The Ambivalent Empire. Soviet Rule in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 1945-1964, PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2013

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The Ambivalent Empire

Soviet Rule in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 1945–1964

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Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
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Examining Board

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the functioning of Soviet rule in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic from 1945 to 1964. The thesis contributes to a growing body of literature on the late-Stalin and the Khrushchev periods and sheds light not only on the tremendous influence Soviet rule had on Uzbek society, but also on the changes and continuities that occurred between Soviet rule under Stalin and Khrushchev. It focuses on the effects of two fundamentally opposing forces that characterised Soviet rule in Uzbekistan: On the one hand, the Moscow leadership held a strong claim to power resulting in quasi-imperial practices to ensure the implementation of central government interests in the Uzbek Soviet republic. On the other hand, even during the Stalinist dictatorship, the Uzbek periphery was subject to a continuous integration into the Soviet Union through central government investment in all spheres of the country in the name of communism. *Ambivalent Empire* is meant to capture the essence of a state that disregarded imperial power and invested enormous forces to that very end, but paradoxically flanked anti-imperial policy with quasi-imperial practices in its pursuit of communist modernity.

This ambivalence of Soviet rule was accompanied by the condition of limited statehood, which is used as an analytical analytical concept to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms that directed the centre-periphery relations in the Soviet Union. Instead of understanding limited statehood as a sign of weakness of the Soviet state or as opposition to the Soviet project on side of the Uzbeks, the thesis explores the meanings and strengths of limited statehood in the implementation processes. Far from being a one-sided expression of low efficacy of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR, limited statehood was produced by the complex interplay between different forces that made it dysfunctional *and* functional to different actors at different times. As a consequence, the thesis provides a better understanding of the deeper functioning not only of the Soviet state but also of the forces holding it together.

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1. INTRODUCTION

"The collective farms that have 'patronage' (*shefstvo*) from regional and republican officials remain out of control, because leaders of regional, provincial, party, Soviet and agricultural organizations do not dare intervene and take control of their activities."[1] The atmosphere in the Uzbek Executive Bureau was tense when Sirodzh Nurutdinov, secretary for agricultural questions to the Uzbek Central Committee, presented his explanation for the limping cotton production in the collective farms in the Uzbek SSR in August 1950. The Uzbek political elite had been summoned to the headquarters of the Central Committee by devoted Stalinist S. D. Ignat'ev, who had been deployed to Tashkent in 1949 to improve the state of affairs in the Central Asian Soviet republic.[2] Ignat'ev was not pleased with his findings and had just concluded a sharp reprimand to the Uzbek Executive Bureau members, when Nurutdinov cautiously pointed to the obstructive character of networks existing within Uzbek society. "Take several rural party officials", Nurutdinov continued, "chairmen of collective farms etc., a great part of these leading cadres remains out of control, drops out of sight of the party…these chairmen frequently do not obey, make mistakes and often need be removed."[3]

Sirodzh Nurutdinov touched upon a central theme of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR and put into words what the political elite in both Moscow and Tashkent already knew: Soviet power suffered tremendously beyond the urban border of the major Uzbek cities. In the Uzbek party and state institutions, Soviet political leadership continuously discovered those whom it deemed unruly incumbents, who disregarded orders, pursued their own interests, engaged in misappropriation of funds or even propagating "anti-Soviet" attitudes. Moscow held a no less grim picture of the Uzbek population. Marked by suspicion, the political leadership in the Soviet capital was distrustful toward the (real) ambitions of the Uzbeks, their cultural "backwardness" and their degree of devotion to the Soviet state. Through the historical sources, the reports of Soviet officials on the Uzbek SSR, speaks not only the voice of a state that was suspect and annoyed by its political policies' limited effect on state and society in the Uzbek periphery. It is also the voice of an apparatus determined to fight the condition and uphold its claim to power.

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[1] RGASPI, 574, 1, 23, l. 40.

[2] When the Uzbek SSR, the Uzbek republic and Uzbekistan are used interchangeably it reflects the use by the historical actors at play. If not stated otherwise, all refer to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic according to the borders of 1929, after the Tajik ASSR was given the status of a proper Soviet Socialist Republic.

[3] RGASPI, 574, 1, 23, l. 40

The story unfolding on the following pages is one that tells the tale of a state, seeking ways to penetrate the Uzbek periphery and secure its power and interests under the condition of limited statehood.[4] The study focuses on the political relations between Moscow and Tashkent and how the Uzbek leadership implemented the Soviet rule. We begin our story in 1945 after the Soviet victory in the Second World War and end it with Nikita Khrushchev's political downfall in 1964. During these nearly twenty years, the relations Moscow and Tashkent were marked by considerable political tension. No less than five different individuals sat in the chair of the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, while an unprecedented eight chairmen held the highest office of the Council of Ministers. This meant more personnel exchanges than at any other point of the Soviet period, and the Moscow leadership was clearly vexed by the situation in the Uzbek periphery.

The post-1945 Soviet and Uzbek history was a tumultuous time that was characterised by two seminal events: World War II and the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Despite its geographic distance to the battlefields, World War II had left the Uzbek SSR in deep crisis. The post-war years were marked by a reconstruction not only of the production basis, but also of the state's control over society, both of which suffered severe setbacks during the war. Furthermore, Uzbekistan did not escape the repressions of the late-Stalin period that struck the political elite and the intelligentsia. The death of Joseph Stalin ushered in a new period in Soviet history. The relaxation of repression, de-Stalinisation and the Thaw altered the nature of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR.

It is against the background of these general developments of Soviet history that we analyse how the relations between Moscow and Tashkent evolved. The policies of both Stalin and Khrushchev toward the Uzbek SSR have often been done away with as erratic and illogical.[5] A closer examination of Stalinist and Khrushchevian rule in the Uzbek SSR, however, reveals quite a different picture. Stalin and Khrushchev both possessed very clear political rationales, but they focused their energy on retaining power and securing all-union interests, which were only partly congruent with republican interests.[6] And while Stalin employed the

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[4] I understand limited statehood as territories, policy areas and/or certain social target groups, within which or towards whom a state is (temporarily) unable to enforce binding rules and/or its monopoly on violence. This definition is leaning on the work of political scientiests: Thomas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl, "Governance in Räumen Begrenzter Staatlichkeit," *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte* no. 20–21 (2007): 3–5.

[5] Scholars largely agree, for example, on the political, economical and environmental irrationality of creating a cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan: James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan : a Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 61–77; Adeeb Khalid, *Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2007), 85–98.

[6] Stalin as a rational dictator: Paul Gregory, *Terror by Quota : State Security from Lenin to Stalin : (an Archival Study)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 1–32.

most vicious strategies to achieve it, Khrushchev was no less aiming for the same goals. Within a federal state structure, the production of such hierarchies between state and republican interests is neither surprising nor uncommon. Similarly, it is not unusual for a federal state that republican leadership is not always as compliant as the central government hopes for. More often than not, however, Stalin and Khrushchev, as well as the apparatus they spearheaded, saw in such discrepancies an obstacle to their effective claim for power and the mishandling of all-union interests in the Uzbek SSR.

Conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tashkent do not necessarily mean that Soviet rule in Uzbekistan is a story of Moscow repression and Uzbek resistance with a central apparatus forcing its policies upon the Uzbek leadership when required.[7] It is a simplification and an unjust denial of political rationale to present the Uzbek political leaders as mere puppets of Moscow.[8] Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR is thus a story of leaders on both all-union and republican levels seeking ways to best realise their individual political, economic and socio-economic agendas. Republican leaders were not merely "willing executioners", victims or faceless puppets of Moscow, but pursued their own goals that, at times, correlated with central leadership's visions and, at other times, did not.[9] Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR from 1945 to 1964 was a process characterised by the pursuit of political ambitions of both sets of leaders. Yet, neither Stalin nor Khrushchev questioned what they understood as their prerogative to decide matters to their benefit. The quest for the Uzbek leaders was to adapt to the central government, play along, pursue and – under Stalin, quite literally – keep their own interests alive.[10] It is well known that Khrushchev changed the face of the Soviet Union, but it was a

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[7] Ulrich Hofmeister, "Kolonialmacht Sowjetunion. Ein Rückblick Auf Den Fall Uzbekistan," *OSTEUROPA* 2006, no. 3 (2006): 69–95; Alexandre Bennigsen, "Colonization and Decolonization in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 1 (January 1969): 141–151; Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire : Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004); Baymirza Hayit, *Sowjetrussischer Kolonialismus Und Imperialismus in Turkestan* (Oosterhout, Netherlands, 1965).

