashev devised machinations to debilitate the Government of Uzbekistan and deluge the Republic of Uzbekistan with the message of Hanafi Islam. The conspirators declared that “I shall serve Allah, I shall not swerve from the path of Allah, I am ready to kill the enemies of religion {e.g. Islam Karimov} for the sake of Allah, and I agree that I shall be punished in case I violate the oath.”

However, in September 1999, the Secret States Agencies delineated the conspiracy of the Uzbek Militant Islamists: “At the end of September 1998, Yuldashev, Namangani, Zakirov, and Bahrom Abdullaev met in Kabul. Yuldashev was declared to be the amir of the movement, Namangani became his assistant for military affairs, and Bahrom Abdullaev became the amir of the jihad organizations carrying on their activity in the Republic of Uzbekistan. In early December 1998, a meeting of Yuldashev, Namangani and Muhammad Salih was held in Kabul in Afghanistan.

The President and the Cabinet of the Uzbek Government were to be liquidated in Tashkent. Yuldashev would invade the Republic of Uzbekistan from Kashkadarya; Namangani militants would incur into the Ferghana Valley aboard 24 ADF-4 Kamaz armoured vehicles. Muhammad Salih would assume leadership in the republic, while Yuldashev would be assigned the role of war minister. Muhammad Salih pledged to allocate $1,600,000 for this affair.”

Russian Mafia “shadow operations and organizations” supplicated for the alteration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Republic of Uzbekistan and surrogated fro the abnegation of the Ministry of Anti-Terrorism of Islam Karimov; the correlation of Russia Mafia-Salim (Ferghana Valley Clan leader)-Jurabekov (Islam Karimov’s right hand)-Salih

138 Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkley
Islamists may circumvent all the logical assumptions which apprehend the “coup d’etat” against Islam Karimov in February 1999 and circumscribe all the allegations which animate the ‘Orange-Green Revolution’.

Jurabekov is supported by the minister of interior, Zakir Almatov; and Jurabekov and Almatov, who are members of the Samarqand clan, are in turn allied with the Jizak clan, represented by the former minister of foreign affairs, Abdulaziz Kamilov (since March 2003, Kamilov has been the president’s advisor for foreign affairs), as well as some other influential officials. Members of the allied Tashkent and Ferghana clans (including the minister of defense, Qadir Ghulamov, as well as others) believe that their representation in the government is insufficient, and the underground rivalry between these alliances, as well as some other interest groups, may have been related to the Islamists activities.


The President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was criticized by the Government of Uzbekistan for the consent to the Uzbek and Tajik Militant Islamists and was castigated for the concession towards Western Democracy and Liberalism in Kyrgyzstan. On August 19, 1999, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan captured a General of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and combatted the Kyrgyz National Guard; however, the National Guard of the Kyrgyz Republic collaborated with the Ground Forces of the Russian Army and the Uzbek Militant Islamists capitulated.

On August 21, 1999, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan captured the meteorological facility of the Uzbekistan Meteorological Committee at the Abramov Glacier in Kyrgyzstan and 12 employees of the Scientific and Research Board of the Meteorological Facility along with 6 employees of the CNN Broadcast News Agency on the Abramov Glacier were captivated; the President of the Kyrgyz Republic deprecated the National Guard of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and denigrated the Major-General of the Ministry of Defense.

In late August, Zardaly in the Bakten District of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was captured by Arab, Pakistanis, Afghans, Uzbek, Iranians and Tajik Militant Islamists and was consecrated to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, since the Osh Pass connected the
Republic of Kyrgyzstan with the Ferghana Valley and correlated with the Republic of Uzbekistan; Arab, Pakistani, Afghan and Iranian Militant Islamists coalesced with the Uzbek and Tajik Militant Islamists to coerce the Muslims of Central Asia into Islamic Jihad.

Moreover, 9 police officers, 4 Japanese geologists, a Kyrgyz interpreter and 6 local inhabitants were also captured by the Arab, Pakistanis, Afghans, Uzbek, Iranians and Tajik Militant Islamists who defied the the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, despised President Bishek, disdained the Commonwealth of Independent States and declared Osh and Zardaly an Islamic Imamate. However, the National Guard of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan defeated and decimated the Militant Islamists from Zardaly in the Balten District and the Osh Pass who dispersed in the Republic of Tajikistan.

However, in September 1999, Uzbek Militant Islamists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan returned to the Osh Pass of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and repulsed the National Guard of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; Islam Kaarimov had repressed the Uzbek Militant Islamists and repurcussioned the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 5 days earlier. Tursunbai Bakir-Uulu, deputy of the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, proscribed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the National Assembly to be penalized and prescripted the Uzbek and Tajik Militant Islamists to be punished in the Conference of the Ministry of Defense; moreover, he prognostigated that the Government of Uzbekistan would protest and predicated that Islam Karimov would pressurize the Government of Kyrgyzstan.

The Air Force of the Uzbek Army assaulted the Uzbek Militant Islamists in the Osh Pass and aimedadverted on the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Uzbek Militant Islamists confronted the Kyrgyz National Guard and combatted the Ground Forces of the Russian Army; Abduwali Yuldashev demised along with 26 Uzbek Militant Islamists while another 12 Afghan Islamic Mujahadeen were detained by the Kyrgyz National Guard.

Juma Hojiev, who affirmed the activities of the Tajik Militant Islamists with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, attacked the Batken District of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to alleviate the assault upon the Uzbek Militant Islamists. On August 26, 1999, the Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Saiyd Abdulla Nuri recommended the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to release of the 4 Japanese hostages in order to revoke the reprimand from the United Nations Organization. In October 1999, the 4 Japanese hostages were released without ransom by the Uzbek Militant Islamists. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan reproved the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and recommended Tahir Yuldashev to resolve of the hostage crisis.

Namangani convinced the Uzbek Militant Islamists to be contemplate the consignment to the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; the Russian Army in the Republic of Tajikistan conjured the conviction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the United Tajik Opposition conjectured the capitulation of the Uzbek, Arab, Tajik, Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan Militant Islamists to the National Guard of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.
Tashkent condemned Moscow that the Russian Army consented to the conspiracy that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan colluded against Islam Kaarimov.

In May 2000, the Uzbek Militant Islamists were deported to Kandahar in the Taliban Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Arab and Iranian Islamic Mujahadeens were dislocated to the Islamic Republic of Iran; however, in July 2000 the Uzbek Militant Islamists destroyed the villages Tavildara and Tarkijara of the Republic of Uzbekistan and discarded the Uzbek villagers. Tashkent accused Dushanbe that the National Guard of the Republic of Tajikistan accorded with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and animadverted on the Government of Tajikistan to acclaim the United Tajik Opposition.

On 17 June 2000, the Government of Tajikistan abjured the arrest of the Tajik Militant Islamists and adjured the abdication of the United Tajik Opposition from the access to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the Government of Uzbekistan asseverated the abnegation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and adumbrated the arrest of the Uzbek Militant Islamists. Thus, Dushanbe and Tashkent accorded the abstraction of the armor from the United Tajik Opposition and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ans ascribed the arrangement for the arrest of the “Islamist Terrorists”.

In August and September 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan assaulted the Osh Passs in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and assailed the Surkhan-Darya District in the Republic of Uzbekistan; the Districts of Janjiabad and Bostanlyk, near Tashkent were also attacked. The Uzbek National Guard expelled 2,560 Tajiks from the Surkhan-Darya District after the expounding of cooperation and complicity with the Uzbek Militant Islamists and exiled 1,034 Kyrgyz from the Districts of Janjiabad and Bostanlyk after the explication of collaboration and connuction with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the Governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan expostulated with Tashkent against the eviction of the Tajik and Kyrgyz nationals.

The Kyrgyz Interior Ministry stated that Tajikistan’s Security Ministry, supported by the CIA, had conducted a search for Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan contingents in the mountains of the Republic of Tajikistan; however, no Uzbek terrorists were traced. When the Northern Alliance occupied Balkh province, captured Taliban fighters confessed that Namangani had demised during the assault against Mazar-i-sharif. In July 2002, Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Secretary, Misir Ashirkulov, claimed that Namangani was still alive and was once again preparing attacks on the Ferghana Valley. And Ahirkulov also resurrected the charge that Namangani.s fighters were regrouping at camps in Gorno-Badakhshan of the Republic of Tajikistan. In October 2001, Juma Hojiev (Namangani) from Kunduz instructed Ilhom Hojiev and Rasul Okhunov, to commit terrorist attacks on US and Russian aircraft.

The Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan estimated that in December 2002, 6,400 people remained imprisoned on political and religious grounds. Of those arrested on the grounds of religious activism, about 1,200 to 1,700 are considered Wahhabbis, 4,200 to 4,300 members of Hizb at-Tahrir, and 600 to 700 are pious Muslims not
belonging to any political religious organization. Yet another Amnesty International claimed that 30,000 political and religious prisoners resided in Uzbekistan in 2002.\footnote{Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkley}

As a result, the only political organizations for Muslims in Uzbekistan remain the Uzun Soqol (Long Beards), Tabligh Jamaat, Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Uzbek Hizbullah, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and the Turkish Nurcular (Followers of the Light).