[8] Kathleen Carlisle, for example, presents the Uzbek First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov as a "weakling" who was instrumentalised to fulfil central demands: Kathleen Bailey Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan" (PhD, Boston College, 2001), 301.

[9] "Willing executioners" is a term borrowed by David Goldhagen, describing the political attitudes of Hitler's supporters: Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (Vintage, 1997). On Uzbeks merely as victims of Soviet rule: Baymirza Hayit, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism," *Studies on the Soviet Union* 1, no. 2 (1961): 78–95. On Soviet decision-making and centre-local relations, pioneering: Jerry F Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, Russian Research Center Studies 58 (Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1969); E. A. Rees, ed., *Centre-local Relations in the Stalinist State, 1928-1941*, Studies in Russian and East European History And (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

[10] Vladimir A. Kozlov, "Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet Governance. From the Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1944-1953," in *Stalinism : New Directions. Re-writing Histories.* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999), 117–141. See also: Jörg Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde : Stalins Herrschaft der Gewalt* (Munich: Beck, C H, 2012), 265–266.

face-lift with consequences. His predecessor had created a system based on three essential pillars: A political order of a single-party dictatorship, the economic order of a non-market and, lastly, a system of mass state terror.[11] Be it for the sake of securing central interests or an affinity for violence, Stalin legitimised terror as a political practice to achieve his goals.[12] With the abolition of mass violence, Khrushchev was confronted with the task of ensuring all-union interests in the union republics in a manner he had never needed to rely on before. From a crude political standpoint, it is questionable if Khrushchev did himself a favour by loosening the reins of the Stalinist dictatorship. In Uzbekistan at least, his policies were met by objections and generated conflict between Moscow and Tashkent of a character that would have been inconceivable under Stalin. In fact, Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation campaign sparked a process where neither the republican leaders nor the Soviet population simply re-treated to a position of gratitude, but instead voiced and pursued interests more determinedly than during the period of late Stalinism.[13]

The situation in the Uzbek SSR was no different from that in other Soviet republics and this study's view toward Central Asia does not find its justification in the singularity of the Uzbek case.[14] The Uzbek leadership and the Uzbek population constituted an integral part of the Soviet Union, so that the analysis of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan sheds light on central features of the political challenges ruling a multiethnic and multicultural state entails. To be sure: Uzbek particularities influenced Soviet rule and generated certain idiosyncrasies to the devel-opment in Uzbekistan. The focus here however, is on the interests that guided Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR, in order to provide a better understanding of the deeper functioning not only of the Soviet state but also of the forces holding it together. Based analytically on the concept of limited statehood, the study asks how Soviet rule was implemented in the Uzbek SSR des-pite the clearly weak state and party structures so eloquently described above by S. Nurut-dinov. Thereby, the changes and continuities that Soviet rule underwent from 1945 to 1964 stand the centre of attention. We analyse how the Moscow central government as well as the Uzbek leadership pursued and implemented their interests, how these developed over time under altering political conditions and what political conflict they generated.

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[11] Amir Weiner, "Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: The Life Cycle of the Soviet Revolution, 1945-1968," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86, no. 2 (April 2008): 209.

[12] Stalin's lust for violence: Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde*.

[13] For a general view on the Soviet Union: *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 23 (London: Routledge, 2006).

[14] Analogous developments have been shown for the Armenian SSR: Maike Lehmann, *Eine sowjetische Nation: nationale Sozialismusinterpretationen in Armenien seit 1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011).

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The Ambivalence of Empire

The Soviet Union was not an empire in the traditional sense of the term. That conclusion must be drawn from the recent debate amongst historians on the Soviet Union and the empire question.[15] Gone are hasty definitions that relied too heavily upon a rigid totalitarian concept or saw in the Soviet Union a *nation killer*.[16] In their place has stepped an understanding that gives precedence to sensitive analyses of Soviet policies, the processes they released as well as their alteration over time. There is a certain commitment amongst empire theoreticians to include the Soviet Union into the family of empires, despite the difficulty of identifying a clear-cut analytical concept that would encompass all empires of human history.[17] Empire, generally seen as an entity of vast geographical size with a dominant centre of power, a populous of multiple ethnicities and cultures and a strong ideology, appears to describe well the Soviet Union.[18] In addition to these composite state elements, Ronald Suny defined the relationship between the central and the peripheral actors "as one of justifiable or unjustifiable inequity, subordination, and/or exploitation."[19]

Although the Soviet Union carried traits of an empire *par excellence*, it was also marked by characteristics that question this categorisation and make it an odd fit in the family of em-

[15] Participants include: Mark R. Beissinger, "The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11, no. 2 (April-June) (1995): 149– 184; Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out. Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," in *A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (New York/Mass., 2001), 23–66; D. C. B. Lieven, *Empire : the Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2001); Jörg Baberowski, "Stalinismus Und Nation: Die Sowjetunion Als Vielvölkerreich 1917-1953," *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft* 54, no. 3 (2006): 199–213; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History : Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[16] Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities.* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 133–134; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *De sovjetiske minoriteter (Orig. La Glorie des nations ou la fin de l'Empire soviétique, 1990)* (Cph.: Forum, 1991). The most comprehensive model of totalitarian states: Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). For a comprehensive discussion on totalitarianism in comparison between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union: Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York, N.Y: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[17] Mark Beissinger argued for the strength of a temporally adapted use of empire as a political concept, which should be "understood in the broad sense of large-scale system of foreign domination" in order to fit it into the large family of different empires throughout human history: Mark R. Beissinger, "Soviet Empire as 'Family Resemblance'," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 297. The debate on the Soviet Union as an empire is a branch of a larger debate aiming to decipher mechanisms of empire also as a present day occurrence heavily influenced by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[18] Lieven, *Empire : the Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, xi–xii; Jurgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus* (Munich: Beck, 1995), 21 and 63; Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out. Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," 26–27; Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 8.

[19] Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out. Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," 26.

pires. First of all, Lenin and the revolutionary guard were bent on creating the very anti-thesis to imperial suppression and exploitation and it is impossible to locate a clear and coherent Soviet imperial strategy over the entire course of the Soviet Union's existence.[20] Secondly, it is difficult to sustain an argument that the dominant populous of the centre (Russia) was tout court benefitting from its role as centre. This was not least due to the Soviet nationality policy that, thirdly, integrated and invested in the peripheral states to an unprecedented extent. On the political level, native cadres flocked into the state apparatus, a policy that differed substantially from the cooptation of elites as seen in other empires.[21] Creating an elite of indigenous representatives was a bold move, for surely its members had little interest in colonialism or imperialism.[22] Likewise, the sheer enormous economic investment in society and institutions are indications of state policies aimed not at dominating or exploiting as a foreign force, but at integrating and raising the natives of all Soviet ethnicities (including Russians) into a system of equals.[23]

The odd fit of the Soviet Union in the imperial paradigm is also expressed in the diverse temporal stages of Soviet rule. For although the Soviet Union carried little resemblance to traditional empires during some periods, it was quasi-imperial during others. The imperial thrust of Soviet rule was inseparably connected to different periods, different political interests and, not least, different rulers. In the Uzbek SSR, this was particularly outspoken: Soviet rule was ensured through a bitter struggle in Central Asia, which was followed by respect of relative cultural autonomy in the 1920s.[24] With the Cultural Revolution, Stalin's "revolution form above" and the installation of the Stalinist dictatorship, Soviet rule took imperial form.[25] By

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[20] The premise formed Lenin's book *Imperialism, the highest state of Capitalism*. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism : a Popular Outline* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965).

[21] Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*, 70–76.