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan purportedly changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan in June 2001, presumably to reaffirm its aspiration to establish an Islamic state in all of Central Asia (which would include China’s Xinxiang province). For similar reasons, Kyrgyz authorities believed that, in October 2002, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan joined with other regional radical Muslim groups - including the Hezb at-Tahrir, Uighur separatists, and Tajik and Kyrgyz Islamist - to form the Islamic Movement of Central Asia. Militants calling themselves the Jihad Islamic Group (JIG) or “Jamoat” (“Community”) claimed responsibility for the 2004 attacks. (But the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan posted a statement on an Islamic website affirming responsibility for the July 2004 bombings)

The formal founding of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan itself took place in 1998 in Kabul, then under Taliban control. At the time, Yuldashev apparently resided in Kandahar, where Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden also lived. Subsequently, Osama bin Laden, Omar, Namangani, and Yuldashev met frequently to plan strategy for operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Taliban leaders twice refused to extradite Namangani or Yuldashev to the Republic of Uzbekistan after Uzbek officials, who supported the anti-Taliban opposition, accused the two men of responsibility for the February 1999 bomb explosions in Tashkent.\footnote{In May 2001 Taliban authorities even appointed Namangani head of a sort of Islamic foreign legion. This military unit consisted of a variety of non-Afghan Islamic fighters, including Pakistanis, Turks, Uighurs, and Uzbeks. The Taliban employed the brigade against the opposition forces of the Northern Alliance.}

The new Afghan Government under Hamid Karzai has cooperated fully with its neighbors in suppressing the remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan within its borders. In August 2002, Afghan authorities expeditiously transferred seven suspected
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members to the Republic of Uzbekistan’s law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, in December 2003, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov said that Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan activity in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continued to threaten Central Asian countries.

During the allied intervention in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed that the United States and Great Britain had declared war on Islam and urged Muslims to oppose the Uzbek Government’s policy of supporting the NATO Coalition. Leaflets attributed to the group’s Central Asian members also allegedly urged attacks on United States soldiers at Ganci Air Base, located at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas International airport.

After American and British troops attacked Iraq, Hizb ut-Tahrir members in southern Kazakhstan called for a jihad against the United States and Great Britain. Law enforcement agencies found similar leaflets in the Southern Republic of Kyrgyzstan. In late 2003, Kyrgyz authorities arrested several Hizb ut-Tahrir members who allegedly planned to detonate a bomb at Ganci. Russian police have arrested 121 people in Moscow allegedly connected to the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, and seized explosives, detonators, and grenades at the organization’s Moscow branch.

The’s ideology also has been influenced by Deobandism, a version of Islam popular among in Pakistan and (under the Taliban) Afghanistan. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leaders also have contacts with, and have been influenced by, adherents of radical Wahhabism. Its affiliates also advocate the establishment throughout Central Asia of Islamic law (Shariah) and Islamic governments based on the Muslim community that existed at the time of Prophet Muhammad.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan reportedly has received most of its financial support from three main sources: narcotics trafficking, Al Qaeda, and ethnic Uzbeks living in Saudi Kingdom of the Arabian Peninsula. Initially, the largest share of funds came from wealthy Saudi businessmen of Uzbek origin, but recently self-financing through drug smuggling and other illegal activities (such as several cases of kidnapping foreigners) have become the most important source of funds. Numerous reports suggest the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been heavily involved in Central Asian narcotics trafficking, with Russia and the rest of Europe the ultimate delivery destination. Some sources suggest that its members control some 70 percent of heroin and opium traffic in the region.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader Namangani reportedly received sanctuary and support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), until at least 2001. Yuldashev himself was based in Peshawar from 1995 to 1998. Before 11 September 2001, several Inter-Services Intelligence Agency operatives reportedly also worked closely with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Afghan sponsors, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Some of the Islamic political parties in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier also have historic ties to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. For example, Sipha-e-Sahaba and Harkat Ul Mujheddin have provided recruits and finances to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the past.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan operatives also allegedly continued to operate in parts of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan has accused Pakistani leaders of overlooking the activities of Uzbek terrorists on their territory. He told reporters in April 2002 that, “The Pakistani authorities have done nothing to detain bandits from Uzbekistan who were trained in Afghanistan and took part in the Al Qaeda terrorist network. . . . Uzbekistan has an extradition agreement with Pakistan, but we haven’t seen its practical implementation.”

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the Pakistani Government under President Pervez Musharraf has increased its cooperation with Central Asian authorities attempting to suppress the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In June 2002, Pakistani security forces killed six alleged Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members in the South Waziristan tribal agency and in the city of Kohat after the foreigners had killed a Pakistani policeman and an official of Pakistan’s military intelligence. Pakistani authorities extradited two suspected Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members (Ikhon Mamajanov and Hamidullah Kudratov) to Uzbekistan in August 2002 after the Uzbek Government appealed to Washington for assistance against terrorists.

According to the media, intelligence available to United States CENTCOM purportedly indicates that Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members have been receiving training in Iranian-based camps in recent years. These sources also assert that some of the camp trainers belong to Iranian Revolutionary Guards units based at Tehran’s Imam Ali garrison and the Bahonar garrison, located north of Tehran. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leaders have broadcast statements over Iranian radio, which suggests they enjoy some support within the Iranian regime or its intelligence services.

In the Republic of Turkey, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan cofounder Yuldashev reportedly received funds from various groups committed to Islamic pan-Turkism. Uzbek President Karimov later said that the February 1999 attempt to assassinate him had been planned in the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish government recalled its ambassador in response to the accusation. Uzbek authorities then expelled hundreds of Turkish business people from the Republic of Uzbekistan and ordered scores of Uzbek students in the Republic of Turkey to return home.

That Turkey has granted asylum to members of the Erk party, which represent Karimov’s main democratic opposition, has also aggravated relations between the two countries. Karimov accuses Erk of also trying to overthrow him. In recent years, the Turkish authorities have distanced themselves from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In 1999, the Turkish Government provided military equipment and training to Uzbek and Kyrgyz border guards in order to strengthen their ability to combat the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Turkish officials also have denied visas to suspected Uzbek militants.

140 Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, University of California, Berkley
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan reportedly has received funding from sympathetic Saudi patrons (especially wealthy Uzbek émigrés in the Saudi Kindom of the Arabian Peninsula who deem the current Uzbek regime insufficiently Islamic) and Muslim charities in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan military leader and co-founder Juma Namangani may have trained at a religious center connected with Saudi intelligence in the late decade of 1990.

In December 2002, Uzbek authorities, ostensibly for economic reasons, began closing border crossings with the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, severely disrupting regional commerce. In December 2003, Karimov declared his opposition to the establishment of additional foreign military bases in neighboring countries. He specifically cited the new Russian airbase at Kant, even while denying that the Karshi-Khanabad air base used by United States forces in the Republic of Uzbekistan constituted a full-fledged military base.

Fifty-five Kyrgyz soldiers died fighting the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000. In July 2001, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guerrillas tried to capture a television relay station in Kyrgyzstan that broadcasted to both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Before it could launch its next major offensive, however, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan lost its bases, and many of its members, in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan following the large-scale United States military intervention there starting in October 2001, and fell dormant.

After a year-long hiatus, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan renewed military operations in Kyrgyzstan, especially along the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier. Its members allegedly detonated several bombs, including in an alleged attempt to kill National Security Council Secretary Misir Ashirkulov in September 2002. Boris Poluektov, Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz National Security Service, told the Kyrgyz and Russian press that Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan operatives, working with members of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), caused an explosion in the largest clothes marketplace (Oberon) of Bishkek in December 2002.

Boris Poluektov, Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz National Security Service also held them responsible for a blast, in which one person died, which occurred in a currency exchange outlet in Osh in May 2003. Kyrgyz authorities detained two Uzbek nationals with possible links to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in May 2003. They allegedly were connected with the bombings, as well as the murder of 19 Chinese citizens in March 2003.

On 26 November 2003, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court, at the initiative of the Public Prosecutor General, banned the Islamic Party of Turkestan (another name for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) as well as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization, and the Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan. The head of Kyrgyzstan’s intelligence agency, Kalyk Imankulov, had claimed that both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Al Qaeda had been recruiting Hizb ut-Tahrir adherents.
The Republic of Kyrgyzstan hosts approximately 1,200 United States troops at Ganci Air Base at Manas International Airport, located 19 miles from the capital Bishkek. The USAF warplanes deployed there include fighter-bombers, transport aircraft, and airborne tankers. Although American, French, and other coalition forces employed the base heavily during Operation Enduring Freedom in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz Government prohibited its use during Operation Iraqi Freedom because it officially opposed the United States-led campaign. In November 2003, Kyrgyz authorities arrested three men who they claim were Islamic extremists preparing to explode a bomb at Ganci.¹⁴¹

Uzbek President Karimov even accused members of the Tajik Coalition Government belonging to the United Tajik Opposition of assisting their former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan allies to infiltrate Uzbekistan. Tajik authorities repeatedly have denied these assertions. But in September 2000, Tajik authorities claimed their troops had killed 40 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guerrillas near the Tajik-Kyrgyz border.