[22] On Soviet power as colonialism: Hayit, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism"; Hofmeister, "Kolonialmacht Sowjetunion. Ein Rückblick Auf Den Fall Uzbekistan"; Northrop, *Veiled Empire : Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia*. It is worth reminding in addition that the affirmative action policy never subsided from Soviet politics, even under of Stalinism. Peter Blitstein, "Stalin's Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy Between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953" (PhD, Princeton University, 1998).

[23] Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 89. The enormous investment in the Soviet republics does indeed pose the biggest problem to the colonial empire paradigm and the Soviet Union. Belonging to the core features of colonial rule is the economic exploitation or gain from the periphery to the centre. In the Soviet case this did not add up as large subventions poured out of Moscow funds in the direction of the republics.

[24] On the revolutionary struggles in what was to become the Uzbek SSR: Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform Jadidism in Central Asia*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 27 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent : 1865-1923* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), chap. 7 and 8; Buttino, "Politics and Social Conflict During a Famine. Turkestan During a Revolution," in *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union*, n.d., 257–277.

[25] Stalinism as imperialism: Baberowski, "Stalinismus Und Nation: Die Sowjetunion Als Vielvölkerreich 1917-1953."

various means and through habitual campaigns, the centre ensured its control over Uzbek periphery. Rigid legislation and campaigns against the "backward" Muslim culture kept the population in check, while purges ensured compliance from the Uzbek political elite.[26] The imperial thrust and political repression subsided under Khrushchev, but he too implemented socio-cultural campaigns and political purges to ensure Moscow interests in the Uzbek SSR. It was only under Brezhnev that the cohesive forces of the centre reached a minimum, when the republics were largely left at peace as long as the all-union economic interests were secured.[27]

The decline in imperial thrust of Soviet rule was mirrored in the Uzbek responses to the Soviet crisis and implosion in 1991. It is an odd circumstance that of all the fifteen Soviet republics, Uzbekistan was one of the most reluctant to secede from the Soviet Union. In October 1990, the First Secretary Islam Karimov even announced that the Uzbek problems could "only be solved in the framework of a federation", before circumstances left him no other choice than to make a remarkable turn and join the choir demanding independence.[28] The public referendum on Uzbek secession, however, was only held after Russia's official separation from the Union in December 1991.[29] In other words, Karimov's position in 1991 makes us questions whether even an all-embracing loose analytical concept of empire based upon "foreign domination" is a sensible solution to describe Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR.

If we are to seek answers as to why the Soviet Union fits so awkwardly into the empire paradigm, we have to seek them in the anti-imperial strategy inherent to both Soviet ideology and political policy. Adeeb Khalid has argued against the adoption of the (pre-modern) empire paradigm, for as he pointed out, the key difference between traditional empires and the Soviet Union lay in the ideological premise inherent to the revolution: The Bolsheviks were concerned with the "*conquest* of difference" between rulers and ruled, while traditional empires

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[26] On collectivisation: D. A Alimova et al., eds., *Tragediia Sredneaziatskogo Kishlaka: Kollektivizatsiia, Raskulachivanie, Ssylka, 1929-1955 Gg.: Dokumenty I Materialy*, 1–3 vols. (Tashkent: Shark, 2006). On criminalisation of culture from the perspective of religion: Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.-Pr., 1974); Shoshana Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca. The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941* (Westport, Coon: Praeger, 2001); Northrop, *Veiled Empire : Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia*. Political purges in the Uzbek SSR: Rustambek Shamsutdinov, *Repressiia, 1937-1938 Gg : Dokumenty i Materialy* (Tashkent: Shark, 2005); Donald. S. Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)," *Central Asian Survey* 5, no. 3/4 (1986): 91–132.
[27] Political purges under Khrushchev: Jeremy Smith, "Leadership and Nationalism in the Soviet Republics, 1951-1959," in *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1956-64*, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilič (London: Routledge, 2011), 79–93; Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, chap. 4.
[28] Cited from: Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan*, 191.
[29] It is worth noting that two other Central Asian states were the very last to decide on secession, namely Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

"were based on the *perpetuation* of [this] difference"[30] and it is not least due to scholars' strong emphasis on (the evil) empire that this key feature long fell into oblivion. Instead, Khalid suggests we interpret Soviet state action in terms of a "modern polity, the activist, interventionist, mobilisational state that seeks to sculpt its citizenry in an ideal image."[31] While the role of communist ideology within the mobilisational conquest of difference is an unresolved question and dependent on specific contexts, there can be no doubt that the conquest was driven by political interests in power and regulation, which the Soviet Union pursued with unprecedented force and determination.[32] The young Soviet state's obsession with counting and categorising[33], the quest for order[34], so to speak, through state sponsored evolutionism[35], affirmative action[36] and Cultural Revolution[37] – these were socio-cultural experiments aiming at "bringing the natives up to a universal standard, to force them to overcome their own backwardness, to bring them into the orbit of politics."[38] The meaning and goals of upheavals in Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s are simply turned upside down if we limit ourselves to an empire analysis, even on the loose basis of foreign domination. Hence, although the path chosen differed substantially from the one European states long held up as the 'ideal type' of the modern condition, the Soviet Union nevertheless pursued objectives intimately tied to modernity.[39]

The emphasis on a modern mobilisational state as opposed to a pre-modern empire has nuanced our understanding of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the "mobilisational state" perspective too entails limitations. Already in 1920, Bertrand Russell recognised a deeply unmodern aspect of Bolshevism, for its devotion to ideology and its intolerance to other

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[30] Adeeb Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 232 and 238.
[31] Ibid., 232.
[32] On the importance of ideology: Michael David-Fox, "On the Primacy of Ideology: Soviet Revisionists and Holocaust Deniers (In Response to Martin Malia)," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5, no. 1 (2004): 81–105.
[33] Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities," *Russian Review* 59, no. 2 (April) (2000): 201–226.
[34] Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror. National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as Multiethnic Empires," in *Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180–227.
[35] Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations," 7–8.
[36] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
[37] Jörg Baberowski, *Der Feind Ist Überall. Stalinismus Im Kaukasus* (Munich: Deutsche Verl.-Anst., 2003), chap. 7.
[38] Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization," 233.
[39] Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities Vs. Neo-traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54, no. 4 (2006): 535–555. For a general discussion: Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question : Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 113–151.

world views "was a denial of the Enlightenment commitment to rational discourse."[40] The Soviet Union did, however, not only contradict elements considered inherent to the modern state on an ideological level. In fact, several aspects of Soviet policy were profoundly anti-modern: The restriction of civil society, the impingement on any sense of citizenship, the impediments to free communications, the restriction on individual freedom and free expression.[41] Furthermore, the overarching ideological goals of a communist modernity cannot explain the political practices implemented under a changing central leadership throughout the history of the Soviet Union. This aspect becomes most brutally evident in the study of Stalinism: The terroristic state that developed under Stalin cannot be understood except through close examination of the dictator himself as the driving force of the regime he ruled.[42] Similarly, Terry Martin has rightfully pointed out that more often than not, the ideological, modernist agenda was trumped by other policy interests on a day-to-day level, most commonly of security or economic concerns.[43] Although Martin limits his study to the pre-World War II period, these interest priorities remained constant also in the years 1954–1964.

The discrepancy between theory and practice in the Soviet Union has thus produced an ambivalence that neither the empire paradigm nor that of the mobilisational state fully resolve. In his work on integration of society, Edward Shils saw integration in its most abstract sense as "the articulation of expectation and performance."[44] Understood as a force, Shils held that integration was a product of coercion, payment, or consensus about moral standards, but contended that there are always some parts of society, which the centre cannot assimilate to the extent desired.[45] Thereby, integration can be understood as a coercive force, based upon one

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[40] Cited from: E. A. Rees, "Introduction. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe," in *New Perspectives on Sovietization in Central and Eastern Europe After the Second World War* (Washington D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2008), 10.

[41] Ibid. On the question whether or not the Soviet Union can be regarded a modern state, see also: David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities Vs. Neo-traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History." Stephen. Kotkin, "Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, no. 1 (2001): 111–164; Terry Martin, "Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism," in *Stalinism. New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York ; London: Routledge, 2000), 268–367; Baberowski, "Stalinismus Und Nation: Die Sowjetunion Als Vielvölkerreich 1917-1953."