Analysts believe that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has become popular in the Karategin Valley, a stronghold of Islamist opposition forces during the Tajik Civil War. They also identify the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s military camps and recruiting centers in the Tavildera Valley, established in 1992 by Namangani after he and his followers fled the Republic of Uzbekistan, as its most important base in Central Asia. Both these valleys lie in Tajikistan’s isolated Pamir Mountains, located northeast of the capital, Dushanbe.

Tajik authorities have permitted Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division and units of the Russian Federal Border Guards, numbering as many as 20,000 soldiers in total, to deploy along the Republic of Tajikistan’s borders in an attempt to halt the infiltration of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other terrorists from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

They also have granted the United States and several of its NATO allies permission to use the Dushanbe International Airport for antiterrorist operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.) Following its devastating losses during Operation Enduring Freedom, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members regrouped in the Garm Valley in the mountains of the Eastern Republic of Tajikistan. On 2 November 2002, the Tajik government announced it would extradite 12 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members whom it had captured earlier to the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In January 2004, Tajik Deputy Prime Minister Saidamir Zuhurov said that he had received no information that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan had increased its activities in the country. That same month, the United States State Department issued a statement acknowledging that, “The political security situation in the Republic of Tajikistan has improved in the last two years.” Nevertheless, the Department continued to warn of potential anti-American terrorist attacks in the country: “terrorist groups allied with the terrorists of al-Qaida, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), remain active in Tajikistan and still pose risks to travelers.”

¹⁴¹ Vitaly V. Naumkin: Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Universiy of California, Berkley
Efects of Muslim Terrorism in Central Asia

In May 2000, participants at a Commonwealth of the Independent States summit in Minsk agreed to a formula whereby Russian troops could deploy to assist Collective Security Treaty parties in an emergency. In order to coordinate members’ efforts to suppress the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other transnational terrorists, the Commonwealth of the Independent States established a Counter-Terrorism Center in Bishkek. The Center began operating in December 2000 under the leadership of General Boris Mylinikov, a former senior official in Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).

In August 2001, the Collective Security Treaty parties established a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) in Central Asia consisting of one battalion each from the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia, which has allocated a reinforced battalion from the 201st Infantry Division. The Collective Rapid Deployment Force, which currently consists of approximately 1,500 troops, has its permanent headquarters in Bishkek. The Collective Security Treaty members held operational and tactical exercises in April 2002 in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. The exercises, code named South Anti-Terror 2002, involved the Rapid Deployment Force, the CIC Counter-terrorism Center, and other national military assets of the member states. The head of Russia’s FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, supervised them.

In May 2002, the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan decided to institutionalize their cooperation further by establishing a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In August 2004, the Collective Security Treaty Organization organized a major antiterrorist exercise in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan with a scenario that simulated the 1999 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan incursion (including such tasks as evacuating civilians, intercepting and destroying terrorist units, liberating hostages, and providing assistance to the local population). It involved over 2,000 troops from the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan as well as Russian combat aircraft based at Kant.

The Governments of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan subsequently established another counterterrorist center at Bishkek under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, officially founded in June 2001, had evolved from the earlier arms control processes associated with “the Shanghai Five” (the Republic of Uzbekistan initially did not participate). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has sponsored extensive, senior-level consultations on several issues, including crime, narcotics trafficking, economic development, transportation, communication, energy, the Afghan War, and terrorism.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization members also signed a formal 26-point charter in St. Petersburg in June 2002, and a “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism,
Separatism, and Extremism” at their June 2001 founding summit. In October 2002 China and Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework, involving joint border operations by hundreds of troops. It marked the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s first maneuvers with another country’s military. All the Shanghai Cooperation Organization militaries, with the exception of the Uzbek armed forces, participated in the first formal SCO-sponsored combined exercise (Cooperation 2003). It involved several counterterrorism scenarios in eastern Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang region in August 2003.

NATO’s ties with the region increased markedly starting in 1994, when all the former Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia except the Republic of Tajikistan, then engrossed in Civil War, entered into the alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. (Tajikistan joined Partnership for Peace in 2002.) Central Asian militaries have participated in Partnership for Peace-sponsored exercises in the United States since 1995, and American and other NATO militaries have deployed in Central Asia for exercises in 1997, 1998, and 2000.

The alliance also played a role in helping organize a Central Asian Battalion (Centrasbat) in 1997. NATO Secretary General George Robertson, who visited the region in 2003, said that the events of 11 September 2001, led the alliance to appreciate “that our security is linked closely to security in remote areas. Central Asia is now going to be very much part of NATO’s agenda.”

The Republic of Uzbekistan has not bothered to send delegates to many Commonwealth of Independent States or Shanagai Cooperation Organization meetings, and it (along with the Republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia) withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty in May 1999 “on political grounds.” Nevertheless, the Republic of Uzbekistan quickly signed a mutual defense pact with Russia later that year. Although Centrasbat includes soldiers from the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, most of its personnel are Russian, and it has never engaged in combat. An agreement signed by the leaders of the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in April 2000 to provide mutual aid against terrorist threats has proven equally ineffectual.

Russian troops have been stationed in the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan under various bilateral security arrangements over the past decade. The largest contingency, in the Republic of Tajikistan, includes almost 20,000 Russian troops, of which some 11,000 serve as border guards. Since his inauguration as Prime Minister and then President, Vladimir Putin has made strengthening Russia’s influence in Central Asia a priority. In October 2003, the Russian Air Force formally opened a new base at Kant, in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

The Russian special services determined that the explosives used in the 1999 Tashkent bombings were identical to those Chechen terrorists have employed in Russia. The Russian military also has repeatedly identified killed and wounded Chechen guerrillas as Uzbek citizens. On the other hand, Russian military forces on three occasions (in 1999, 2000, and early 2001) helped evacuate Namangani’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan insurgents.
from the Republic of Tajikistan to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as part of local peace agreements. Foreign observers speculate that at least some Russians have appreciated the value of an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan threat in inducing Central Asian Governments to turn to Moscow for military assistance.

Chinese authorities claim the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has worked with Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighur separatists, especially members of the banned Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), who have been active in Xinxiang province. China’s leaders worry about separatist agitation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where deadly uprisings have occurred since the decade of 1980.

American officials have become increasingly concerned about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s activities. On 15 September 2000, the United States State Department first designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), citing its armed infiltrations into Central Asia and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s practice of seizing foreign citizens, including Americans, as hostages. The decision to designate the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a Foreign Terrorist Organization came shortly after its members kidnapped four American mountain climbers, who escaped a few days later.

The move allowed the FBI and CIA to cooperate more actively with Uzbek intelligence agents against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. United States law also makes it illegal for American citizens or residents within the United States to provide funds or material support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It permits the United States Treasury to block any assets a Foreign Terrorist Organization might possess in the United States, and empowers the American Government to deny visas or expel a Foreign Terrorist Organization’s members or representatives.

The following September, the Bush administration applied the provisions of its Executive Order 13224 on Terrorist Financing to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which blocked its assets within the United States. In his national address before a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush explicitly linked the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, identifying both groups as terrorist threats to the United States. On 25 September 2002, the State Department made the required biennial reaffirmation that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan remained a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The levels of United States foreign (especially military) assistance to Central Asian countries soared after September 2001. American military personnel also began using the region’s transport and military resources as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These assets have included general overflight and specific emergency landing rights at Almaty, Chimkent, and Lugovoi in the Republic of Kazakhstan; general overflight rights for humanitarian missions through the Republic of Turkmenistan’s airspace.

Temporary basing privileges were acquired at Manas in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Kulyab and Dushanbe in the Republic of Tajikistan and at Karshi-Khanabad, Termez, and
possibly Tuzel in the Republic of Uzbekistan. United States Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has indicated that, as part of their global military posture review, Pentagon planners
are anticipating using temporary (“expeditionary”) military bases in Central Asia in the
future. In early August 2004, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs
Elizabeth Jones said that, although the United States had no plans to establish permanent
bases in the region, “we will stay in Central Asia as long as the situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan requires this.”

The presence of American troops has helped the local economies and provided
substantial profits to influential business and political elites. United States forces pay the
central government thousands of dollars for each aircraft that lands or departs from the
region’s airfields. They also buy food, water, fuel, and other provisions from local businesses.
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev reportedly described the United States military
presence as a “gold mine” for his country. The activities at the Ganci airbase generated about
$50 million in fiscal year 2003, equivalent to approximately 5 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s gross
national product. Only the country’s real gold mine accounted for more revenue.

The United States increased its foreign aid, especially security assistance, to Central
Asian states after they agreed to host American military forces. United States assistance to the
Republic of Uzbekistan almost doubled (from $83 million to approximately $160 million) in
early 2002 after Tashkent granted the United States Air Force access to Karshi-Khanabad
airport and the cooperation of their security services.