[42] The most recent account underlining Stalin's role: Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde*.

[43] As an explanatory paradigm, Martin differs between soft- and hard-line policies and institutions, by which the hard-line overruled soft-line policies and institutions: Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 21–22.

[44] Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery : Essays in Macrosociology*, Selected Papers of Edward Shils ; 2. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), x.

[45] Ibid., xi. I understand centre as the party and governmental bodies that exercised power in deciding policy on the most important issues regarding the functioning of the state. By contrast, periphery is constituted by the republican administration but also the city, province and district level. I lean on: E. A. Rees, "Introduction," in *Centre-local Relations in the Stalinist State, 1928-1941*, Studies in Russian and East European History And (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 3.

or several simultaneous interests (for example, imperial, ideological, economic or dictatorial etc.), but the crux of the matter is that integration can never reach the level desired. This latter aspect of Shils's integration theory is better understood in terms of limited statehood, which, in its broadest scope, captures a state's inability to enforce rules that enjoy automatic obedience.[46] Limited statehood is not necessarily the property only of weak states where the monopoly on the use of force and territorial integrity is threatened. Indeed, limited statehood subsists even in what political scientists define as strong, highly developed democratic states with a strong state apparatus and high levels of consent from their populations.[47]

The analytical depth of limited statehood is not exhausted in the dichotomy of support versus resistance or weak state versus strong state, though. Rather degrees of limited statehood can vary considerably within a state structure and are best defined as realms, within which different interests are expressed, whereby their intensity can vary from manifestations of active rejection to mere private negligence. The strength of limited statehood as an analytical concept is its ability to shed light on the grey zone between a state's claim to power and its probability to enforce it.[48] As such, the concept captures a condition, in which the diverse interests of multiple actors find their expression in ways that are not by default directed against the rule of a state, but rather hamper the goal of the state's claim to power in their accumulative effect.[49] Moreover, it is not merely a characteristic of the modern state structure, nor the absence of it.

With regard to the centre-periphery relations in the Soviet Union, limited statehood is a powerful tool that allows overcoming the ambivalence between theory and practice. Scholars largely agree that the Soviet Union in the period 1945–1964 had a strong central state apparatus with a totalitarian claim to power that was challenged by weak institutional structures or,

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[46] Sonderforschungsbereich 700, ed., *Working Paper 8: Grundbegriffe Der Governanceforschung. SFB Working Papers Series* (Berlin: Sonderforschungsbereich 700, 2009), 9. The definition leans on Max Weber's definition of power and rule: Max Weber, "Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft. Grundriss Der Verstehenden Soziologie," *Textlog.de*, September 5, 2011, para. 16, http://www.textlog.de/7312.html. At the heart of Weber's definition lay G. Jellinek's definition of a state as an entity with a clearly delimited territory, a body politic and a state authority. Georg Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 2. Ed. (Berlin: O. Häring, 1905), 381–420.

[47] Risse and Lehmkuhl, "Governance in Räumen Begrenzter Staatlichkeit," 3–5. It need be stressed here that limited statehood carries a somewhat negative connotation. For the sake of clarity: I use it as a neutral analytical term, deprived of any normative value. For an overview of a vast discussion on 'weak' and 'strong' states on the example of early Soviet Russia: Gerald Easter, *Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge (a.o), 2000), 1–24. Instrumental: Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes De Sociologie* 25, no. 02 (1984): 185–213.

[48] Sonderforschungsbereich 700, *Working Paper 8*, 9.

[49] Risse and Lehmkuhl, "Governance in Räumen Begrenzter Staatlichkeit," 5.

better yet, limited statehood.[50] Moreover, one of the crucial properties of centre-periphery relations under Stalin and Khrushchev were the centre's constant attempts to integrate society further. Under the condition of limited statehood, however, the centre accumulated massive powers and implemented quasi-imperial measures, precisely because Soviet rulers were under the impression that their integrative campaigns were not bearing the desired success whether defined according to political, ideological, economic or dictatorial goals. Indeed, recurrent purges of the Uzbek party and state apparatuses as well as repressive campaigns toward the Uzbek population were tools of the central leadership to overcome interest conflicts in the integration of Uzbek society.

Unfortunately, features of limited statehood – such as bureaucratic deficiencies, (clandestine) power abuse by party and state representatives, corruption, the Uzbek population's continued religious observance or nationalist expressions – have been understood in much too rigid terms as Soviet rule's weak influence on Uzbek society or even as expressions of a growing opposition to the Soviet project.[51] In the present study, this argument is, in fact, turned upside-down and limited statehood is understood as one of the main reasons for the longevity of the Soviet Union. For while limited statehood was dysfunctional to certain integrative goals of the Soviet central leadership, it was often functional on the Uzbek level as a means to mobilise resources, satisfy central government and accommodate popular demands. Thereby, limited statehood had an institutional and a popular dimension. On the one hand, limited statehood existed within the structures of the political system of the Soviet Union and in the Uzbek SSR, which interfered with the execution of all-union and Uzbek interests. On the other hand, the popular dimension of limited statehood is better understood in terms of the state and party institutions' inefficacy to penetrate and integrate Uzbek society to the desired extent. The lack of effect of Soviet policies was not always simply a result of limited statehood within the Uzbek institutions with regard to all-union leaders' policies. In fact, the Uzbek authorities often encountered difficulties in achieving the desired results because the Uzbek population was not obedient to the policies of the Uzbek state and party institutions.

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[50] Graeme J. Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System*, Soviet and East European Studies 74 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jörg Baberowski, "Totale Herrschaft Im Staatsfernen Raum. Stalinismus Und Nationalsozialismus Im Vergleich," *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft* 57, no. 12 (2009): 1013–1028. The question over strong or weak institutional structures sparked a heated debate between the so-called totalitarianists and revisionists: The totalitarianists contended that a strong state apparatus kept the population in check by total control and murderous repression. The revisionists countered that it was the institutional weakness that led the regime to spark terroristic campaigns time and again. The best introduction to the totalitarian debate: Michael Geyer, "Introduction: After Totalitarianism - Stalinism and Nazism Compared," in *Beyond Totalitarianism - Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–41.
[51] Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan*.

The focus of the present study it to track down and interpret the interplay between core Soviet policy demands with regard to the Uzbek SSR and the condition of limited statehood that Soviet rule encountered. What policies directed Soviet rule in Uzbekistan from 1945 to 1964? What forms did limited statehood take? What practices did Moscow and Tashkent implement to overcome limited statehood and secure policy goals? Which conflicts emerged between the Soviet all-union and the Uzbek republican leadership? How did Uzbek society respond to Soviet policies? These are the questions that stand at the centre of attention. Thereby, the main concern is to diversify our understanding of Soviet rule by breaking free of the dichotomy of a repressive (imperial) Soviet centre against a resisting Uzbek periphery. *Ambivalent Empire* is thus meant capture the essence of a state that, on the one hand, disregarded imperial power and invested enormous forces to that very end, yet, on the other hand, paradoxically flanked anti-imperial policy with quasi-imperial practices in its pursuit of communist modernity.[52] The recurrent repressive practices were not only a feature of the Stalinist dictatorship. They surfaced whenever central leadership pushed for the deepening Soviet structures to overcome limited statehood. In fact, it was only with Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964 that the Soviet central government retreated from interventionist policies to overcome limited statehood and launched the most stable period of Soviet history.

Nation, Traditionalism and Modernism

When the Bolsheviks invented the Soviet nations in the 1920s, it was a counter-intuitive compromise between *realpolitik* and ideology in order to overcome Lenin's bête noire Great Russian chauvinism and ensure the support of the formerly repressed peoples of the Russian Empire.[53] The compromise was an ideological stretching that understood the nation as a necessary step on the developmental ladder toward communism which needed to be created in order to jump-start development in the "backward" Central Asian regions. In the Soviet teleological understanding of history, however, the nation remained a step to overcome, although it constituted a step forward on the developmental scale toward communism. The result was a Soviet "ethnophilia" that provided citizens of the Soviet Union with a nationality according

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[52] Mark Beissinger hints at this paradox, but insists on the use of empire for the Soviet Union: Beissinger, "Soviet Empire as 'Family Resemblance'," 302.