The increased United States military presence in Central Asia has not resulted in the
emergence of democratic regimes in the region. On 13 July 2004, a State Department
spokesperson declared that the United States could not confirm that the Uzbek Government
was making substantial and continuing progress toward meeting its commitments to
improving civil and political rights in the country, calling into question the continuation of
millions of dollars in United States Government assistance to that country. Other Central
Asian Governments also continue to harass political opponents, hold fraudulent elections, and
suppress radical but nonviolent religious activists. At the same time, it appears that Russia
and, with less enthusiasm, China, have appreciated the beneficial effects of the heightened
American role in Central Asia.

Russian leaders, reluctant to increase their own military involvement in the region,
appear to have accepted the American military presence in Central Asia as a valuable tool for
combating chaos and extremism along Russia’s volatile southern frontiers. During Operation
Enduring Freedom, Russian authorities readily shared intelligence on Central Asia, permitted
NATO planes to fly over their territory and use Russian bases for search and rescue
operations, deployed Russian special forces alongside their United States counterparts in in
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and even, somewhat belatedly, helped American forces
gain access to former Soviet military bases in the region.

Chinese officials also have acquiesced in the surging U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Philippines, and other areas around their borders. Unlike their
Russian counterparts, however, Chinese officials have offered little beyond lukewarm rhetoric backing for the United States-led war on terror and the American-dominated war in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. During a visit to Iran in April 2002, President Jiang Zemin declared that, “Beijing’s policy is against strategies of force and the US military presence in Central Asia and the Middle East region.” Fears that Washington was exploiting the situation after 11 September 2001, to contain China by encircling it with military bases (the United States forces in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, lie only 200 miles from China’s border) manifested themselves in the quasi-official press in Hong Kong and elsewhere.

Conclusion

The other important radical Islamic movements in Central Asia are the Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami (HTI, or Party of Islamic Liberation) and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Both are quite different from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami has to date advocated nonviolent political struggle. Its principal mode of operation has been education and the dissemination of printed materials. Its goal is the creation of an Islamic state encompassing the entire region of Central Asia.

Unlike the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami is a true transnational organization that consists of semi-independent branches, only some of which are in Central Asia. In Central Asia, it has been most active in the Republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, although there has been growing evidence of activity of Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami in the Southern Republic of Kazakhstan.

While the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been losing influence in the wake of post.September 11 and the launching of the global war on terror, the Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami has been gaining popularity. Central Asia’s acute socio-economic and political problems, as well as the inability of its ruling elites to find a formula for successful modernization and democratization, are increasing social frustration and disaffection, which in turn provide fuel for Islamists of all types, especially those that do not espouse violence such as the Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami. The persecution of Islamist activists by Central Asian governments also creates new martyrs, increasing the popularity of Hizb at-Tahrir al- Islami and broadening its social support.

Though not the only political actors in Islamic movements, the specialists in violence and armed conflicts are of great importance in reproducing a general culture of violence. Violent rituals have become a feature of Central Asian political life. In this regard, a comparison can be drawn between Central Asia and the Caucasus Mountains. In the Caucasus Mountains, violent public rituals play an even more significant role in creating strong images of public figures, and they thereby help mobilize people politically.
Televised public executions and floggings organized by Chechen separatists during the break between the two wars with Moscow (1996-1999), or the punishment of a policeman who was decapitated by Islamic radicals in the Ferghana Valley, are examples. Another purpose of these acts is to signal the commitment of Islamic radicals to a certain code of honor and the tradition of the blood feud. Cutting the ears off deceased enemies during the Tajik Civil War was another vivid and frightening example.

Specialists in violence have been recruited not only by Islamists but by secular forces as well. During the first phase of the Civil War in Tajikistan in 1992, for example, many former racketeers and criminals took the side of the secular opposition to the Islamic Revival Party. In doing so, they sided with certain solidarity groups and regional elites. Sangak Safarov, the leader of the Popular Front (which was responsible for the victory of the Kulyabi-Leninabadi-Hissari alliance over the Gharm-Karategin-Pamir coalition of Islamists and democrats) had spent 23 years in jail on charges of theft of public money and fraud. After the victory over the Islamists in the Tajik Civil War, former racketeers were rewarded by appointment to ministerial posts, including, for example, Yaqub Salimov, who became Tajikistan’s Interior Minister.