[53] Jeremy Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23*, Studies in Russia and East Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 172–212; Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 8.

to territorial-political and ethnocultural models.[54] Inherently based upon a primordial understanding of nations, the Soviet authorities adopted a position of "state-sponsored evolutionism" based upon the assumption that the state could intervene in the natural process of development and 'construct' nations.[55] The Soviet nationality policy thus generated what could be termed a Soviet paradox: The nationality policy promoted nations, national consciousness, national cultures, languages and histories in the hope of overcoming them, thus creating an *Empire of Nations*.[56]

The effects of Soviet nation-building efforts have long been heavily debated amongst scholars of Soviet Central Asia. Generally speaking, two powerful paradigms have developed, both of which emphasise a 'conflictual' centre-periphery relationship although they accentuate different reasons for this conflict. The first line of argument holds a primordial understanding of Uzbek society and contends that a specific socio-cultural traditionalism obstructed the Soviet modernising effort. Based on a primordial understanding of identity, it was particularly during the 1980s that scholars painted a bleak picture of socialism in the Uzbek periphery. The Soviet ethnographer Sergei Poliakov, for example, defined the cultural-religious heritage in terms of "traditionalism" that demanded "constant correction of life-style according to an ancient, primordial" model.[57] As a champion of Soviet modernising theory, Poliakov saw this "traditionalism" as a source of "an anti-Soviet background that [was] far from innocent."[58] It celebrated the time before the Soviet Union and the Central Asian Soviet intelligentsia never spoke "positively of the Soviet period", thus nurturing "traditionalism" from within the system.[59]

The primordial view of identity was not held only by Soviet researchers. In the midst of the debate over whether or not the nation is an expression of a primordial sense of belonging or a

[54] Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (1994): 414–452; Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*, Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 20–71; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed : Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 36–39.

[55] Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet Union*, Culture and Society After Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005), 8. Primordial means attachment ties of an ethnic group based upon a shared past, memories, traditions as well as a language and a common territory.

[56] Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*.

[57] Sergei Poliakov introduced the larger non-Soviet public through translating his book: Sergei P. Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia*, With an introduction by M. A. Olcott (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 4. On the dogmatic view on Islam within the humanities discipline of the Soviet Union up until the 1970s: Geoffrey Wheeler, "National and Religious Consciousness in Soviet Islam," in *Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power*, ed. Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher (New York: Published for the centre de recherches et d'étude des institutions religieuses by Praeger, 1969), 187–198.

[58] Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia*, 134.

[59] Ibid., 126.

socially constructed identity, the influential Russian émigré historian Alexandre Bennigsen clearly chose the former. As a consequence, Bennigsen saw a strict opposition between Central Asia and the Soviet project based upon suspicious identity patterns founded on an unbreakable sense of Muslim brotherhood. "The several "nations" of Central Asia", he argued in an influential article in 1979, "will have given way to one Muslim people" that were likely to subvert Soviet power and possibly give way to one Turkic state encompassing all of Central Asia.[60] Bennigsen's view has been reproduced in several forms, most commonly with regard to regional clan identities that have been understood as generating stronger ties than the (superficial) identities provided by the Soviet nation-building.[61] The traditionalist interpretation thus holds that the distinct socio-cultural context of Uzbek society generated a force that opposed and obstructed the impact of the Soviet experiment on Uzbek society.

Contesting the primordial identity scheme by Bennigsen, the second line of argument emphasises in modernist terms that the Soviet creation of nations did, in fact, succeed in generating a national identity, although it was largely artificially constructed.[62] In one of the most comprehensive studies on Uzbek nationalism, James Crichtlow argues that being Uzbek had become internalised through the efforts of the Soviet system.[63] Also building upon an argument that acknowledged the effects of Soviet rule, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone saw Soviet policy creating an legal orthodox and an 'illegal' unorthodox nationalism rise as a cause of

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[60] A. Bennigsen saw three levels of ethnic consciousness among Muslims in Central Asia: A sub-national, a supra-national and a national, the former of which were deeply rooted in the culture of the area. The national, on the other hand were created on the basis of the Soviet constructed nationalities. See: Alexandre Bennigsen, "Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness Among Soviet Central Asians," *Survey - A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* 24, no. 3 (1979): 64.

[61] Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 23–33; Demian Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan," in *Muslim Eurasia : Conflicting Legacies*, ed. Yaacov Ro'i, Cummings Center Series (London ; Portland Or.: F. Cass, 1995), 105–122; Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations*, Library of International Relations (Series) 15 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

[62] In the most extreme cases, modernists such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson saw nations and nationalism as imagined communities constructed by the elites of society. See: On the nation as construction: Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1964). Strongly opposing was Anthony Smith who contended that nations must be understood as building upon pre-existing popular sentiments that saw the ethnic nation as the family and locality writ large. See: Anthony D Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism : A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 130.

[63] Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan*, 14–15. See also Michael Rywkin who argued that "an educated Uzbek manager and party member may speak Russian, ride to work in an automobile, and dress in Western style; but this has no bearing on his national-religious feeling." Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge : Soviet Central Asia* (Armonk N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1982), 91. The list is long of studies that have emphasised the conflictual character between the Soviet and Uzbek identity. See for example: Paul Geiss, *Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien* (Frankfurt am Main ;;New York: P. Lang, 1995); Carrère d'Encausse, *De sovjetiske minoriteter (Orig. La Glorie des nations ou la fin de l'Empire soviétique, 1990)*; Roy, *The New Central Asia*; Douglas Northrop, "Nationalizing Backwardness. Gender, Empire, and Uzbek Identity," in *A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford, 2001), 191–220; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule," *Central Asian Survey* 2, no. 2 (1983): 7–88.

Soviet rule in Central Asia.[64] In similar veins, Donald Northrop views Soviet rule in Uzbekistan as a colonial experience and holds that the Soviet cultural revolutionary policy against the veil was the prime vehicle in generating the Uzbek nationalism. By framing the veil as a (backward) national symbol of the Uzbek ethnicity, Soviet rulers unintentionally provided the Uzbek population with a powerful symbol of self-understanding.[65] In contrast to the traditionalism paradigm, these scholars see the new Uzbek identity as a nationalism that was defined in opposition to a Soviet identity and Soviet rule.

Despite their different interpretations of the effects of Soviet integration projects, the traditionalist as well as the modernist paradigms produce an interpretation of centre-periphery in the Soviet Union defined by conflict. Moreover, they share the view that local Central Asian and Soviet identities were opposing one another, which harmed the Soviet cause. The implosion of the Soviet Union along the borders of the Soviet nations in 1991, ostensibly proved these interpretations right and they remain powerful explanatory models for our understanding of Central Asia under Soviet rule.

The binary understanding of opposition between Central Asian and Soviet identities has recently met increased critique from researchers. Despite the ongoing debate about what defines modernity, the one feature scholars widely agree on is its disruptive effect on tradition.[66] Marianne Kamp has thus rightfully suggested that we go beyond seeing such struggles in binary terms and adopt a multidimensional perspective. This allows for a more flexible analysis of the Soviet integration project and the multiple integrative and disintegrative processes enacted through Soviet rule.[67] This approach has been influenced by ethnologists and anthropologists that have emphasised the inner Uzbek conflicts that Soviet modernity[68] sparked, the merging identities and Soviet patriotism[69] and the changes in the religious-

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[64] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Pro* 23, no. 3 (1974): 1, 10 and 21.

[65] Northrop, *Veiled Empire : Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia*.

[66] Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform Jadidism in Central Asia*, 1.

[67] Marianne Ruth Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan. Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling Under Communism* (Seattle - London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 221. On the complexity of the driving forces and multiple processes of modernity in Russia and the Soviet Union: David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities Vs. Neotraditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History."

[68] Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan. Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling Under Communism*; Marianne Ruth Kamp, "The Wedding Feast: Living the New Uzbek Life in the 1930s," in *Everyday Life in Central Asia. Past and Present*, ed. Jeff Sahadeo and Russell Zanca (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2007), 103–115.

[69] Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, chap. 4. Adeeb Khalid has shown the multiple interests and the lack of a one common identity among the political revolutionary elite in Central Asia: Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform Jadidism in Central Asia*, 250. On the supranational Soviet identity: Timothy Johnston, *Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). In the course of European integration, political scientists have spent a great deal of energy on detecting to what extent a European identity is developing. In their efforts the "marble cake" has come into being

cultural setting.[70] Paul Geiss, for example, detected traditional and modern, ethnic and national, Central Asian and Turkestani, tribal and clan-related, Muslim and communist identities all present to a different extent in the Uzbek SSR.[71]

For the understanding of limited statehood in the Uzbek SSR, the sensitive approach to the processes elicited by Soviet rule is crucial. For instead of harping on the dichotomies Soviet versus Uzbek, modernity versus tradition and portraying the Uzbek SSR as a general entity hampering Soviet rule and creating limited statehood in all spheres of the political system and Uzbek society, we can better assert the multiple sources that produced limited statehood.

Soviet Rule and the Uzbek SSR

The historical actors that guide us through the history of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR from 1945 to 1964 are the members of the top-level Uzbek political leadership. In their position as political leaders of the Uzbek SSR, they were the representatives of the Uzbek populous as well as the executors of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR. For the Moscow leadership, they were thus the crucial entity for effective Soviet rule in the Uzbek periphery. On the one hand, we analyse how Moscow ensured their compliance in policy matters. On the other hand, we look at how the Uzbek leaders implemented these policies on the lower levels under the condition of limited statehood.

There has been a certain commitment by recent scholarship to view Uzbek politics as a local affair to which Moscow possessed no access. This is an interpretation primarily based on a reading of Uzbek politics along the lines of "clan politics."[72] Thereby, scholars emphasise Moscow's inability to penetrate the Uzbek political sphere due to prevalent "clan structures" that determined political behaviour in the Uzbek SSR. According to this branch of scholars, clans are defined as "an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive identities"; clans are strictly hierarchical entities attributing power and auth-

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to exemplify the intertwinement of different identities in a given individual. See: Thomas Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?," in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 251.

[70] Ewa A. Chylinski, "Ritualism of Family Life in Soviet Central Asia: The Sunnat (circumcision)," in *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*, ed. Shirin Akiner (London ; New York: Kegan Paul in association with Central Asia Research Forum School of Oriental and African Studies London; Distributed by Routledge Chapman & Hall, 1991), 161; Johan Rasanayagam, *Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: The Morality of Experience*, 1. publ (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011); Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory* (Curzon, 2001); Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Makarova, "Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post‑Soviet Uzbek City," *Central Asian Survey* 17, no. 4 (December) (1998): 579–596.

[71] Geiss, *Nationenwerdung in Mittelasien*, 159.

[72] Kathleen Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia* (Cambridge - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 102.

ority to kinship ties and deeply rooted in "tradition" such as values, beliefs and respect.[73] Following a primordial understanding of clans, "clan politics" thus created an informal regime in the Uzbek SSR, an arrangement of power and rules in which clans were the dominant social actors and political players. Their regional identities and kinship ties opposed the "superficial" Uzbek identity and directed their interests. In fact, "clan politics" denotes a political system that is transformed by clans: "Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real power."[74]

According to the champions of this clan-based paradigm, it was the Stalin's retreat from rapid modernisation and cultural revolutionary campaigns as well as relative calm following the Great Purges that established strong clan networks in the Uzbek SSR. The humble backgrounds and rural roots of the new Uzbek elite extended even into the highest political echelons and Moscow compromised ideological goals of revolutionary change in order to secure economic and security interests.[75] Instead of abolishing pre-modern political structures and overcoming limited statehood in institutional structures, the compromise with clans effectively cemented "clan politics" in Soviet Uzbekistan.[76]

It is undeniable that "clans" played an important role on the political level of the Uzbek SSR, but the clan-based paradigm underestimates Moscow's capacity and devotion to control affairs in the Uzbek SSR and over-emphasises clans' primordial ties. If we aim to understand how Soviet rule in the Uzbek periphery operated, we must look into the institutionalisation of politics and the patron-client relations, for these were the crucial factors in generating the centre-periphery relations and important instruments for Moscow to intervene with Uzbek politics.

First of all, the institutionalisation of centre-periphery relations changed the modality of rule in the Uzbek SSR. Centre-periphery relations were constitutionally ordered and institutionalised in a federal structure. The all-union executive and legislative bodies (Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers) were flanked by the all-union party Central Committee, all of

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[73] Kathleen Collins defines clan as "an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive in identities. These affective ties comprise the identity and bonds of its organization. Kinship ties are rooted in the extensive family organization that characterizes society in this region and in historically tribal societies. "Fictive kinship" ties go beyond blood ties and incorporate individuals into the network through marriage, family alliances, school ties, localism (*mestnichestvo*), and neighbourhood (*mahalla*) and village (*qishloq*)." Ibid., 17. See also: Gregory Gleason, "Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia," *Soviet Studies* 43, no. 4 (January 1, 1991): 618–620; Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 23–33.

[74] Collins, *Clan Politics*, 3; Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 271–277.

[75] Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 273–277; Roy, *The New Central Asia*, 106.

[76] Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 275; Roy, *The New Central Asia*, 106.

which included representatives from the union republics.[77] Despite the complex relationship between the party and the state bodies, in practice the party structure held a monopoly on power.[78] The all-union form of the single-party structure and the state institutions was replicated on the republican level and de jure the republics held sovereignty in party and government matters.[79] Nevertheless, both Stalin and Khrushchev were firm believers in what can be termed an all-union prerogative to disregard the federal principle and de facto interfere with republican policy and replace republican leaders at will.

Although the clan-based interpretation of centre-periphery relations downplays the importance of the institutional structure, it did fundamentally change the mode of political behaviour in the Uzbek SSR. Most importantly it systematised political decision making, which became traceable to central leadership and identified institutionally incumbents that Moscow could hold accountable for their actions. Nevertheless, these institutions were weak and several monitoring institutions were installed to ensure implementation of Moscow's will on the republican level. In the party and state apparatuses, secretaries and deputies from the centre were given prominent positions – as a rule the Second Secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee and at least one of the deputy chairs of the Uzbek Council of Ministers were Russian/European – and the republican Party Control Commission remained an influential checking mechanism despite voices claiming otherwise.[80] Furthermore, non-natives from the European territories of the Soviet Union were proportionally high represented in institutions on the republican and regional levels in the Uzbek SSR. Lastly, central leadership frequently installed trusted affiliates of the Moscow ruling circle in key positions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Uzbekistan in order to guarantee control and stability.

A second measure that Moscow leadership held to influence republican political matters, was a powerful informal patron-client relation that the clan-based reading of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan underestimates. Scholars largely agree that the patronage system in the Soviet Union was a result of the early Soviet period's "politico-administrative circumstances and the general conditions of life that encouraged everyone to rely heavily on personal connections and mutual favours for their daily bread, security and any luxuries that were going."[81] In order to

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[77] Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 362–408.

[78] Ibid., 409–410.

[79] Ibid., 480–517.

[80] J. Arch Getty, *Pragmatists and Puritans : the Rise and Fall of the Party Control Commission* (Pittsburgh PA: Center for Russian and East European Studies University of Pittsburgh, 1997).

[81] Thomas H. Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot, 1990), 69. See also: Easter, *Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet*

secure power and make writs run despite the low level of "infrastructural power" in the regions beyond immediate reach for the centre, central leaders vested authority in trusted individuals to control territorial administrations. This gave birth to a permeating patron-client network throughout the Soviet Union.[82] With the further consolidation of state structures, patronage arrangements remained a prominent feature of Soviet governance, but while facilitating mobilisation and implementation it simultaneously restrained institutionalised power of the state.[83] The outcome was contradictory: On the one hand, patronage cemented the institutional deficit. On the other hand, patron-client relations were strengthened for the very goal of overcoming this deficit.