A factor that helps maintain a culture of violence in Central Asia and indeed throughout the space that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the high level of militarization of society that is a legacy of the Soviet period. A great number of former army, police and security specialists were trained to use weapons and fight by the Soviet regime. Many of these people have since entered politics, business, or the civil service to make ends meet. Still other specialists became unemployed, which has meant that they are subject to recruitment by political actors.

Religious determinism as expressed in religious doctrines is also an important factor shaping individual and group behavior. In medieval Islam, a broad debate unfolded between “jabriyyah” and “qadiriyyah” in regard to the question of free will. Are the Muslims free in their actions, or is everything predestined by Allah? If the latter, do Muslims bear responsibility for what they do? The “jabriyyah” asserted that individuals could not be responsible for deeds because Allah (the All-Mighty God and Destiny for Muslims) guides people in this world and predetermines all that happens.

The “qadiriyyah”, in contrast, held that Allah gives believers a choice of actions within a certain range. By choosing within that range, individuals realize their free will. They will be either rewarded or punished on the Day of Judgement for the choices they make. This debate continues among Islamic scholar and theologians today, and it is quite relevant to the interpretation of the behavior of certain Muslim groups and to the ways in which Islam is used to mobilize people politically.

In 42 religious civil wars from 1940 to 2000, incumbent governments and rebels who identified with Islam were involved in 34 (81 percent), far more than those identifying with other religions, such as Christianity (21, or 50 percent) or Hinduism (7, or 16 percent). In addition, civil wars in which key actors identify as Islamic are more likely to escalate into
religious civil wars than civil wars in which key actors identify with other religions. From 1940 to 2000, there were 42 religious civil wars: in 25 of these, religion was a central issue; in 17 it was a peripheral issue.

The Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the era of the unfettered prince as sovereign and ushered in a progressively more secularized system of leadership. Princes no longer acted as agents of religious authority (or on an equal basis with regard to temporal authority), and they increasingly came to view religious authority as a resource. Much of the destructiveness of the Thirty Years’ War, especially in the early years, was wrought by the necessity of quartering troops in areas with accessible food supplies.

The process of foraging and counterforaging—as armies fought over the same lands season after season—soon left much of the European heartland incapable of supporting military operations (and eventually non-combatants). In addition, poor diet and constant movement made soldiers more susceptible to disease and more capable of spreading it. Europe was beset by plagues even more lethal than losses from starvation and combat.

Princes turned increasingly to mercenaries to supplement their military power, which led to a dramatic increase in the demand for cash to pay them. Princes found that to raise enough money to continue the fight, they had to bargain with merchants and bankers (i.e., their social subordinates). Such subordinates were thus positioned to advance their own agendas in exchange for funding the princes.

By the end of the Thirty Years War, mutual exhaustion and crossclass bargaining combined to make the previous century’s ideal of a religiously sanctioned, all-powerful prince nearly extinct (it survived only in Russia). As a result, emerging European states progressively abandoned the model of countries being ruled by God, save perhaps for the Russian Empire and the vestigial “state” of Vatican City in Rome.

The Islamic world, however, has not undergone a similar experience. The 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War is its only major internecine conflict, and horrific as this war was, it never approached the scale or intensity of the Thirty Years’ War. Like Christianity, Islam is a religion supported and constrained by holy texts. But unlike Christian polities, Islamic polities have not had sufficient incentives to separate religion and state.

The Civil War fulfils certain criteria, which are enumerated in six general criteria. First, the focus of the war was control over which group would govern, as each contender rejects the legitimacy of the claims of other contenders for control of the government. Second, there were at least two groups of organized combatants. This criterion therefore excludes spontaneous mob actions or riots, such as occurred during the Albanian pyramid scheme crisis in 1997.

Third, the state was one of the combatants. This excludes communal conflicts in which the government is not one of the warring parties. Fourth, there were at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average. This excludes other types of violence such as crime, riots, and smaller-scale insurgencies. It also excludes cases such as the fight for Northern Ireland (although the long-term costs of that conflict have been high).
Fifth, the ratio of total deaths was at least 95 to 5, meaning that the stronger side had to have suffered at least 5 percent of the total casualties. This criterion excludes massacres and genocides. Sixth, the war had to start within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state or entity. This excludes wars between two sovereign states. The total number of wars that qualified for inclusion in the data set was 133; therefore, 45 wars of this data set, 42 (32 percent) were religious civil wars.

The data show that whereas non-religious civil wars last on average 76 months, religious civil wars last 103 months, or about two years longer. The same holds true if one compares civil wars in which religion is central with all other civil wars; the former last on average 91 months and the latter about 76 months. These data reveal that civil wars in which religion is peripheral are the longest, lasting 119 months on average.

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