The result was a reciprocal patron-client system based on mutual trust and loyalty. The patron supported and protected the client in political rivalries on the republican level. Meanwhile, the client ensured the implementation of central interests and supported his patron on the all-union level.[84] Despite this reciprocality of the patron-client alliances, the clients were in a considerably weaker position than the patron. Particularly evident during the despotic rule of Stalin, the republican leaders remained the less powerful entity of the mutual dependency between patron and client throughout the Soviet period. Clients were acquiesced and their loyalty ensured by placing them under severe pressure through (often unfeasible) economic and production targets. In lack of a "rational-legal" bureaucracy with binding rules and norms providing security of incumbents, the fate of the client was decided upon according the goodwill of the patron, the performance and the fulfilment of expectations and not according to contravention and breach of rules.[85]

Russia, 1–24; John P Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–41; Andreas Oberender, "Die Partei Der Patrone Und Klienten. Formen Personaler Herrschaft Unter Leonid Brežnev," in *Vernetzte Improvisationen : Gesellschaftliche Subsysteme in Ostmitteleuropa Und in Der DDR*, ed. Annette Schuhmann (Köln: Böhlau, 2008), 57–76; T. H. Rigby, "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin," *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 1, 1981): 3–28. I lean on Eisenstadt/Roniger and understand the patron-client relation as based upon an asymmetrical, reciprocal relation of informal nature. The patron holds a favourable position based on material or immaterial resources which allows him to dispense goods or power to a client who, in turn, awards the patron loyalty and support: S. N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 1 (January 1, 1980): 42–77.

[82] Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State"; Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR*, 1–5; Easter, *Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia*, 13–16.

[83] Easter, *Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia*, 15–16.

[84] Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System*, 314–316.

[85] The term "rational-legal" is from Gorlizki/Khlevniuk: Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace. Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (New York (a.o.): Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 9–10. See also: Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev*, 69; Oberender, "Die Partei Der Patrone Und Klienten. Formen Personaler Herrschaft Unter Leonid Brežnev," 57–61; Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR*, 1–5.

The importance of personal relations between the patron and client was an important lever in the constitution of Soviet centre-periphery relations. First of all, the central leaders personally knew the people they were promoting to the republican leadership positions. Secondly, the promotions were guided by economic and security interests, but the devotion to ideology and the change of the political system did not subside. Thirdly, the relations between the patron and the clients allowed central leaders to personally judge and hold accountable the clients they promoted.[86]

These elements had severe influence on the nature of the Uzbek elite. The historically most explicit example of a client exchange were Stalin's Great Purges when he replaced his early client basis with a younger Soviet generation of cadres.[87] After the revolution, Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR had been established by the support of groupings seeking to reform the existing societies. The Muslim reform movement, the Jadids, the Young Bukharans – these were groups with intimate ties to the traditional clan elite of Central Asia that fought for revolution and reform in Central Asia. Faizulla Khodzhaev, who became the first president of the Uzbek SSR, for example, was son of one of the wealthiest merchants of Bukhara.[88] The Bolshevik–Jadid coalition was a compromise that ensured Soviet rule in Central Asia in the light of a bitter civil war struggle.

The Great Purges removed the coalition partners of the early Soviet period and installed the *vydvizhentsy* generation (Khodzhaev and First Secretary Akmal Ikramov were both executed after the Moscow show trials).[89] As a consequence, power was relocated from established authorities in the Uzbek SSR to the "class of '38"[90], that more than anything else was a product of the Soviet integration projects. Its members had risen through Soviet institutions ever since their adolescent years, obtained a Soviet education and profited from the "indigenisation" (*korenizatsiia*) policy that positively discriminated native cadres into party and state positions.[91] The majority of these beneficiaries of the affirmative action policy were of humble backgrounds and owed their upward mobility, new status and vast resources entirely to

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[86] Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR*, 1–5.

[87] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939," *Slavic Review* 38, no. 3 (1979): 377–402.

[88] R. D. Kangas, "Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896-1938" (Indiana University,, 1992); Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform Jadidism in Central Asia*.

[89] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror : a Reassessment* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 356–357. On the promotion of the new younger Soviet elite – the *vydvizhentsy* generation: Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939."

[90] Carlisle coins the *vydvyshentsy* generation "class of '38": Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)," 100.

[91] Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, chap. 4.

the new regime.[92] These influences had severe impact on the cadres and despite (or maybe because of) their humble background and rural roots they were quite willingly pursuing an *Uzbek* communist modernity.

The new clients were promoted according to different principles than the previous Uzbek elite. Communist Party membership, merits in the Communist Youth League (komsomol), education, active participation in workers' soviets, trade unions or the primary level party institutions were crucial for the advance in the Soviet hierarchy.[93] Furthermore, patronage relations, trust, submissiveness and merits within the Soviet structures became decisive for the support and promotion of clients, not clan affiliation.[94]

The institutionalisation of politics, the all-union prerogative and the patron-client relations were crucial for the centre-periphery relations as it gave Moscow important levers to intervene with Uzbek politics. Nevertheless, this did not result in the eradication of clans, but it did change their nature. Adeeb Khalid has powerfully argued that the "clan" networks existing in the Uzbek SSR became more complex with the further consolidation of Soviet rule than the term "clan politics" suggests. Instead of rooting them in primordial patterns of behaviour, he views them as the product of "a rational and logical calculus of people confronted with the brutal, impersonal machinery of a modern state and an economy of distribution."[95] As a consequence, these groups were networks of mutual obligation based on kinship (real or fictive) or common places of origin and formed large regional entities.[96]

Given the character of the centre-periphery relations described above, Moscow vested enormous power and responsibility in the First Secretaries. In their function as national leaders in the Soviet integration of society, their interests were guided by very real Uzbek *and* regional economic and political goals. Indeed, they had to be because the allocation of resources from Moscow was tied to regions only through the prism of the Uzbek SSR and it made the republican secretaries dispensers of vast resources on the republican level. With these resources at hand and facilitated by the Soviet shortage economy and scarce resources, party secretaries

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[92] Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 80.
[93] For the educational development of the political elite: N. T Bezrukova, *Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Turkestana i Uzbekistana v Tsifrakh, 1918-1967 Gg.* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1968). A insightful study on the constitution of the Tajik elite: Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia : the Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore : London: Johns Hopkins press, 1970), chap. 5.
[94] On clan affiliation as decisive in promotion: Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)." On trust and submissiveness: Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev*, 69; Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde*, 265–266.
[95] Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 90.
[96] Ibid., 89.

created vast patronage networks in order to secure their own power.[97] Given the relative low urbanisation rates in the Uzbek SSR and strong regional identities, these networks certainly carried geopolitical elements.[98] The party secretaries secured their power through the support of a regional base, which in turn supplied cadres for the network that could dispense resources to the lower levels of society.[99] These networks included kinship relations, but they did indeed encompass much wider circles that included friends, colleagues and friends of friends, the ties with whom were established and deepened through the institutional upbringing of cadres, patronage, friendship, trust and compliance.[100] As a consequence, they are better understood as political clans or political networks.[101]

The political clans permeated all levels of Uzbek institutions down to the primary levels. As S. Nurutdinov eloquently articulated in 1950, however, the patronage networks often turned unmanageable further down the local hierarchy, i.e. to some extent on the province (*oblast''*), but most certainly on the district (*raion*), city and collective farm (*kolkhoz*) level.[102] On these very local levels, kinship is sure to have played a larger role than in the higher echelons of Uzbek politics.[103] Just as during the early Soviet period, these networks helped people "getting by" in everyday life that was hardened by the shortage economy and a dysfunctional bureaucracy.[104] Unfortunately, it remains impossible to determine with certainty who or what cause these lower level cadres within the Soviet apparatus in Uzbekistan answered to

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[97] Collins, *Clan Politics*, 30; Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 87. James Critchlow argued that these networks were established because "rank-and-file looked instinctively for leadership to a chieftain and his council of elders." Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan*, 19. Michael Rywkin takes a similar stand but argues that it was the limited knowledge of communism and the desire for power that it was due to an indifference to dogma, opportunism and nationalist feelings that resulted in the dysfunction of the system: Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 114.

[98] Carlisle, "Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan," 109–110; Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 92–93.

[99] Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)"; Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan." See also: Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 120.

[100] Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev*, 69; Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde*, 265; Khalid, *Islam After Communism*, 89.

[101] When I speak of "clans" throughout this study, it is this definition I bear in mind.

[102] RGASPI, 574, 1, 23, l. 40.

[103] Collins, *Clan Politics*, 85–102.

[104] For a general account: Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More : the Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). For everyday life, "bricolage" and "*blat*" under Stalin see also: Johnston, *Being Soviet*; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism : Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times : Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). On similar networks in the Eastern bloc countries: Klaus Roth, "Trust, Networks and Social Capital in the Transformation Countries. Ethnological Perspectives," in *Soziale Netzwerke und soziales Vertrauen in den Transformationsländern: ethnologische und soziologische Untersuchungen*, ed. Klaus Roth (Wien; Zürich; Berlin, 2007), 7–20. On Russia: Vjacheslav Popkov, "Werden soziale Netzwerke transformiert? Informelle Beziehungen im sozialistischen und postsozialistischen Russland," in *Soziale Netzwerke und soziales Vertrauen in den Transformationsländern : ethnologische und soziologische Untersuchungen*, ed. Klaus Roth (Wien; Zürich; Berlin: Lit, 2007), 239–248.

(whether Moscow, Tashkent, regional kinship structures, cultural or national belonging, personal economic needs etc.), but they were unlikely to have been guided by one sole factor.

The most influential regional networks in the Uzbek SSR were constituted by Tashkent, Fergana region and Samarkand/Bukhara. There were different reasons for these geopolitical constellations. First, the absence of a national structure before the Soviet nationality policy had generated regional identities. The Uzbek SSR was puzzled together on the basis of the pre-revolutionary century-old Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva and Kokand Khanate, territorial pieces of which were divided between the new Central Asian Soviet republics.[105] Second, there was an ethnic divide between Samarkand/Bukhara (predominantly Tajik) and Tashkent (predominantly Uzbek). Fergana region stands out as a highly mixed area with Uzbek, Kirgiz and Tajiks living together and party in enclaves within different republics.[106] Third, the capital Tashkent was most heavily urbanised compared to Fergana and Samarkand/Bukhara, while Fergana was the most valuable agricultural region. Lastly, Samarkand had a strong identity due to its history as the centre of Central Asia and adding to the feud with Tashkent, Samarkand had been the capital till 1930, when it was decided to move it to the predominantly Uzbek Tashkent instead.[107]

Compared to the remaining regions of the Uzbek SSR, these were ones with the most important political clans. Their everyday dealings and functioning are difficult to decipher. Scholars suggest they included heavy bargaining over resources, equal distribution of power or pacts to retain power.[108] Others see marriage unions between clan members as a way to appease internal feuds and accumulate power on the republican level.[109] Given their informal character, these struggles were never codified. As a consequence, we can only infer their presence by personnel exchanges amongst the top-level of Uzbek leadership.

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[105] The Bukhara Emirate was divided between the Uzbek, the Turkmen and the Tajik SSRs; the Khiva Khanate between the Uzbek, the Turkmen and the Kazakh SSRs; the Kokand Khanate between the Uzbek, the Kirgiz, the Kazakh and the Tajik SSRs. See: Donald S. Carlisle, "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and Its Neighbours," in *Muslim Eurasia : Conflicting Legacies*, ed. Yaacov Ro'i, Cummings Center Series (London ; Portland Or.: F. Cass, 1995), 71–103; Gero Fedtke, "Wie Aus Bucharern Usbeken Und Tadschiken Wurden: Sowjetische Nationalitatenpolitik Im Lichte Einer Persönlichen Rivalitat," *Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft* 54, no. 3 (2006): 214–231. See also: Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan"; Edward A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present. A Cultural History*, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR, 373 (Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 1–63 and 173–209.
[106] Carlisle, "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and Its Neighbours," 97–98.
[107] Fedtke, "Wie Aus Bucharern Usbeken Und Tadschiken Wurden"; Carlisle, "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and Its Neighbours."
[108] Collins, *Clan Politics*; Kathleen. Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002): 137–152.
[109] Maksim Olenev, "Rody i Klany Srednei Azii: 'Karimovy, Rakhmonovy, Niiazovy'," n.d., http://www.ariana.su/?S=8.0612010038; Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan."

For the understanding of centre-periphery relations, these informal struggles on the Uzbek level are of limited importance. As one scholar rightfully noted, the Soviet leadership's influence on the Uzbek political arena was so powerful that a political clan had "no incentive to pact with other clans", when it enjoyed Soviet backing.[110] In other words, if we aim to understand the constitutional pillars of centre-periphery relations between the Soviet and the Uzbek political leadership and the effect it had on different spheres of the Uzbek SSR, we must uncover what Soviet backing there was and how Uzbek leaders used it on the republican level.

In 1995, the long-time Uzbek politician Nuritdin Mukhitdinov recalled how Stalinism had deprived the Soviet republics of their rights. "If the union were to survive", he noted, - "politics had to strike a balance between the interests of the republic and of the union."[111] The study of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR from 1945 to 1964 is in many ways guided by the question how the Uzbek leadership attempted to achieve the balance of interests between Moscow and Tashkent. Formulated loosely around the notion of integration of society, we look into the complex effects the Soviet rule had on politics and society in the Uzbek SSR. The above described actors, interests and political practices form the red thread along which we navigate in order to shed light on the multiple forms of limited statehood in the Uzbek SSR.

Structure

A chronological structure of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR shapes the story evolving on the following pages. I draw attention to a number of key events, where the centre of power combated limited statehood in the Uzbek SSR with the aim of deepening its power and maximising its control. Broadly speaking, chapters two through four cover the late-Stalin period while chapters five through seven sharpen our picture of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR under Khrushchev.

Chapter two serves as a background section. The institutional setting and the historical actors are introduced and we look into the configuration of the Uzbek political elites. Furthermore, the section sheds light on Soviet rule in Uzbekistan during the Second World War, as it was the main cause of the multifaceted limited statehood that central leaders sought to overcome during the late-Stalinist period. Following this, in chapter three, is an analysis of the immedi-

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[110] Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia," 144.
[111] Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, *Reka Vremeni. Ot Stalina Do Gorbacheva. Vospominaniia* (Moskva: Rusti - Rosti, 1995), 189.

ate post-war conditions in the Uzbek SSR and the Uzbek leadership's struggle to overcome the legacy of war. In a second step, we analyse how the escalating political climate influenced affairs in the Uzbek SSR. Thereby, we follow the rising pressure from the Moscow central leadership on the Uzbek leaders. Furthermore, we analyse how the increased pressure resulted in a party purge and how the campaigns against the intelligentsia of the late Stalin years merged with long-standing Soviet policies in Central Asia related to "feudal-bai backwardness".

Overlapping on the temporal scale with the chapter three, chapter four takes a somewhat different angle and analyses the pursuit of economic interests within the area of cotton production. Having crumbled during the war, Soviet central authorities as well as the Uzbek leadership fought to reinstall their power over the rural regions and optimise economic output. As a consequence, a centralisation of power followed suit, which in turn released republican unrest due to the deprivation of power over former core republican political areas.

Chapter five sheds light on the deeper functioning of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation of the Uzbek political scene, while simultaneously analysing Uzbek responses to the new course. With the change of leaders in Moscow followed a leadership exchange in Uzbekistan and we gain a closer look at the political concerns driving the policy interests in Uzbekistan. Central Asia experienced an overall upgrade under Khrushchev's tutelage and chapter five also deepens our understanding of how the new republican leadership explored the limits of de-Stalinisation. Chapters six looks at the political changes that followed from leadership exchange in the Uzbek SSR as well as at how de-Stalinisation changed socio-cultural policies. We look at religious identity, conflicts over women's rights and analyse the political tensions they resulted in. Meanwhile, chapter seven centres on de-centralisation and re-centralisation of the Khrushchev administration within the political sphere. The *sovnarkhoz* reform, the new party programme and the party reform of 1962 stand at the centre of interest and we backtrack how the Uzbek political elite reacted to and benefitted from them. Furthermore, chapter seven examines how the new Uzbek leadership consolidated its rule by instrumentalising the central government policies for its own gain.